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Holder v. State

S. W. Holder v. the State

Holder v. State, 29 S.W. 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895)
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Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · State Highest Courts
Decided
February 16, 1895
Docket
No. 578.
Judges
Davidson
Citations
29 S.W. 79335 Tex. Crim. 191895 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 196
Headnotes
1. Marriage—Validity of. In the absence of any positive statute deelaing void all marriages not celebrated in the prescribed manner, or solemnized by certain magistrates or ministers, any marriage regularly made according to the common law, without observing the statute regulations, would be a valid marriage. 2. Same—Ordained Ministers. If the marriage be good as a common law marriage, the fact that it was solemnized by a minister of the gospel, who had never been ordained would not affect its validity. 3: Bill of Exceptions—Practice. A bill of exceptions setting up objections to evidence, to be sufficient, must show: 1st. That the evidence was permitted to go to the jury. 2nd. That it was improperly admitted. 4. Adultery—Evidence. On a trial for adultery, where the defense was that the parties were legally married, and that the former marriage of defendant to another was void, the suit brought by defendant against his first wife for a divorce was competent and admissible as evidence against him; and, if, such suit was improperly brought by an attorney without authority, the want of such authority should be proved by the defendant.
Summary
This appeal is from a conviction for adultery, the punishment assessed being a fine in the sum of $1000. The indictment charged defendant, “did unlawfully live together and have carnal intercourse with one, Alice Carlock, he being then and there lawfully married to another person living.” The State proved that defendant was married to one Rosa Cleveland, in Bosque County, in 1888. The marriage license showed that the rites of matrimony were celebrated on the 28th of February, by one W. H. Roberts, who signed the certificate of marriage and attached to his name the letters “O. M. G.” (signifying, we presume, that he was an ordained minister of the gospel.) These parties lived together several years, when they separated. Defendant left the county soon thereafter, and when he returned, in January, 1893, he brought back with him one Alice Car-lock, to whom the evidence showed he had been married in Clay County, Texas, on the 4th day of July, 1892. The defense was that defendant had never been legally married to Rosa Lee Cleveland, because W. II. Roberts, who performed the marriage ceremony, was not an ordained minister of the gospel, and consequently had no authority to celebrate the rites of matrimony. The evideuce as to this matter, ivas as follows: W. II. Roberts testified, “That he came to Bosque County about ten years ago and had performed the marriage ceremony many times. That he married the defendant to Rosa Lee Cleveland in 1888. That about twenty-five years ago in Alabama, he was licensed by the Methodist E. Church, South, to preach, and after-wards he concluded to join the Protestant Methodists, and exhibited his license from the M. E. Church, South, and the Protestant Methodists endorsed them, and I went on preaching for them afterwards, and jirior to the Holder and Cleveland marriage applied to the Cumberland Presbyterian synod for license to preach for that denomination; that they told him they would license him to preach, but they never gave him any written authority to preach, and if they made any written record of this he does not know; that this synod belonged to the Waco Presbytery, and he performed this ceremony under the authority of the Presbyterian church; that he has married many people; that in 1890, ho applied to the M. E. Conference, presided over by Rev. Nelms, of Fort Worth, for license to preach for that denomination, and failed to get the license. Defendant attacked the authority of Roberts to perform a legal ceremony. Rev. Nelms swore for defendant that he is the Methodist Episcopal presiding elder of the Fort Worth district, and Bosque County is in his district; that in 1890 the witness, W. II. Roberts, applied to . him for a license to preach and Avas refused because he Avas incompetent and because he could not tell hoiv he got out of the Presbyterian Church, but told him that he (Roberts) had left it about íavo years ago, (which Avould be in 1888); that in the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, a license to ¡breach does not give authority to perform marriage ceremonies; that Avhen a licensed minister left one State or a conference and moved to another the license was void and of no effect. D. C. ICinnard swore for defendant that he was Secretary of the Waco Presbytery, and as such keeps the books, records and minutes of the same; that W. II. Roberts had no connection with the Presbytery for the past eighteen years, nor since 1885, and any rites performed by him as a minister of the gospel during said term, Avas without authority of said Presbytery and void. A. W. Dumas, for defendant, sAvore that he Avas a member of the Waco Presbytery, and did not knoAV Roberts as a minister of said church; that D. C. Kinnard is secretary of Waco Presbytery, and keeps the records of all licensed and ordained ministers belonging to the same; that no one has authority to perform the ordinances of said church except ordained ministers; that a licensed minister only has authority to bury the dead, etc., and such license only lasts six months, and after that time becomes null and void unless renewed or he becomes ordained Avithin the six months. Defendant introduced marriage license to himself and Miss Alice Corlock, with the return shoAving they Avere married in Clay County, Texas, on the 4th day of July, 1892. Over objection of defendant the State Avas permitted to introduce in evidence the copy of petition in divorce case in Eastland County, Texas, filed June 1, 1892, showing that defendant and Rosa Cleveland were married in 1888, and lived together as man and wife until 1890; that defendant asked for a divorce on the ground of the violent temper of said Rosa and cruel conduct, and that she refused to allow defendant to have sexual intercourse with her; that said petition was not signed by defendant, but by attorneys.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Davidson

