State v. Brockwell

Connor, J.

When the validity of a statute enacted by the General Assembly of this State in the exercise of its legislative authority (Const, of N. C., Art. II, sec. 1) is challenged on the ground that its enactment was in violation of some express or implied limitation upon the exercise of such authority, imposed by the Constitution of North Carolina or by the Constitution of the United States, as in the instant case, the courts of *212 this State have the power and in a proper ease it is their duty, in the exercise of the judicial power vested in them by the Constitution of this State (Const, of N. C., Art. IY, sec. 2), to decide whether or not the statute is valid. In the exercise of this power and in the performance of this duty it is a recognized principle, uniformly applied, that the courts will not adjudge that a statute is void on the ground that its enactment was in violation of a constitutional limitation, unless it so appears beyond a reasonable doubt. If there is any reasonable doubt as to the validity of the statute, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of the statute. This principle is founded upon a proper respect for the intelligence and good faith of a coordinate department of the State government, which derives its authority from and is responsible to the people of the State, as is the case with the judicial department.

The statute involved in the instant case manifestly was enacted by the General Assembly in the exercise of the police power vested in the General Assembly as the legislative department of the government of this State. The exercise of the police power is left largely to the discretion of the General Assembly. The judicial power of the courts cannot be invoked to control this discretion, unless its exercise results in an unnecessary interference with rights of the citizen, for the protection of which the government was established.

In the instant case, conceding that the statute was enacted by the General Assembly for the protection of the public health, and the promotion of decency, we are of opinion that the statute needlessly interferes with property rights.

We can discover no relation between the use by an owner or by one in the lawful possession of a milk bottle and the public health, or ordinarily with the susceptibilities of the public, unless indeed the bottle is used or intended to be used thereafter for the distribution of milk.

We concur with the learned judge who presided at the trial of this action in the Superior Court that the statute for the violation of which the defendant was tried is void. The defendant, although he has violated its provisions, has committed no crime and was properly discharged. The judgment is Affirmed.

Devin, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.