Barbee v. Lamb

Barnhill, J.

It sufficiently appears on the face of the further answer that the agreement of rental was an oral understanding. The contemplated occupancy was for an indeterminate period — so long as the defendant and his family would live thereon. No annual rental was reserved. The landlord conveyed the premises. Hence the facts admitted by the demurrer are insufficient to constitute a valid defense or to defeat plaintiffs’ present right to the premises.

A parol lease agreement for more than three years is void. G. S., 22-2;

Mauney v. Norvell, 179 N. C., 628 , 103 S. E., 372 .

One who enters into possession of premises under a void lease or under an agreement which is for an indefinite and uncertain term, Barnes v. Saleeby, 177 N. C., 256 , 98 S. E., 708 ;

Rental Co. v. Justice, 212 N. C., 523 , 193 S. E., 817 ;

Sappenfield v. Goodman, 215 N. C., 417 , 2 S. E. (2d), 13 , or for so long as the tenant may wish to occupy the premises, Mhoon v. Drizzle, 14 N. C., 414 , becomes a tenant at will.

Some authorities hold that if such agreement provides for the payment of an annual rental and the landlord accepts payment on an annual basis, it is converted into a lease from year to year. But those authorities are not in point for no rental was reserved or accepted. Instead, the agree *213 ment expressly provides that the defendant is to occupy “free of rent and taxes.”

Tenancy at will may be terminated at any time by either party to the agreement.

Mhoon v. Drizzle, supra,; Mauney v. Norvell, supra; Rental Co. v. Justice. supra; Simons v. Lebrun, 219 N. C., 42 , 12 S. E. (2d), 644 .

When it is terminable at the will of one party, it is terminable at the will of the other also.

Mhoon v. Drizzle, supra; Sappenfield v. Goodman, supra.

And it is terminable instanter by demand for possession, Love v. Edmonston, 23 N. C., 152 ;

Howell v. Howell, 29 N. C., 491 ;

Mauney v. Norvell, supra, 32 Am. Jur., 83 , or by a conveyance of the property by the landlord.

Howell v. Howell, supra;

Anno. 120 A. L. R., 1008.

That plaintiffs knew, or by reasonable inquiry could have ascertained, that defendant was in possession is immaterial for, to affect the purchasers with notice, a lease for a term exceeding three years in duration must be in writing and registered in the proper county.

Mauney v. Norvell, supra.

The defendant does not claim ownership of the premises. He acknowledges his status as a tenant under agreement with the true owner. Hence his open, notorious, exclusive possession as such would not avail him either as notice to plaintiffs or as a source of title superior to that of the plaintiffs.

The agreement under which defendant occupies the premises is insufficient to create a trust estate or other equitable interest.

Frey v. Ramsour, 66 N. C., 466 ;

Wood v. Cherry, 73 N. C., 110 ;

Cobb v. Edwards, 117 N. C., 245 . Indeed it is not so alleged. See Grimes v. Guion, 220 N. C., 676 , 18 S. E. (2d), 170 .

It follows that there was no error in the judgment sustaining the demurrer and adjudging, under the stipulation of record, that the plaintiffs are the owners and entitled to the immediate possession of the land in controversy. It must be Affirmed.