Briggs v. Hunton

Warranty. Stallion. Registration of Animals. R. S-, o. 3S, § 61. There is no implied warranty, in a contract for the service of a stallion for breeding, that the animal is free from disease that may be transmitted to offspring. Where the use of property is private, and not deleterious to public health or welfare, so as to come within proper police regulation, its use may be enj oyed free from legislative control. Held; That the price of service for a stallion, when the animal has not been registered as required by R. S., c. 38, § 61, may be recovered when the animal has not been advertised or held out for public use.

On exceptions. This was an action on the case upon an account annexed, the principal item of which was for services of the plaintiffs’ stallion, '' Sir William,” to the defendant’s mare in 1889, when said mare was bred to said stallion. The evidence tended to show that the plaintiffs were then engaged in the business of keeping and owning other stallions for breeding purposes; that defendant attempted to breed his mare to another of the plaintiff's’ stallions at an agreed price of seventy-five dollars, but was unsuccessful: that these plaintiffs offered defendant the service of Sir William, then two years old, then kept and owned by plaintiffs for breeding purposes only as appears by the evidence, for the sum of fifty dollars, and that thereupon defendant’s mare was bred to said Sir William ; that there ivas no express contract as to the condition of said stallion, and no express condition to said contract of service, except that the mare should prove to be in foal; that said mare did prove in foal and dropped a colt the following season; that said colt, the defendant claimed, was dropped weak, sick and diseased, and lived only four days. The defendant claimed that the evidence tended to show that said stallion at the time of said service was afflicted, with an incipient disease, which afterwards developed into fits (this, however, was denied by the plaintiffs), and thereupon the defendant claimed that there was an implied warranty in the contract o'f service that said stallion was not then diseased, and that if the jury should find that said stallion was so diseased, it would be a defense to said item. But the presiding justice ruled otherwise, and that even if said stallion was at the time of said contract and service afflicted with any incipient disease, unknown to the plaintiffs, it would be no defense to said item. The plaintiffs admitted that prior to said contract and service, they had filed no certificate with the register of deeds in the county ivhere said stallion was owned or kept, stating the name, color, age and size of the same together with the pedigree of said stallion as fully as attainable, and the name of the person by whom he was bred, as provided in section 61, chapter 38, of the Revised Statutes; but the plaintiffs claimed and offered evidence tending to show that prior to said contract and service, they had not advertised the services of said stallion by any written or printed notices. All the other items in the account annexed were admitted. Thereupon the defendant requested the presiding justice to rule that the plaintiffs could not in this action recover compensation for said service, namely, said item of fifty dollars. But the presiding justice declined so to rule, but ruled, pro forma, that the plaintiffs could recover for said service, notwithstanding their failure so to file such certificate, and directed the jury, there being no other defense offered, to return a verdict for the plaintiffs for the full amount of their account annexed, including said item, and which they accordingly did. To all these rulings and the directions so to return a verdict, the defendant took exceptions. We have not been able to find a case exactly parallel with this, and therefore the analogies to be drawn from decided cases are not perfect. It is not the case of a sale ; it is more nearly akin to a case of contract to manufacture, or perhaps a sale of goods manufactured by the owner. There is in such cases an implied understanding that the ai’ticles manufactured or sold for a specific purpose will answer the purpose. See Note to 24 Am. Rep. 104. No analogy from the doctrine of caveat emptor can apply. The defect was not discoverable; the disease was latent. See note to Ghandelor v. Lopus, 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, 318. The trouble, not being in its nature discernible, and the undoubted purpose being to obtain a colt that was at least healthy or free from hereditary disease, it must be beyond question in such a case that there was an implied understanding, stipulation or warranty that the stallion was in that respect fit for breeding purposes. See note to Ghandelor v. Lopus, supra ; Warner v. Arctic Ice Go. 74 Maine, 475 ; Downing v. Dearborn, 77 Maine, 457; Thoms v. Dinghy, 70 Maine, 100. II. The second question is whether failure to file a certificate of pedigree, etc., as required by R. S., chap. 38, section 61, is a defense. The plaintiffs claim (a) that the stallion was not "kept” for breeding purposes, and (b) they "had not advertised the services of said stallion by any written or printed notices.” (a) As to the first point, the case shows that the plaintiff's " were then engaged in the business of keeping and owning other stallions for breeding purposes.” The defendant unsucessfully tried to breed his mare to another stallion of plaintiff's at an agreed price. Plaintiffs then " offered ” the service of Sir William, the stallion in question, which was accepted. It is immaterial whether Sir William had been used for customers’ mares before that. There always has to be a first time. They used him this time in their business of " keeping-stallions,” etc., and as a substitute for another. They contracted his services for a price, which they are seeking to recover. He was a jiart of their stud, and apparently used as such when occasion required. The purpose of the statute applied to him just as much as to any other stallion. The fact that he was ungelded shows why he was " kept,” and being so kept the statute should be applied to him. (b) In answer to plaintiffs’ second claim, we say that the statute is explicit: " Whoever neglects to make and file such certificate shall recover no compensation,” whether he has advertised or not. The advertising is not a condition to the forfeiture of compensation.