State v. Morrison

Stacy, O. J.

The following excerpt taken from the charge forms the basis of one of the defendant’s exceptive assignments of error:

*805 “Tbe court tells you that, receiving stolen goods, knowing them to bave been stolen, means exactly wbat tbe language implies; taking into one’s possession tbe goods, wares, and chattels of another, knowing at tbe time of such taking that tbe goods were stolen, or under such circumstances as would put a reasonably prudent man on notice that such goods are stolen.”

It will be observed tbe indictment charges tbe defendant with “feloni-ously” receiving stolen goods, knowing them to bave been feloniously stolen or taken, and be has been “punished as one convicted of larceny.” C. S., 4250. Thus, it would seem, under tbe indictment as drawn, tbe intent with which tbe defendant received tbe stolen goods, knowing at tbe time that they bad been feloniously stolen or taken, was inadequately submitted to tbe jury.

S. v. Caveness, 78 N. C., 484 ;

S. v. Rushing, 69 N. C., 29 ;

S. v. Dail, 191 N. C., 231 , 131 S. E., 573 ;

S. v. Bethel, 97 N. C., 459 , 1 S. E., 551 ;

S. v. Eunice, 194 N. C., 409 , 139 S. E., 774 .

Personal-profit motive is not essential. It was said in 8. v. Bushing, supra, that intent to aid tbe thief, with tbe other elements present, would render tbe receiver guilty. But, of course, one who receives stolen goods for a lawful purpose, i.e., an officer making arrest, incurs no criminal responsibility by taking such goods into bis possession. Tbe law does not condemn where tbe heart is free from guilt.

Tbe indictment is under C. S., 4250, and not under C. S., 4251. It is provided in tbe latter statute that if tbe value of tbe stolen property be in doubt, “tbe jury shall, in tbe verdict, fix tbe value of tbe property stolen.”

S. v. Spain, 201 N. C., 571 , 160 S. E., 825 .

For tbe error as indicated, tbe defendant is entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered.

New trial.