Woodley v. Gilliam

Bodman, J.

The question whether an action to recover the possession of land, is a civil action, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Act of 186S-’69, ch.. 76, p. 189, so as to require the summons to be returned in term time, — or, is a special proceeding, as distinguished from what is termed in the Code a civil action, so that the summons may be returnable before the Clerk at any time, is decided in Tate v. Powe, ante 644. Personally, I do not quite approve of the manner in which the line of distinction is drawn in that case. I think those actions are special proceedings, in which existing statutes direct a procedure different from the ordinary. In practice, the two lines will almost always co-incide, but this seems to me the most convenient.

On any principle of distinction such an action as this must be deemed a civil action. The mention by the Code Com- *650 nuissioners, in their Beport, of the action of ejectment as one -of those in which some legislative provision of special proceeding would probably be found necessary, no doubt indicated the opinion of the Commissioners, and their intention to present some such provision to the General Assembly for its consideration. It may be that for the same reasons which caused the introduction of the modern action of ejectment in lien of the old action of ejections firmes, the Legislature may yet find it expedient to provide some special proceeding for such a case. But hitherto they have not done so. There was error in the opinion of the Judge : the demurrer must be overruled. ' The defendant will recover costs in this Court. Let this opinion be certified.

Per Curiam. Beversed.