TaiLexi AI U.S. Case Law

Shepherd v. Hall

Samuel E. Shepherd v. Mary E. Hall and another

Shepherd v. Hall, 1 A. 696 (Me. 1885)
Download
Format
Include

Star paging (*137) is kept for pin cites.

Court
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · State Highest Courts
Decided
December 9, 1885
Judges
Danforth, Emery, Foster, Libbey, Peters, Walton
Citations
1 A. 69677 Me. 5691885 Me. LEXIS 117
Headnotes
Officer’s receipt. Demand. Action. A sheriff attached personal property on a writ, took a receipt therefor, and went out of office while the action was pending' in court. • The receipt was never legally nor equitably assigned by the sheriff to the creditor. Held, that an action could not be maintained in the name of the ex-sheriff against the receiptors for the benefit of the creditor, unless the property was demanded of such, ex-sberiff by an officer, bolding tbe execution, witbin thirty days from the date of tbe judgment in the first suit; a demand on tbe receiptors is not sufficient.
Summary
On report. An action on an officer’s receipt. The material facts are stated in the opinion. cited: Hunter v. JPeales, 74 Maine, 367; Moulton v. Ghapin, 28 Maine, 505. cited: R. S., c. 81, § 67 : Humphrey v. Gobb, 22 Maine, 380; Norris v. Bridgham, 14 Maine, 429 ; Sawyer v. Mason, 19 Maine, 49 ; Bradbury v. Taylor, 8 Maine, 130.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Peters

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Peters, C. J.

This is an action by an ex-shei’iff upon an accountable receipt given for property which he attached. An execution, issued in the suit in which the attachment was made, was delivered to the plaintiff’s successor in office within thirty days after judgment was recovered, and he made a demand on the receiptors, but no demand is shown to have been made on the present plaintiff within the thirty days.

The liability of a receiptor is contingent. Unless the officer is liable to either the creditor or the debtor for the production of the property attached, the receiptor is not liable to the officer. The officer has no personal interest in the property or its possession. He holds it merely for the purposes of the law. The creditor’s lien continues for thirty days only after judgment, unless steps are taken within that time to retain or perfect the lien. In this case the debtor had no claim upon the officer, for the property had returned into his possession; nor has the creditor any claim upon him, because he failed to assert his claim by a demand within the thirty days. Any claim upon either officer or receiptor, is lost. Bradbury v. Taylor, 8 Maine, 129 ; Norris v. Bridgham, 14 Maine, 429 ; Humphreys v. Cobb, 22 Maine, 380; Moulton v. Chapin, 28 Maine, 505.

It is readily seen that a demand upon the receiptor is not an excuse for the want of a demand upon the officer. The receiptor *571 is under no obligation to the creditor. His agreement is not with him. There is no privity between them. The officer is responsible to the creditor whether the receiptor is liable to him or not. The receipt is for the officer’s protection,— not for the creditor’s. Phillips v. Bridge, 11 Mass. p. 247; Pearsons v. Tinker, 36 Maine, 384. In the present case an unnecessary demand was made upon the receiptors, and a necessary demand upon the officer was omitted.

We do not mean to say that there may not be a case where a receiptor would be liable without a demand upon a retiring-officer to whom the receipt was given. We have been speaking of the usual relation, such as appears to have existed in the case in hand. An exception exists where the receipt has been assigned by officer to creditor. It may be an equitable assignment. It has been held that such an assignment arises where an officer takes a receipt at the instance of the creditor, upon his approval, and at his risk, the creditor by agreement relying upon the receipt and not upon the obligation of the officer. In such case the creditor is substituted for the officer. He owns the right. He need make no demand upon the officer. He is acting in his behalf in calling upon the receiptor. A demand on the officer is implied — or waived. Hapgood v. Fisher, 30 Maine, 502; Lawrence v. Rice, 12 Metc. 527 ; Moore v. Fargo, 112 Mass. 254 .

Plaintiff nonsuit.

Walton, Danforth, Libbey, Emery and Foster, JJ., concurred.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1896: 11900: 11914: 11936: 118962026peak 1896 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Stannard v. Tillotson90 A. 950 (Vt. 1914)
  2. Hurd v. Ladner81 N.W. 470 (Iowa 1900)
  3. Citizens' National Bank v. Loomis69 N.W. 443 (Iowa 1896)
  4. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. McFadden53 P.2d 1085 (Ariz. 1936)

Most recent

  1. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. McFadden53 P.2d 1085 (Ariz. 1936)
  2. Stannard v. Tillotson90 A. 950 (Vt. 1914)
  3. Hurd v. Ladner81 N.W. 470 (Iowa 1900)
  4. Citizens' National Bank v. Loomis69 N.W. 443 (Iowa 1896)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 1

DepthCaseCited by
Moore v. Fargo, 112 Mass. 254 (1873) 4

Keyboard shortcuts

/Focus the search box
j kNext / previous result
EnterOpen the selected result
xAdd / remove the selected result from the download list
n pNext / previous search term in a case
cCopy the citation of the current case
+ −Larger / smaller reading text
?Show this list