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Howeth v. Anderson

Sewell Howeth and others v. J. M. Anderson

Howeth v. Anderson, 25 Tex. 557 (1860)
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Court
Texas Supreme Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
July 1, 1860
Judges
Wheeler
Citations
25 Tex. 557
Headnotes
A covenant to redeliver a steam saw mill at the expiration of thé term of the lease in as good order as when it was received, excepting the usual wear and tear and unavoidable accidents, does not render the lessor liable in damages for the accidental loss of the premises bjr:fire. It may be questioned whether the terms “ unavoidable accidents,” in a contract of lease like the foregoing, would not embrace the exception of such losses by fire as might occur without fault or negligence on the part of the lessee, and which could not be prevented by the use of ordinary care. A contract of lease is unlike the_ contract of common carrier, nor is it governed in its construction, to the same extent, by considerations of public policyi See the opinion of the court for remarks concerning the rules for the construction of contracts of lease, to ascertain the intention of the parties. Where, on the special verdict of the jury determining the material issues of fact, judgmentwas rendered thereon by the District Court for the plaintiff, and on a revision of the cause this court on the law of the case arising upon the facts so found, adjudges that the defendants were entitled to a judgment, the cause being brought up by the defendants without a statement of facts, this court will not render such judgment as ought to have been given below, but Will reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Summary
Error from Cherokee. Tried below before the Hon. C. A. Frazer. This was a suit brought by James M. Anderson against Sewell Howeth, William M. Sloan, and Cicero Broom, for three thousand five hundred dollars, as damages, for the destruction by fire of a steam saw mill, a quantity of lumber, a lot of tools, and injury to certain machinery belonging to the mill which was not wholly destroyed, all of which was specially set out in a bill of particulars attached to the petition. As grounds for the action, the petition alleged that on the 26th day of January, 1857, the defendants Howeth and Sloan executed to petitioner their obligation in waiting whereby they rented from petitioner his steam saw and grist mill and fixtures, also three yoke of oxen and the carry-log, and every article usually used about said mills, for the period of two months from the 9th day of February, 1857, and in consideration thereof said “ Howeth and Sloan as principals, and Cicero Broom as security, bound themselves to redeliver said mills, oxen, carry-logs and fixtures to said Anderson in as good order as they received them, excepting usual wear and tear and unavoidable accidents—-and to pay to said Anderson,” &c. The petition alleged that Broom,, although he represented himself and entered into said contract as surety for his co-defendants, was at the time, and continued to be a copartner with them in the renting and use of said mill; a fact which petitioner alleges was then unknown to him. Petition alleged that on the night of the 18th of April, 1857, (after the expiration of the term limited in the lease,) by the neglect, carelessness and actual imprudence of the defendants, (all of whom it is alleged were jointly in possession.) the said mills and fixtures were destroyed .by fire, causing destruction and damage to the other property aforesaid. The special act of carelessness or imprudence charged against the defendants was that, said night being dry and windy, they used about said mills pine torches; and after the mill ceased to run, that they hurriedly left the mills, in consequence whereof the fire resulted, which might have been prevented by the use of lanterns, which petitioner alleges he had provided to. be used about said mills. The defendants demurred generally, and for special grounds of demurrer excepted, because it appears that the • lease, by the terms of the written contract, had expired when the fire occurred. Which special exception with several others which need not be set out here, appears to be comprehended properly in the general demurrer. The defendant Broom answering separately, specially excepted to the "averments in the petition which allege his partnership, because the contract does not restrict him from being such partner; and because the effect of charging him as a principal is to contradict and vary the terms of the written contract.' The defendants answered by a general denial; special traverse of the alleged carelessness, and set up the exception in the covenant that the burning was an unavoidable accident, and which occurred after the expiration of the term limited in the contact sued on. They specially pleaded that when the mill was burned it had been previously, on the same night, redelivered to plaintiff’s agents in like good condition as when it Was received; and that it was a long established custom of said mill, which was well known to the plaintiff, to use torches in and about said mill; and that they Avere used whilst the same Ayas under the control of the plaintiff. Defendant Broom, in addition to the foregoing defences, pleaded that the burning took place several days after the expiration of the lease specified in the written contract sued on, and after the making of a new lease of the mills by plaintiff to his co-defendants, the plaintiff having received the rent therefor, and being estopped thereby from a denial of the same'. Under the instructions of the court the jury found a special verdict as to the matters of fact, as MIoavs, to wit r That the defendants HoAveth and Sloan, by virtue of the Avritten contract sued on, did rent the mill from the 9th day of February, 1857, until the 9th day of April, 1857. That the defendant Broom Avas not a partner at the time the contract was made. That the mill was a steam mill, and Avas run by the agency of fire; was destroyed by fire on the morning of the 19th of April, 1857, some four or five hours after it had stopped running. That the defendants could not have prevented the burning of the mill by extinguishing all the fire in and about said mill at the time they stopped running, and when they left the same. That the defendants did not use more care to prevent the burning of the mill than would be used by a man of ordinary care. That they could not, by any degree of care before they left the mill on the night when it was burned, have prevented the conflagration. That the defendants at the end of the term of renting, continued in possession of the mill, and did run the same nine days thereafter, Avhich was Ayithout the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. That the defendants did not, either before or after the termina^ tion of said renting, notify the plaintiff that they would abandon possession of the same; nor did the plaintiff at any time demand the possession of the said mill, or give the defendants notice to abandon the same. That the defendants continued in possession of said mill after the termination of said contract for renting, without the consent of the plaintiff. That there was no new contract between the plaintiff and defendants. Also, that “the mill was burned, damages done to the same, nineteen hundred and ninety dollars and fifty cents.” Upon which verdict the court rendered judgment against all the defendants for the amount last aforesaid and costs of suit. From Which the defendants prosecuted'this writ of error, Assigning as grounds of error : 1. The overruling of the demurrers. 2. That the court erred in submitting to the jury in the charge, the question whether, after the expiration of the time of renting specified in the written contract, there was a new contract between the parties ? 3. And that the court erred in not giving judgment on the special verdict, in favor of the defendants instead of the plaintiff. There was no statement of facts contained in the record. The following endorsement appeared on the written contract sued on, and made a part of the petition, to. wit: 11 Rec’d payment in full of the rent mentioned within and for nine days additional rent, $292 58. “ May 21st, 1857. Jambs M. Anderson.”

