Slattery v. Hall

Question of Ambiguity not Eaised on General Demurrer for Want of Pacts.—Under a general demurrer that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, an objection cannot be taken that it is merely ambiguous. Trust in Payor of Settlers in Possession—Question on Dispute as to Possession.—Where a number of settlers on a Mexican grant deeded their claims and contributed money to trustees, under an agreement that the trustees were to buy up the grant title, and afterwards deed to each settler the land in his possession, and there was a dispute between two of the settlers as to the right to a deed of a particular piece: held, that though the extent of one’s possession would generally be indicated by his fences, it was the fact of actual possession, with or without a fence, which would entitle the possessor to a deed.

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Sonoma County. The complaint, after setting forth the death of Michael Slattery, and the appointment and qualification of the plaintiff as his administratrix, and the possession of the deceased, and of the plaintiff, as his administratrix, of a portion (some two hundred and twenty acres) of the Blucher Rancho, in Sonoma County, describing it, proceeded to allege that while said plaintiff, and a great many other settlers, possessing other portions of the rancho, were so settled, and had such possession, it was ascertained that the land was claimed and held by a valid title then outstanding, and adverse to the said settlers; that thereupon, November 18th, 1865, said settlers, including plaintiff, appointed a committee, consisting of defendants Hall, Mills, Hinshaw, Hubbell, and Mc-Cune, “with an agreement and understanding that said committee would purchase and procure, for the benefit and use of said settlers, including the plaintiff, and in trust for them, and each of them, including the plaintiff, any and ■ all outstanding title, or titles, in said Blucher Rancho, held adversely to them, and to each of them;” that said committee accepted the trust, and promised and agreed to execute the same; that “it was mutually agreed by said settlers, and by said committee, that the parcels of lands possessed by them, and each of them, respectively, should be assessed as to the value of each tract separately, taking in the estimate quantity and quality of each parcel or tract of land possessed by each settler, and the value of each tract to be in such manner ascertained; that said assessment was made of all of said tracts of land, including the land of the plaintiff, in accordance with said agreement; that said assessment was to be made in reference to the amount said committee might have to pay for the whole of said Blucher Rancho; that the land above described was assessed to the plaintiff at the price of seven dollars per acre; that for the purpose of facilitating the action of said committee, and the better enabling them to carry out said agreement between said settlers and said committee, said settlers, including this plaintiff, did, on November 18th, 1865, make, execute, and deliver to said committee their joint deed in writing, whereby the said settlers, and each of them, including the plaintiff, conveyed to said committee, as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common, all the right and title owned and claimed by each of said settlers of, in, and to, said Blucher Rancho,” which said deed was duly recorded; that said committee purchased all the outstanding titles to said rancho; that in accordance with said agreement, the plaintiff paid the entire assessment on the said tract of land claimed by Michael Slattery in his lifetime, being the tract before described; that after said payment, and before the commencement of suit, plaintiff demanded of said committee a proper deed to her, as such administratrix, which she presented to them for execution; but that they had refused, and still refused, to execute or deliver the same, or in any manner to comply with their agreement with her, to her damage five hundred dollars.” The complaint proceeded to allege that the defendant Sharon pretended to some right or interest in a portion (twenty-four acres) of said land of plaintiff; that said pretended claim was without foundation, and had been set up to prevent the said committee from executing the deed to her; and prayed that Sharon might be compelled to set ■forth the claim “ which he pretends to have to said portion of said land by him claimed, and detained, and withheld, and from which said Sharon has kept the plaintiff ousted since ¡November 18th, 1865, to her damage three hundred dollars.” The complaint closed with a prayer for damages as alleged; for an order compelling the trustees to execute a deed to her; for a writ of restitution compelling Sharon to deliver up the portion of said land claimed by him, and for general relief. The defendants interposed a general demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which was overruled. They then answered, and set up that defendant Sharon was, and had been' since 1861, in the continuous, open, notorious, adverse, and exclusive possession of the twenty-four acres of land in controversy; that Sharon was one of the settlers, and possessed other land; that all his lands, including the twenty-four acres, were, and had been since 1861, inclosed by his fences; that he, and not the plaintiff, was entitled, to the deed to the twenty-four acres piece; that a proper deed had been tendered to the plaintiff of all the land claimed by her, except" said piece, and that she had refused it. The cause was tried by the Court, and after much testimony as to possession of the twenty-four acres piece, conflicting in its character, resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff as prayed, but without damagés. The defendants moved for a new trial, which being denied, they appealed from the judgment and order.