Morgan v. Hood ex rel. Page Trust Co.

ConNOR, J.

At the bearing of appellant’s motion that the judgment rendered in this action at the January Term, 1936, of the Superior Court of Hoke County, and purporting on its face to be a judgment by consent of the plaintiffs and of the defendants D. J. Dalton, Jr., and Nola B. Dalton, be vacated and set aside on the ground that appellant did not consent to said judgment, the court did not find that the attorney who was employed by the defendant D. J. Dalton, Jr., to represent himself and the appellant jointly, as authorized by her, compromised the matters involved in the action and consented to the judgment in her behalf, solely by reason of bis employment as her attorney. The court *93 found that the defendant D. J. Dalton, Jr., compromised the action and consented to the judgment in behalf of the appellant, as her agent, and that for that reason appellant is bound by the judgment.

It is well settled that an attorney-at-law has no authority to compromise his client’s case, or to consent to a judgment which will be binding-on his client, founded upon such compromise, unless he had been specially authorized so to do by his client. Such authority will not be presumed from his employment, and a judgment by consent of the attorney founded upon a compromise made by him, without such authority, will ordinarily be vacated and set aside on motion of the client made in apt time. See Bank v. Trotter, 207 N. C., 442 , 177 S. E., 325 ;

Chavis v. Brown, 174 N. C., 122 , 93 S. E., 471 ;

Bank v. McEwen, 160 N. C., 414 , 76 S. E., 222 ;

Morris v. Grier, 76 N. C., 410 ;

Moye v. Cogdell, 69 N. C., 93 . In the last cited ease, it is held that authority to compromise a case, and to consent to a judgment founded on such compromise, cannot be conferred upon an attorney by an agent who was authorized by his principal to employ an attorney. In that case a compromise made by an attorney as authorized by the agent was set aside on motion of the principal. She had not consented to the compromise and was therefore not bound by its terms.

The finding by the court in the instant case, that the defendant D. J. Dalton, Jr., was authorized by the appellant to employ an attorney-at-law to represent her in the action, does not support the conclusion by the court that the said D. J. Dalton, Jr., had authority to agree to a termination of the action by compromise or otherwise.

In view of the finding by the court that appellant did not consent to the compromise and to the judgment, there is error in the judgment denying her motion which was made in apt time. The judgment is Reversed.