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Hopkins v. Crittenden

Hopkins v. Crittenden, 10 Tex. 189 (1853)
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Court
Texas Supreme Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
July 1, 1853
Judges
Tvheeleb
Citations
10 Tex. 189
Headnotes
Conventional interest does not give place to “legal” interest at the maturity of the contract, but- continues to run until payment.
Summary
Error from Red River. This suit was brought upon a promissory note, dated January loth, 1849, and payable on the 25th day of December thereafter, “with ten per cent, interest from date.” In the rendition of the judgment at the May term, 1851, interest was computed at ten per cent, from the date of the note up to that time.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Tvheeleb

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TVheeleb, J.

It is objected that interest at ten per cent, was allowed after the maturity of the note; whereas, it is insisted that eight per cent, only was recoverable after that period. The statute fixes the legal rate of interest at eight per cent., and authorizes the recovery of that rate of interest “ on all written con- “ tracts ascertaining the sum due, when no specific premium or rate of interest is “expressed.” (Dig., art. 1607.) But here a specific rate of interest is expressed in the contract. Ir. does not, therefore, come within the provision fixing the legal rate of interest, but is clearly within that which authorizes the recovery of any rate of interest for which the parties may contract, not exceeding twelve per cent. (Id., 1608.)

it doubtless was the intention of the parties to contract for ten per cent, interest upon the debt until paid, and there can be as little doubt that it was the intention of the Legislature to authorize the making and enforcing of such a contract. The interest was computed according to the universally received construction of the statute, and the uniform practice of the court under it from its adoption to the present time, and with what appears to he its plain meaning and intention. We entertain no doubt of the correctness of the rule of computation adopted, and are of opinion that the judgment be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

How later courts describe this case

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Cited by 12 cases

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1863–1864: 11865–1866: 11871–1872: 11875–1876: 11877–1878: 11879–1880: 11881–1882: 11883–1884: 11887–1888: 11901–1902: 11979–1980: 11983–1984: 118632026peak 1863 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Cromwell v. County of Sac96 U.S. 51 (1878)
  2. Petroscience Corporation v. Diamond Geophysical, Inc.684 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1984)
  3. Union Institution for Savings v. City of Boston129 Mass. 82 (1880)
  4. Barbour v. Tompkins7 S.E. 1 (W. Va. 1888)
  5. Hubbard v. Callahan42 Conn. 524 (1875)
  6. Borders v. Barber81 Mo. 636 (1884)

Most recent

  1. Petroscience Corporation v. Diamond Geophysical, Inc.684 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1984)
  2. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Long608 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App. 1980)
  3. Greenhaw v. Holmes68 P. 537 (Ariz. 1902)
  4. Barbour v. Tompkins7 S.E. 1 (W. Va. 1888)
  5. Borders v. Barber81 Mo. 636 (1884)
  6. Shaw v. Rigby84 Ind. 375 (1882)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

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