Hooker v. Pitt County

Stacy," C. J".

Plaintiffs having profited from a reduction in tbe valuation of their properties, rather than suffered from any. increase therein, and tbe rate levied for general county purposes being within tbe limit fixed by tbe Constitution, both causes of action were properly dismissed as wanting in any basis for equitable relief.

Glenn v. Comrs. of Durham, 201 N. C., 233 ;

Wilson v. Green, 135 N. C., 343 , 47 S. E., 469 .

*6 Speaking to a situation similar to that disclosed by plaintiffs’ alleged first cause of action, in R. R. v. Commissioners, 82 N. C., 260 , Smith, C. J., delivering the opinion of the Court, observed: “In this connection it may be remarked that, when the law-making power directs an act to be done in a specific time and manner, the judicial authority should be reluctant to interpose and obstruct the execution of the expressed legislative will, on the ground that the end to be accomplished by the use of the prescribed means is unwarranted by the Constitution, until some substantial right of the complaining party is to be injuriously affected; since, if the alleged repugnancy exists, no harm can come from noninterference, and if it does not the process of the court will have been used to defeat a valid act of legislation.”

Plaintiffs did not pursue the remedy suggested in Power Co. v. Burke County, 201 N. C., 318 , and followed in Caldwell County v. Doughton, 195 N. C., 62 , 141 S. E., 289 .

Furthermore, it is provided by chapter 427, Public Laws 1931[ section 510, that the collection of any tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1931 shall not be prevented by injunction. .The plaintiffs, having failed to make out a case calling for the aid of a court of equity, are in no jmsition to challenge the constitutionality or applicability of this provision.

Barber v. Benson, 200 N. C., 683 ;

Ragan v. Doughton, sufra, The action was properly dismissed.

Affirmed.