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is a conviction for adultery, the fine imposed being $1,000. Under license issued for that purpose in 1888, the appellant was, by W. H. Roberts, a preacher, married to Miss Rosa Cleveland, with whom he lived as husband for about two years, when they separated. Upon the trial he proved that said Roberts was not an ordained minister of the gospel at the time he performed said marriage ceremony. This fact being established, he contends this marriage was a nullity, and therefore his second marriage was legal; hence he was not guilty of adultery in living with the woman to whom he was married in 1892. The fact that Roberts was not an ordained minister does not render the first marriage a nullity. Simon v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 186; Foster v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep., 409; Gillian v. Reddick, 4 Iredell, 368; 5 Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, pp. 100, 103 and notes; Hays v. People, 25 N. Y., 30 . Justice Strong, for the Supreme Court of the United States, quoting Greenleaf on Evidence, says: “Though in most, if not all, the United States, there are statutes regulating the celebration of marriage rites, and inflicting penalties on all who disobey the regulations, yet it is generally considered that, in the absence of any *24 positive statute declaring that all marriages not celebrated in the proscribed manner shall be void, or that none but certain magistrates or ministers shall solemnize a marriage, any marriage, regularly made according to the common law, without observing the statute regulations, would still be a valid marriage.” Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S., 76, 80 . Such statutes are merely directory. Marriage is a civil contract, and is a thing of common right, so recognized by all civilized countries in all ages, and is encouraged by public policy. A rule of construction an contended for by appellant, would bastardize children whose parents believed they were legally married, and who were not conscious of violating any law, human or divine, and who believed they had entered into the marital relation without coming in conflict with the provisions of statutory enactments. Such a rule, we think, fraught with consequences fearful to the interest of society, would tend to flood the courts with litigation, unsettle property rights, and disturb settled rights of inheritance. We cannot agree to such a rule of construction. Our statute does not render null or prescribe penalties against marriages not entered into under the terms thereof. This view was entertained, and so held, by the Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas, in a recent able and exhaustive opinion delivered by Lightfoot, C. J., in the case of Ingersoll v. McWillie, 30 S. W. Rep., 56 .

The first five bills of exception reserved by appellant were not filed in the trial court, as manifested by the record before us. In regard to the admission of evidence complained of in some of the bills of exception, we find—First, that they do not show the evidence was admitted to the jury; and, second, if that be granted, it was properly admitted. The suit brought by appellant against his wife prior to his second marriage, was correctly admitted against him. If he did not authorize it, and the attorneys brought the sidt without his knomledge or consent, he should have produced evidence to that effect. The special instructions asked by appellant were correctly refused. We find no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1895: 21899: 11902: 11924: 11934: 11946: 12004: 12017: 118952026peak 1895 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. MacDougall v. Levick805 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 2017)
  2. In re Gabaldon's Estate34 P.2d 672 (N.M. 1934) · Dissent
  3. Chapman v. Chapman32 S.W. 564 (Tex. App. 1895)
  4. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Cody50 S.W. 135 (Tex. App. 1899)
  5. Lee v. State61 L.R.A. 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902)
  6. Adkisson v. State30 S.W. 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895)

Most recent

  1. MacDougall v. Levick805 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 2017)
  2. Dodrill v. Dodrill, Unpublished Decision (4-28-2004)2004 Ohio 2225 (2004)
  3. Untitled Texas Attorney General OpinionNo. O-7529 (Tex. Att'y Gen. July 2, 1946)
  4. In re Gabaldon's Estate34 P.2d 672 (N.M. 1934) · Dissent
  5. Cook v. State266 S.W. 1099 (Tex. Crim. App. 1924)
  6. Lee v. State61 L.R.A. 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 2

DepthCaseCited by
Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1878) 108
Ingersol v. McWillie, 30 S.W. 56 (Tex. App. 1895) 22

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