State v. Lawrence

Every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proved. To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that at the time of committing the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong; partial insanity, if not to the extent above indicated, will not excuse a criminal act. When the defendant, in a criminal case, does not testify as a witness in his own behalf, it is not improper for the presiding judge, in his charge to the jury, to call their attention to the fact, and to instruct them, that it is a circumstance proper for their consideration.

On Exceptions. Indictment por murder. It appeared, on the part of the government, that Elmira Atwood had been living at the house of one Mrs. Marsh, on Hammond street, Bangor, some four weeks prior to the murder ; that the defendant, Lawrence, went there more or less; that on Saturday» January 1, 1870, he went there considerably intoxicated, conversed with Elmira Atwood, and called her by an opprobrious epithet, she answering, that if he called her that, she would make him prove it, whereupon he went away without any reconciliation taking place between them at that time; that on the next (Sunday) evening he went there again; that he, living by himself on Main street, and Mrs. Marsh having been in the habit of preparing food for him, handed her a little tin pail and requested her to put up some hashed fish; that he asked Mrs. Marsh if she were alone; that Mrs. Atwood had gone into a little bedroom; that after Mrs. Marsh went into the pantry, Lawrence went into the bedroom, where he saw Mrs. Atwood; that Mrs. Marsh heard voices talking, but could not understand what was then said until she heard Mrs. Atwood say, “I will, I will, I will, John;” that when Mrs. Marsh came out of the pantry, she saw Mrs. Atwood coming out of the bedroom, Lawrence having already come out and gone across the kitchen, facing the door as if going out; that Mrs. Atwood said, “ Oh, the pistol! the pistol!” and came near fainting ; that Lawrence turned round, drew out his pistol, and without taking any more aim than merely raising his arm and pointing^ it toward Mrs. Atwood, fired twice; that Mrs. Atwood fell; that Mrs. Marsh rushed out of the house, and heard two more pistol shots, at least, fired after she went out; and that Lawrence passed Mrs. Marsh, going out of the house as she returned. It also appeared from the testimony of the attending surgeon, that Mrs. Atwood had three bullet-wounds, one of which was in the right side, between sixth and seventh ribs, through the liver and intestines; and that she died from the wound in about forty-eight hours after the wound was received. It also appeared, that about seven o’clock on the same Sunday evening, Lawrence was found in his room, on Main street, with his throat cut; that he still had a knife in his hand; that when found, his first words were, “ Do you think I am cut enough to die ? ” “Is that damned whore dead? ” “I hope she is. If she is, I can die happy.” It also appeared, that the defendant was jealous of Mrs. Atwood, who, he alleged, had agreed to marry him, and then went with other men. The defense was insanity, and considerable testimony tending to show the condition of Lawrence at the time of shooting Mrs. Atwood, and before and afterwards, was introduced. The presiding judge, inter alia, charged the jury as follows: “Was it a case of jealousy, or was it an insane delusion? You are to determine whether insanity of any kind existed at the time of the homicide. If it is not established, then the defense of insanity fails, and the case stands upon the facts. “ If you find a general or partial insanity, then what is the rule ? If you take the monomania upon the subject of the woman, as he expresses it, “ going back upon him,” if there was an insane delusion upon that subject, then how far did that excuse him for the killing ? Suppose he was insanely jealous, it would not necessarily follow, that he should not know it was not light for him to kill her. “ But if it is shown that he not only had an insane delusion on that subject, but that he supposed he had a right to kill her, that covers the whole. But the mere fact that a man is jealous with cause, does not justify him in killing a woman, if she is his lawful wife. So if he is insane with a monomania, he is not justified in killing her, unless it is shown that he had a faith that it was right for him to do it, and had lost all sense of responsibility for it. I have now reached the point where I can give you the general instructions that I intended. “ To excuse a man from responsibility on the ground of insanity, it must appear, that at the time of doing the act he had not capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the particular act he was doing. That he had not knowledge, consciousness, or conscience enough to know, ,that the act he is doing is a wrong act, and a criminal act, and one that he will be subject or liable to punishment for doing. In order to be responsible, he must have sufficient mind and memory to understand and remember the relation he stands to others, and others to him, and that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of right, wrongfully injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty. If there be partial derangement, or insanity of mind, so that it is not in all respects perfectly sane and sound, yet if not to the extent above indicated, it will not excuse a criminal act. In other words, a man may be a monomaniac, his mind may be disordered, and, to a certain extent, it may be proved that he is of unsound mind, and yet, if he has mind and understanding enough, and is not carried away so but that he understands the difference between right and wrong, as to the act he is then doing, — that is to say, if the man knew that what he was doing was wrong, and he was liable to be punished for it, and that the act would not be excused, then he is subject to punishment, although there might be some partial derangement. “ But if he does not understand the relation of parties, as, for instance, where a son killed his father, and was so deranged that he did not know it was his father, he could not be responsible. But if the party feels and knows that he is doing wrong, although he may have wrought himself up by hatred and jealousy, to a determination to kill, yet if it appears that at the time he had capacity sufficient, and did know he was doing wrongs as before explained, he would not be excused. The rule is as I have stated. If there be a partial insanity, yet if it is not proved he was insane and unsound, to the extent 1 have stated, it will not excuse criminal acts. “ I am requested, by the counsel, to give some instructions. 