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Tullis v. State

E. D. Tullis v. the State

Tullis v. State, 52 S.W. 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1899)
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Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · State Highest Courts
Decided
June 21, 1899
Docket
No. 1976.
Judges
Davidson
Citations
52 S.W. 8341 Tex. Crim. 871899 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 141
Headnotes
Í. Plea in Bar—Agreement to Turn State’s Evidence—Approval of Judge. Whether a party already charged by indictment shall be admitted upon agreement as a witness for the State against his codefendant, in consideration of his immunity from prosecution, is to be determined by the trial judge in his discretion; and, if such contract has been made, it is not binding upon the State unless it has the approval of the trial judge. Without such approval, the agreement will not constitute a good plea in bar to the prosecution. 2. Same. Under. provisions of articles 37 and 630, Code of Criminal Procedure, no case can be dismissed by the district or county attorney without the permission of the presiding judge,’ who shall be satisfied that the reasons are good and sufficient to authorize such dismissal. 3. ..Same. While a contract of agreement to turn State’s evidence made with the prosecuting officer should be made with the consent of the court, yet, where it has been made without the consent of the court and defendant has acted' in perfect good faith, it should be recognized by the court. But if such agreement 'is made by the prosecuting officer not only without, but against the consent and over the objections of the court, it is of no validity and should not be enforced. 4. Same. . An agreement to turn State’s evidence in consideration of immunity from punishment can only be made with a witness in regard to a particular transaction under investigation, and not as to two distinct transactions. If the offenses are entirely distinct arid separate offenses, the agreement is not binding upon the court. 5. Same—Defendant’s Denial of the Agreement. Where defendant had made a contract with the district attorney of agreement to turn State’s evidence in consideration of his immunity from prosecution, and he did appear and testified against his codefendant, but upon his cross-examination, for1 the purpose of impeaching his motive in that ease, when asked if he had made such agreement to turn State’s evidence, he falsely and deliberately swore he had made no such agreement to turn State’s evidence and had been promised no immunity by the district attorney; Held, he was guilty of perjury; and, having tainted the transaction with his- perjury, the agreement ended and the State was released from the contract. .6. Same. An agreement to turn State’s evidence in consideration of immunity from punishment will not be enforced, and is not entitled to be enforced (1) where it has not been made with the proper parties; (2) where made without consideration as to the ease on which defendant is being tried; (3) where- he, by his own corrupt act, has released the State from any agreement that could bind her in any way •whatsoever.
Summary
There is no statement of facts in the record. The only question presented on the appeal is the validity of defendant’s plea- in bar of a contract and agreement with the district attorney for immunity from prosecution in this case in consideration of his turning State’s evidence. • ■

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Davidson

DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted of burglary, and his punishment assessed at two years confinement in the penitentiary. We have carefully read this record, as well as the briefs filed by both parties. The brief of the Assistant Attorney-General fully presents the statement of the case, and discusses the question involved in the appeal and the law applicable thereto. It accords with our view of the law applicable to that issue, and is a very elaborate and able exposition of the law involved in this appeal. We therefore adopt the brief of the Assistant Attorney-General as the opinion of the court in this case. The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1903: 11905: 21913: 21962: 11971: 11999: 119032026peak 1905 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Scribner v. State1913 OK CR 131, 132 P. 933
  2. Austin v. State183 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 1971)
  3. Ex Parte Muncy163 S.W. 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) · Dissent
  4. Graham v. State994 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
  5. State v. Hingle139 So. 2d 205 (La. 1962)
  6. Young v. State75 S.W. 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903)

Most recent

  1. Graham v. State994 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
  2. Austin v. State183 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 1971)
  3. State v. Hingle139 So. 2d 205 (La. 1962)
  4. Ex Parte Muncy163 S.W. 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) · Dissent
  5. Scribner v. State1913 OK CR 131, 132 P. 933
  6. Ex Parte Isbell87 S.W. 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

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