Neal v. Mortland

JRailroacls. Eminent Domain. JR. 8-, c. 61, § 16. Railroad commissioners have authority, on the petition of railroad companies, ' to condemn land for the specific purposes mentioned in the statute only, and not for the general purposes of the corporation, and their certificate should state the special purposes for which such land is needed.

On report. This was a petition for a writ of certiorari to vacate the proceedings of the Railroad Commissioners in condemning lands of the petitioners, in Wiscasset, upon petition of the Knox and Lincoln Railroad. The railroad had applied under R. S., c. 51 § 16, to the commissioners for authority to take the lands ; and in its petition alleged, "that the purchase or taking and holding of all of said land is required and necessary for necessary tracks, side tracks and station for said company ; but that the owners of said land do not consent thereto, and that the parties do not agree as to the necessity therefor, or the area necessary to be taken.” After due notice and hearing thereon the commissioners made a report and decision and gave a certificate of the taking, allowed by them, to the railroad, the essential part of which is as follows : "It appeared to us and we so find, determine and certify that so much of the premises, as is hereinafter definitely described, is necessary for the use of said Knox and Lincoln Railroad company for necessary tracks, side tracks, stations and for the reasonable accommodation of the traffic and appropriate business of said corporation.” . . . In their report and decision preliminary to the granting of the certificate, the commissioners say: "It appeared by evidence adduced atthe hearing on said application, that the lands described in said application consisted of one narrow strip of land about a rod in width, situated next southerly of the freight depot and adjoining the railroad location, not now used for any purpose except for the deposit of rubbish, etc.; that the railroad company desired said strip of land, for the purpose of making an approach from Main street, along a side track there situated, to said freight depot. "The other described parcel of land is a strip fifteen feet wide, on the easterly or shore side of said railroad location and depot grounds, consisting of flats and a portion of an old wharf. The reasons assigned by the petitioners for the taking of this last mentioned strip of land, were to enable them to place a retaining Avail for the support of the railroad embankment, and to give them the right to remove a portion of an old and unoccupied building situated on said wharf, which obstructed a view of a SAvitch near the passenger station, to approaching trains. Counsel, claindng to represent all of the parties interested in said lands, having Avaived proof and admitted notice to all, as the laAv requires, insisted that the reasons given by the petitioners, for taking the several parcels of land before mentioned, were not sufficient in law to empower the board to order a condemnation of said land; because it did not appear that the objects for such condemnation, were embraced in those enumerated in the statute, for which land might be taken. "While we admit that there is some force in the argument to sustain the position taken by counsel for the respondents, we think the statute is sufficiently broad to give the board jurisdiction. The objects mentioned by statute, for which railroad corporations may take and hold land, are 'land for borrow and gravel pits, necessary tracks, side tracks, stations, woodsheds, repair shops, and car, engine and freight houses.’ To limit the extent of the land, which might be taken, strictly to the land covered by these structures mentioned, would be absurd. Such' structures without means or right of approach to them, would be useless. Such lands in connection and in addition to the lands for objects above mentioned, necessary ' for the reasonable accommodation of the traffic and appropriate business of the corporation,’ may we think, under the provisions of statute, be taken. "We, therefore, find that the objects for which the petitioners seek to take and .hold the parcels of land mentioned, are included in the provisions of statute above mentioned.” . . . Among the reasons alleged by these petitioners for vacating the proceedings of the commissioners are the following: . . . "Because it appears by said report and certificate that the lands so attempted to be condemned and taken, were not taken or required by said railroad company, for any of the purposes authorized . by law; but were taken for purposes wholly unauthorized, viz : for the purpose of opening a public street or 'approach’ from Main street to the freight depot of said railroad in Wiscasset, and for the further purpose of enabling the said railroad company to place and retain a wall for the support of an existing railroad embankment, and to give the said railroad the right to remove the portion of a building situated on a part of said land, which, it is alleged in said report, obstructed a view of a switch near the passenger station, to approaching trains. "And hereupon your petitioners say that the said public street or approach from Main street to said freight depot was not one, or either, of the purposes for which land might be so taken and condemned; that said proposed street or'approach’ covered a large tract of land, part of which was owned by said railroad company, and parts of which were owned by some one or more of your petitioners, and none of which was owned by all of your petitioners jointly or as tenants in common. "And that the said wall for the support of the existing railroad embankment, and the taking of land and flats and wharves therefor, was not a purpose authorized by law but ivas for the mere convenience of said corporation and for the furtherance of mere economical consideration. "And that the building situated on a part of said land, which the said corporation desired to remove because it obstructed the view of the switch as mentioned in said report and certificate, stood and existed where it now stands at the time of the original location and building of said railroad and of the erection of said passenger station and switch, and that the removal of said building for the purpose stated is not a purpose authorized by law. "Because said railroad commissioners were not authorized and had no legal authority to determine generally, as they have by said report and certificate attempted to do, that the said lands were necessary for the reasonable accommodation of the traffic and appropriate business of the said corporation, their authority being limited to the determination of how much, if any. of the land described in the petition, is necessary for borrow and gravel pits, necessary tracks, sidetracks, stations, woodsheds, repair shops and car, engine and freight houses, as are specified and individually named and designated with the land deemed necessary for each.” The statute requires the commissioners to state specifically, in their certificate, for which of the several purposes mentioned in the statute the land is condemned ; and if for more than one of those purposes, what and how much land for each, and who is the owner of it. It is impossible to ascertain how much of the land described in the certificate was taken for side tracks and how much for general use. There is no sufficient description in the certificate of the area taken or boundaries or separate ownership. We are entitled to a distinct statement of the uses and purposes for which, and the extent to which, each piece is taken ; so that, as to all other uses and purposes, our rights may be preserved, as in the case of other easements. Certiorari lies only to correct errors in law. Lapan v. Go. Gom. 65 Maine, 160 ; Levant v. Go. Gom. 67 lb. 429. Facts in Bpojford v. li. II. Go. 66 Maine, 26, are different. Petition of railroad complies with the principles established in that case. Commissioners’ certificate shows lands were taken for purposes authorized by statute. Description definite and certain and folloivs petition. Statute does not require separate descriptions for separate owners, — only in the application. This petition addressed to the discretion of the court, and no substantial injustice done. Decisions and findings of the commissioners in matters of fact are binding and conclusive, and not subject to be reviewed.