Cantrell v. Dyer

1. Innocent Purchaser. — Mrs. Beard, a widow administering the community property of herself and her deceased husband, as survivor, traded lots and a debt due the community estate for the tract of land in controversy, and after-wards (she having continued the banking business of her deceased husband), made an assignment for the benefit of creditors and placed the land in controversy upon her schedule, and it passed by her deed of assignment to her assignee, who sold it to P., who sold it to appellee, who paid full value for it in cash and had no actual notice that Mrs. Beard had traded community property for it, but was acquainted with Beard and his family and lived in the same town, and was present at the assignee’s sale. Held, that appellee was an innocent purchaser, and took good title to the whole land. 2. Same — Outstanding Equity. — The assignee took no better title than Mrs. Beard had, and so long as no additional equities supervened, such title only would pass to a purchaser from the assignee; but when a purchaser paid value without notice of any secret trust with which the property was affected, an equity equal to that of the secret beneficiary arose, which coupled with the legal title would give priority to such purchaser. 3. Quitclaim Title. — A deed from an assignee is not necessarily a quitclaim deed in the sense meant when it is said that one holding under a quitclaim deed can not be a bona fide purchaser, because the deed conveys the land for a full •consideration, and not the mere chance of the land.

The agreed case was as follows: In the year 1880 T. B. Beard died intestate, leaving Callie his widow, ■and plaintiff Mattie his only living child and sole descendant; the widow qualified during same year as survivor of the community estate, giving a bond as required by law in the sum of $13,472.28; the estate was appraised at $13,472.28 in excess of liabilities. Beard was engaged in the banking business at the time of his death; Dyer was acquainted with him, and knew that he was in said business, and also knew his widow and child, all residing in the same town in which he lived. When Callie Beard qualified as survivor, she inventoried as part of the community property certain town lots, which on December 2, 1882, she conveyed to -one A. Kerr, and he on the same day conveyed to her the land in controversy and the improvements then on same, by warranty deed, for a recited consideration of $1200 cash, but in fact the true consideration was the conveyance by her to him of the lots inventoried by her as aforesaid as community property, and the allowance of a credit of $400 on Kerr’s account due the community estate. Callie Beard carried on the banking business in which her husband was engaged at the time of his death on her individual account until May ■4, 1887, when she failed, owing about $74,000, at which time she made an assignment under the statutes of Texas for the benefit of her creditors, conveying by deed of assignment to, J. W. Parker, as assignee, amongst other property, the land and tenements in controversy in this suit, which property was scheduled as directed by law, the schedule being duly sworn to by her; this deed and schedule were duly recorded in the proper records about the date of their execution. On June 30, 1888, said assignee, by virtue of his powers as assignee, at public sale struck the property off to one Garvey at §1401, and afterward, at Garvey’s direction, made a deed therefor to Phil P. Pearson, the law partner of the assignee, reciting in the deed all the facts about the assignment of Callie Beard and referring to the deed of assignment from her to him as his authority for selling. Dyer was present at this sale to Garvey, and knew that he was the purchaser at said sale. Dyer bid on same through P. E. Peareson, who is not the same person as Phil P. Pearson, but they are entirely different persons, spelling their sir names differently. The deed from Parker, assignee, to Pearson was dated June 30,1888, and filed for record December 3, 1889. On November 30, 1889, Phil P. Pearson conveyed this property to appellee by a deed with general warranty for §1700, which Dyer paid in cash. Dyer neither then nor prior thereto had any actual notice or knowledge as matter of fact that the property belonged to the community of Callie and T. B. Beard, or that appellants had any interest therein by inheritance from the community estate aforesaid or otherwise, and he knew of no other facts or circumstances to put him upon inquiry, unless such be the legal effect of the facts herein before recited; and his-purchase from Pearson was in good faith, unless the facts recited and the-legal effect thereof make it otherwise; and in said purchase he intended to buy and supposed he was getting the sole and absolute title and interest to the entire property, unless the facts herein before recited charge him with notice to the contrary.