Allen v. Boston & Maine Railroad

Negligence. Verdict. Railroads. Whether the injury received by plaintiff was caused by the negligence of the defendant, without fault on the part of the plaintiff, is an issue to be submitted to the jury. Where the evidence is conflicting, and the jury find the issue in favor of the plaintiff, and it may be that the court would have arrived at a different conclusion, yet the court is not at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of the jury, which is the constitutional tribunal to determine the facts, there being no suggestion of bias or undue influence on their part, and the evidence being such that different minds might reach different conclusions. The rule that a rapidly moving train has a precedence, over the traveler, at a crossing on the highway, does not apply to stationary trains. As to these, neither has precedence, but each should act with due regard to the other, the right of passage being equal to each.

On Motion by Defendant. The facts appear in the opinion. Trainmen must keep sharp lookout to avoid collisions at crossings, and it is the duty of trainmen to avoid a collision if they can. It is the duty of both engineer and fireman to keep a lookout ahead of their locomotive. If the employees of a railroad company, whose duty it is to watch the tracks, fail to discover the peril of persons at a crossing, when reasonable attention would have enabled them to do so in time to have prevented the infliction of injury, the company is liable. Purinton v. M. C. B.. B. Co., 78 Maine, 569; Garland v. M. C. B. B. Co., 85 Maine, 519; 4 Ám. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 909, et seq. and cases. In Well v. P. K. B. B. Co., 57 Maine, 117, the following was deemed negligence: “ The engineer in charge testifying that he did not see Webb’s team until the engine was within ten feet of him, and that the brakeman who was looking out on the side from which Webb was approaching, gave him (the engineer) no notice.” New trial: A verdict should not be set aside as against evidence, where there is evidence, on both sides, unless in extraordinary cases, where it is manifest that the jury have mistaken or abused their trust, and the verdict is manifestly against the weight of evidence and glaringly erroneous. Weld v. Ohadbourne, 37 Maine, 227 ; Tower v. Haslam, 84 Maine, 86; Hodge v. Dodge, 86 Maine, 393. In Dodge v. Dodge, above cited, where much of the evidence was irrelevant and contradictory, the court said: “The weight of evidence depends upon the intelligence, the character, and credibility of the witnesses.” The question of negligence, even in cases where the facts are undisputed, and where intelligent and fair-minded men may reasonably arrive at different conclusions, is for the jury. Rhoades v. Varney, 91 Maine, 226; Hlwell v. Hacker, 86 Maine, 416; Nugent v. B. O. M. R. R., 80 Maine, 62. New trial not granted because court would have drawn different inferences, and arrived at a different conclusion; and the court can not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Hill v. Nash, 41 Maine, 585; Hlliott v. Grant, 59 Maine, 419; Lowell v. Newport, 66 Maine, 78; Parks v. Libby, 92 Maine, 133. Where the evidence is conflicting upon points vital to the result, a verdict will not be reversed, unless the preponderance against it is such as to amount to a moral certainty that the jury erred. Hnjield v. Buswell, 62 Maine, 128; Hunter v. Heath, 67 Maine, 507; Smith v Brunswick, 80 Maine, 192. While it has sometimes been judicially held that the right of neither the traveler along the highways nor the railroad company at crossings was superior to that of the other, it has also been many times declared that, in the exercise and enjoyment of these rights, the railroad must necessarily have precedence. Lesanv. M. G. R. R., 77 Maine, 85, 89, 90; Smith v. M. G. R. R., 87 Maine, 339, 347, and cases cited. And many well-considered cases have held that “in this particular” the right of the traveler was “ subordinate.” Newharcl v. Penn. R. R. Co., 153 Penn. St. 417, 421; Ohio Miss. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 113 Ind. 196; Black v. Bur. C. R. M. Ry. Co., 38 Iowa, 515; Conkling v. Erie R. R. Co. (N. J. Law, June, 1899) ; Morris v. Chic. M. St. P., 26 Ped. Rep. 22. Was it the latter? Quite as clearly, and nearly as often, have courts refused redress to those who choose to take such visible risk. Mertigan v. B. A. R. R., 154 Mass. 189, 191; Chic., etc., R. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; Smith v. M. C. R. R., 87 Maine, 339, 351, 352; Mott v. Detroit, G. H. M. Ry. Co. (Mich. May 9, 1899), 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 113; Ho. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Ereeman, 174 U. S. 379, 384. Where then was plaintiff’s due care ? Applying perfectly well-settled principles of law to facts, as plaintiff discloses them, can this conclusion be escaped? Returning home with an empty, open, farm wagon, he rashly and needlessly rushed a dull horse laterally off a planked crossing as he attempted to hurry through a railroad freight yard, with which he was entirely familiar, at a time when cars were being shifted in and out over it, and precisely when he saw a locomotive with two cars coupled to it “ kick ” a third toward a house-track, and stop only twenty feet away; then, when fully committed to the foolhardy enterprise, he perceived the locomotive again coming toward him, instead of himself stopping until it had gone past, still pushes on, “urging” his horse, until, in his self-invited panic, he swings his wagon wheel clear of the planking, though inside the rail, and was tilted out. In every logical and legal sense all he has suffered therefrom has arisen solely from, and must remain chargeable to, his own negligent want of ordinary care.