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Holliday v. Cromwell

Thomas Holliday v. A. H Cromwell and others

Holliday v. Cromwell, 26 Tex. 188 (1862)
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Court
Texas Supreme Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
July 1, 1862
Judges
Wheeler
Citations
26 Tex. 188
Headnotes
Where a deed was executed before a judge of the first instance on the 25th day of Oct., 1834, and recorded in the office of the clerk of the County Court of Be'ugio county on the 2nd day of June, 1841, without having been proven in the manner provided for by the laws in force at the time of its registration: held, that the deed was not properly admitted to record, and that it could not be proven by the production of a certified copy under the 409th article of the Digest of Oldham & White. The laws in force at that time in reference to the requirements of acknowledgment and proof of the execution of deeds, before admitting them to record, cited and discussed. The rulings of the court below and the facts of the case ought to appear by the record, and should not be left to rest upon the agreement of counsel outside of the record.
Summary
Appeal from Victoria. Tried below before the Hon. Fielding Jones. Trespass to try title to two leagues of land in Victoria county, brought by Thomas Holliday, the appellant, against Alexander H. Cromwell and others, the appellees. On the trial, the plaintiff read in evidence a certified translation from the General Land Office' of the original grant of the two leagues to Santiago »nd,.Lazaro Serna and a chain of title from Santiago. The first link in this chain is a deed from Santiago Serna to John Sutherland, dated February 28th 1840, and recorded in Victoria county, Avhere the land Was then situated, May 24th, 1850, and in Refugio county Sept. 18th, 1850. The defendants also claimed under said Santiago Serna, who, as they alleged, sold the land in controversy to Joshua Davis on the 25th day of October, 1884. As evidence of the sale from Serna to Davis, the defendants offered a copy of the act of sale taken from the record of deeds in Refugio county, certified as such by the clerk. The act of sale, according to this transcript from the record, appears to have been passed before the judge of the first instance in the village of Refugio, and to have been admitted to. record, without proof, in the office of the clerk of the County Court, on the 2nd day of June, 1841. The plaintiff objected to the introduction of this copy in evidence, because', 1st, it was not the host evidence. 2nd. Because the existence of the original had not been proven, nor its absence accounted for, so as to lay the necessary foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence. 3rd. It showed upon its face that the original had not been recorded. These objections Avere overruled and the plaintiff excepted. Verdict for defendants. Judgment rendered accordingly. Motion for neAY trial overruled and plaintiff below appealed. An agreement, signed by counsel, was filed among the papers, reciting various clerical errors made by the clerk below in making up the record.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Wheeler

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Wheeler, C. J.

It was proposed to make proof of the deed of the 25th of October, 1834, by the production of a certified-copy from the records of deeds, under article 745 of Hartley’s Digest. (O. & W. Dig., art. 467.)

It was objected to the introduction of the copy that the deed had not been duly recorded.

The certificate of registration bears date on the 2d day of June, 1841, and is as follows: “ The foregoing deed was this day presented for record and thereupon admitted.”

The laws in force at that time concerning the registration of deeds, required the acknowledgment, or some proof of their execution; or, where the original remained in the public archives, a certificate of the keeper thereof, to authorize admitting them to record. (Hart. Dig., arts. 2,752, 2,755, 2,760, 2,761, 2,768.) And the act of the 19th of January, 1839, required that a certificate of the acknowledgment, or pooof, be made upon the instrument, “ and become a part of the record.” (Id., art. 2,760.)

There not only was no such certificate, but the certificate made by the clerk would seem to imply that the instrument was recorded upon its simple presentation, without more.

The case of Paschal v. Perez, (7 Tex. R., 357,) is relied on as sustaining the ruling of the court admitting the copy in evidence. *194 But that case does not go the extent of holding that a deed recorded as this was in 1841, can he proved by the production of a copy from the records, without some evidence that it was acknowledged or proved for registration. That was not the question the court was there considering.

The statute under which it was proposed to prove the instrument by the production of the copy in question, authorizes that mode of proof only in cases- where the instrument proposed to be thus proved “ is permitted or required by law to be recorded,” and has been recorded “ after being proven or acknowledged in the manner provided for by the laws in force at the time of its-registration..” (O. & W. Dig, art. 469.) There was no evidence before the court that the instrument in question had- been thus proved or acknowledged, and we are of opinion that the court erred in admitting the copy in evidence.

In the very unsatisfactory state of the record,- we decline to express any opinion upon other questions in the case. It is proper, however, to remark that the rulings of the court and the facts of the case ought to appear by the record, and not be left to rest upon the agreement of counsel outside of the record. And that the court below could not be required to give to the jury an instruction which assumed that the plaintiff was a purchaser “for a valuable consideration,” when there was no evidence that he paid value; nor could this court revise the judgment upon the assumption that instructions were given by the court, which the judge certifies in the record that he declined to give.

We are of opinion that the judgment be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1879–1880: 11881–1882: 11925–1926: 11927–1928: 11941–1942: 218792026peak 1941 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co.164 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1942)
  2. Parrish v. Wright293 S.W. 659 (Tex. App. 1927)
  3. McFaddin v. Preston54 Tex. 403 (1881)
  4. Norwood v. McMillan278 S.W. 331 (Tex. App. 1925)
  5. Cavit v. Archer52 Tex. 166 (1879)
  6. Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co.164 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1942)

Most recent

  1. Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co.164 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1942)
  2. Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co.164 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1942)
  3. Parrish v. Wright293 S.W. 659 (Tex. App. 1927)
  4. Norwood v. McMillan278 S.W. 331 (Tex. App. 1925)
  5. McFaddin v. Preston54 Tex. 403 (1881)
  6. Cavit v. Archer52 Tex. 166 (1879)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

No citations to other opinions in this database were found.

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