Rushing v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.

1. Measure of Damages — Evidence—Earning Capacity. In an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by defendant’s negligence, testimony tending to show the decreased earning capacity of plaintiff since the injury, is competent, and he may be asked whht wages he received before and since the time thereof. 2. Contributory Negligence — Evidence—Safe Appliances. When there is evidence tending to show that plaintiff was injured while in defendant’s employment, by a log falling on him which he was carrying at the time, caused by defendant’s negligent orders and negligent failure to furnish proper tools for the purpose, it is competent, to negative contributory negligence, to ask the plaintiff if he caused the log to fall on himself. 3. Negligence — Evidence Conflicting — Question for Jury — Nonsuit. A motion as of nonsuit upon the evidence should be denied, in an action to recover damages alleged to. have arisen from defendant’s negligence, when the testimony tends to show that the injury was caused by an improper order of a vice principal, given ’ to plaintiff in the course of his employment, and that the plaintiff was not negligent in doing the work. 4. Contributory Negligence — Evidence—Safe Appliances — Assumption of Risks. The employer, a railroad company, owes a duty to the employee, to furnish safe and suitable tools and appliances for work to be done by him, and the employee does not assume the risk of doing the work without them unless the act was obviously so dan-' gerous that, in its careful performance, the inherent probabilities of injury were greater than those of safety. 5. Same — Proximate Cause. When the injury complained of was the failure of the railroad to furnish certain implements, called “lug hooks,” for moving heavy timber, which plaintiff was employed to help move, it is-proper for the trial Judge to instruct the jury that, if they should find, by the greater weight of the evidence, that for such service “lug hooks” were usually used by railroads for the work, it was the duty of the railroad to have furnished them; that if they further found, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the character of the work was such that a man of ordinary prudence would be led to see that their use were safer, the failure to provide them would be negligence, which, if the proximate cause, would render defendant liable. 6. Negligence — Master and Servant — Fellow Servants. A negligent and careless act of a fellow servant in throwing down the end of a log which the plaintiff, in the scope of his employment, was helping to carry, will render the employer (a railroad company) liable in damages, if the proximate cause of an injury to the plaintiff. 7. Pleadings; — Connected Meaning — Evidence—Admissions. • When a part of a paragraph of a pleading offered in evidence is so connected with the other part not offered that the whole is necessary to give a connected meaning, it is incompetent. 1. Measure of Damages — Past and Prospective — Permanent Injury —Evidence. Upon an issue addressed to the quantum of damages, in an action for personal injuries, it is error to charge the jury that the inquiry could not extend to the future, but should be limited to damages sustained in the past, thus basing the charge solely upon 'the testimony. of a physician that the injuries were not • ’of a permanent character, when there is other evidence tending ■to show that the injuries were of a permanent character. 2. Same. .As a measure of damages for personal injuries, negligently-inflicted, the injured party is entitled to recover for past and prospective loss resulting from the wrongful act, including ■ indemnity for actual expense incurred in nursing, medical attention, loss of time, loss from inability to perform mental or physical labor, incapacity to earn money, and for actual suffering of mind and body, when they are the immediate and necessary consequences of the negligent injury. 3. Appeal and Error — Issues, New Trial as to Some — Discretion of Supreme Court. It is within the discretion of the Supreme Court to grant a new trial upon one or more issues, and let the others stand, when it clearly appears that the matters involved are entirely separate aiid distinct from the matters involved in the other issues, and that a new trial can be had without danger of complications with other matters; especially so when both sides appeal in an action for damages for personal injuries sustained, and error is found only in the plaintiff’s appeal upon the measure of damages.

Defendant’s Appeal. ActioN tried before Jones, J., and a jury, June Term, 1908, of ANSON. Both sides appealed. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.