1. “That if, at the time of the commission of the act, the defendant was undqr the influence of an insane delusion, impelling him to the commission of the act for 'which he had no rational motive, notwithstanding he may have appeared able to distinguish right from wrong, they shall find for the defendant on the ground of insanity. “ On that request I will say, if he was under an insane delusion, it would be a defense if the act, under that delusion, would be justifiable in assuming the delusion to be a fact. If he acts under the delusion, for instance, that he has a right to kill, then he is justifiable ; but if he acts under another delusion, not the cause, then he may not be. “ For instance, take the case of Abraham offering up his son Isaac. There he had a special commission to do it; he had faith, and believed it was the command of God, and was about to do it. Now suppose some gentleman here should think he heard, in the night, a voice coming to him distinctly and audibly, and saying, ‘ Take your son and build a pile and sacrifice him,’ and he fully believed it, and took his little son and carried him out the next day, and actually sacrificed him. “ There, insanity would be fully proved, because he actually believed it as much as Abraham believed that it was the commandment of the Almighty. A thing would be excused from delusion, where it would be excused if that delusion were true, as before explained. “ I do not think that the evidence, in this case, calls upon me to give any ruling as to a case of blind, unreasoning impulse to take life, irrespective of motive as to the person assaulted, and having no connection with any existing relation between the assailant and the assailed, which impulse overcomes reason, power of the will, conscience, and all fear of consequences, and all power to resist the impulse to kill, although the person might not be shown to have lost all sense of right and wrong. That would be like cases read by the counsel for the defense, in his very clear and able opening. A French woman had a desire to kill young children, — an insane desire to kill, without any jealousy, and without any occasion what-' ever. There have been cases of that kind, and it is a question how far that impulse might excuse. I think there is nothing of the kind shown in this case. 2. “ That in capital cases the prosecution must prove the felonious killing, and if the jury have a reasonable doubt of the murder, the verdict must be for acquittal. 8. “ That the plea of insanity does not deprive the accused of the • benefit of this principle of law, and does not relieve the governrnent from proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the prisoner.” On these requests the judge said he had already given them in his charge, but would repeat the substance of what he had said, viz., That the government was not relieved from proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt by such plea, or on any other ground; but if it had proved beyond such doubt, all that was required to constitute the offense charged before any evidence of insanity was offered; that insanity must be established by a preponderance of evidence, as before fully stated and explained in the charge. 4. “ That where insanity is offered in defense, it is not necessary for the prisoner to prove his insanity by a preponderance of testimony, but, on the contrary, if the jury find a reasonable doubt of the sanity at the time of the commission of the act, there must arise in their minds a doubt of the malice, which alone constitutes murder.” By the court. “ I give you no other ruling than what I have given you before.” 5. “ In this case, where insanity is set up as a defense, the court is requested to instruct the jury, that they are to be satisfied, from all the testimony in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the prisoner, and if they have a reasonable doubt of his sanity, they are bound to acquit.” No new instruction was given under this request. 6. “Will the court also instruct the jury, that if they find that at the time of the commission of the act, the defendant was laboring under an insanity which would excuse him from legal responsibility for its commission, they will render a verdict of acquittal, whether or not they are satisfied as to the causes which produced the insanity, or its particular form.” The judge stated, in regard to this request, that he had already instructed the jury, that if the prisoner was laboring under insanity at the time of the commission of the act, sufficient to excuse him, they will acquit him whatever may be the cause of the insanity, or whether ascertained or not. The judge then proceeded as follows: “ There is only one other thing I wish to call your attention to, and I think it is my duty to say a word upon it. That is the non-production of the prisoner, as a witness in this case. It is only a few years since the prisoner was allowed to testify in criminal cases. The law has been altered, giving the prisoner the privilege of testifying if he chooses. He is not bound, to testify to anything criminating himself, or bearing on the case. "But if he is not put upon the stand, you must necessarily understand and know the fact, that he is not put upon the stand to state his knowledge to the jury. The jury would not be bound to and should not convict simply on the ground that the prisoner does not testify. But it is a fact in the case, more or less potent or important, as you may consider it. In this case the counsel say the plea being insanity, they did not propose to put on the prisoner himself. Ordinarily, where insanity is alleged to have continued, if he was a crazy man when tried, this suggestion would have. more weight than when not laboring under insanity at the time of the trial. While he was not obliged to go on, you are not to draw forced inferences. Perhaps he might have explained his conduct more fully, but he chose to rely upon the evidence presented. At all events, it is for you to consider that he did not choose to go on to the stand, and the government say there are many facts that he might have explained.” The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree ; and the defendant alleged exceptions. cited, Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. 93, dissenting opinion; United States v. Mingo, 2 Curtis, 2 ; Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463 ; Powers v. Russell, 13 Pick. 69 ; Delano v. Bartlett, 6 Cush. 364; Tourtellot v. Rosebrooh, 11 Met. 460; Morrison v. Clark, 7 Cush. 313 ; Sawyer v. Syofford, 4 Cush. 598; Lane v. Crombie, 12 Pick. 177 ; Commonwealth v. MoKie, 1 Gray, 61; United States v. Me Glare, 7 Law Rep. (N. S.), 439; 1 Ben. & Heard’s Lead. Or. Cas. 253; State v. Merrick, 19 Maine, 398; State v. Flye, 26 Maine, 312; Tarbox v. Hast. Steamboat Co., 50 Maine, 345 ;■ 4 Blackstone’s Com. 195 ; Grerrish v. Mason, 22 Maine, 438 ; Loring v. Aborn, 4 Cush. 608 ; Harrison v. Aides, 15 Mass. 347 ; State v. Crowell, 25 Maine, 171 ; State v. Woodward, 34 Maine, 293 ; State v. Churchill, 25 Maine, 306; 1 Ben. & Heard’s Lead. Cr. Cas. 353.