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Opinion of the Court — Wheeler

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Wheeler, C. J.

In order to determine whether the judgment has been rightly rendered for the plaintiff, we must look to the case made by the petition and the special verdict.

In his petition the plaintiff treats the defendants as his tenants rightfully in possession, and seeks to charge and hold them responsible for the injury and loss sustained on the sole ground of carelessness, negligence, and mismanagement on their part, by which he avers the loss was occasioned. There is no averment in terms of a breach of the covenants in the lease; but the gravamen of the complaint is the negligence. The verdict does not support this ground of the action; on the contrary, it fully exculpates the defendants from the charge of negligence. The worst that the verdict establishes is, that the loss was caused by an accidental fire; and the question, as to the principal defendants or tenants in possession is, whether they are liable to make good a loss thus occasioned?

It is deducible from the petition, though it is not averred, that the defendants were holdings over after the expiration of the lease when the loss occurred; and so the jury have found by their verdict. Thus continuing to hold; it was at the election of the plaintiff to treat them as trespassers, or as tenants holding under the terms of the original lease. The receipt of rent accruing after the expiration of the'tenancy would evidence his election to treat them as tenants, and not as trespassers. (Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, § 65, 465, 468; Story on Con., § 934.) Whether we can look to the evidence of such receipt for rent in this case or not is not material, as the plaintiff, in his petition, has elected to treat the defendants as tenants, holding under the terms of the original lease. As such, are they liable for the loss of the premises by accidental, fire? This question was considered in a very elaborate and learned opinion by the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of Warner v Hitchins, (5 Barbour, 666,) upon a lease *572 containing a covenant similar to the present, and it was there held that the tenant was not liable for a loss thus occasioned. The doctrine of this case is adopted by Mr. Taylor in his learned treatise on the American Law of Landlord and Tenant; where the law upon this subject is thus laid down: “When a tenant is under an express covenant to uphold and repair the premises, he is liable to make good all losses, and must even rebuild in case of casualty by fire or otherwise. * * * * If he covenants to keep the premises in repair, and leave them in the same state as he found them, he is merely required to use his best endeavors to keep them in the same tenantable repair in which he found them; for natural and unavoidable decay is no breach of this covenant. But if he covenants to repair generally, this will impose on him a liability to uphold the buildings, without regard to accidents or the necessary decay of the old materials. Where he covenants to surrender the premises at the expiration of the lease, in the same condition they are in at the date of the lease, natural wear and tear excepted, but without any covenant to repair or rebuild, he is not bound, in case the buildings are destroyed by fire during the continuance of the term, to put up new buildings in the place of those destroyed.” (Taylor on L. & T., § 357.) Here there was no covenant to repair; but the covenant of said tenants was “ to re-deliver said mills,” &c., “in as good order as they received them, excepting usual wear and tear, and unavoidable accidents.” According to the authorities cited,-it is clear that upon this covenant the defendants were .not liable for the accidental loss of the premises by fire. 1 think it may at least be questioned whether the terms “unavoidable accidents,” inserted in a contract of lease like the present, would not include the exception of such losses as the verdict of the jury shows the present to have been. It is not like the contract of a common carrier, nor governed, in its construction, to the same extent, by considerations of public policy. Leases are construed, like other written agreements, so as to give effect to the intention of the parties. To arrive at the intention, regard is to be had to the situation of the parties, the subject-matter of the agreement, the object which the parties had in view at the time, and intended to accomplish. A construction should be avoi *573 ded, if it can be done consistently with the tenor of the agreement, which would be unreasonable or unequal; and that construction which is most obviously just is to be favored, as most in accordance with the presumed intention of the parties. ( 5 Barb., 669 ; 4 Humph., 468 .) Looking to the terms and subject-matter of the contract, we do not think it reasonable or fair to conclude that the parties contemplated that the lessors were to become insurers of the property against those casualties which ordinary prudence and foresight could not have guarded against; or that it was supposed or intended that they were to become liable to repair the loss in case of the accidental destruction of the property by fire without negligence or fault on their part. The plaintiff did not frame his petition in any such view of the contract or the liability of the defendants, and we do not think it was the view which the parties had of their rights and liabilities in entering into the contract. It would have been a very extraordinary liability for the lessee to assume; and, if intended, it would doubtless have been clearly expressed in the lease. We conclude that, upon the facts found by the jury, the defendants were not liable to make good the loss of the property, and consequently that there was error in giving judgment for the plaintiff upon the verdict.

The defendant Broom has relied upon the further defence, that he was but a surety upon the contract of lease; but as the maintenance of the defence of his principals- necessarily relieves him from liability, it is unnecessary to -consider the grounds of his separate defence. The view we have taken of the case would lead to the rendition of judgment for the defendants upon the verdict. But as that might deprive the plaintiff of having the case revised upon the evidence, as he might have done had the judgment been, adverse to him in the court below, and he might suffer an injustice by the case taking a direction which he was not bound to anticipate, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

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Authorities cited 1

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Warner v. Hitchins, 5 Barb. 666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) 22

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