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Frolich v. McKiernan

T. H. FROLICH v. CHARLES McKIERNAN

Frolich v. McKiernan, 24 P. 114 (Cal. 1890)
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Court
California Supreme Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
May 29, 1890
Docket
No. 12670
Judges
McFarland
Citations
24 P. 11484 Cal. 1771890 Cal. LEXIS 783
Syllabus
Slander — Charge of Theft against Secretary of Corporation—Actionable Words — Pleading.—The words, “you thief,” “you swindler," “you scoundrel,” “you want to swindle me out of my money,” alleged in the complaint to have been slanderously spoken in the presence of others, by defendant, of, to, and concerning plaintiff as the secretary of a corporation of which defendant was president, and for the purpose of injuring plaintiff in his said office, and to have been meant to be understood, and to have been actually understood, by those who heard them, as charging plaintiff with having committed theft as such secretary, are actionable, and cannot upon demurrer he construed as merely imputing to plaintiff a desire to swindle. Id. —Special Damages. —When the complaint in an action for slander contains allegations sufficiently showing that the words spoken of the plaintiff by the defendant are actionable, it is not necessary to allege special damages.
Summary
Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Santa Clara County. The complaint -alleges that plaintiff is, and was at the time set forth therein, the secretary of the Santa Clara Valley Co-operative Wine Company, a corporation of which defendant is and then was president and a stockholder, and proceeds to allege as follows: “That on the twelfth day of November, 1887, in the presence of one F. Duchatel, the superintendent of said corporation, William Farrington, a stockholder and director thereof, Richard Faull, and other persons then and there present, the said defendant willfully and maliciously spoke to, of, and concerning the plaintiff the following false and scandalous words, ‘ you thief/ ‘ you swindler/ ‘ yon scoundrel/ ‘ you want to swindle me out of my money/ meaning thereby that this plaintiff, by virtue of the position he held as aforesaid, and by reason of his acts as such secretary, clothed with the 'duties thereof, had stolen from the said defendant as stockholder aforesaid, and as such secretary cheated and defrauded the said defendant, and was of such character that he was unfit to be, and to act as, such secretary, because of being dishonest; that defendant desired to be understood, and did mean thereby, and' was understood by said plaintiff "and the said parties then present, as charging the said plaintiff with dishonesty, and as being unreliable in his office in said incorporation as aforesaid, for the services of which plaintiff was being pecuniarily recompensed, and from which recompense he supported his family; and defendant did so charge plaintiff with being a thief, for the purpose of, and defendant did then and there desire to be understood,, and was- understood by said parties, as charging said plaintiff unqualifiedly of having committed theft as such secretary as aforesaid; that defendant did mean, and was understood to mean, by parties then and there present, and by this plaintiff, by said words, ‘you swindler/ ‘you scoundrel/ that this plaintiff was dishonest, unreliable, an.d unworthy of confidence as such secretary as aforesaid; and said defendant did mean by the expression ‘ you want to swindle me out of my money/ and was so- understood by the parties then and there present,, as imputing to plaintiff an attempt to steal, to swindle, and defraud defendant, and want of honesty; and said charges, as- aforesaid, did tend, and were uttered by said defendant for the purpose of inducing and compelling the- directors of said corporation to remove the plaintiff as such secretary from said position, thereby to- deprive the said plaintiff of the support of himself and family from salary as such secretary. By reason of which plaintiff has suffered damages in the sum of ten thousand dollars. Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant in the sum of ten thousand dollars, and costs o.f suit/’ Further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — McFarland

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McFarland, J.

Action for slander; verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $450; defendant appeals from the judgment upon the judgment roll alone. The only points made by the appellant relate to the sufficiency of the complaint, to which he demurred, upon the grounds that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and is ambiguous, uncertain-, and unintelligible.

There is supposed to be still some relic of the exaggerated nicety with which pleadings in actions of libel and slander had formerly to be constructed, and it is invoked in this case. The words alleged in the complaint to have been slanderously spoken by defendant of plaintiff are these: “You.thief,” “youswindler,” “you scoundrel,” *180 “you want to swindle me out of my money.” Of this language the ordinary man would say, with the hostess in Henry IV., “These are very bitter words”; but it is contended that, for the purposes of the law of slander, the sting of the first part of the language is removed by the qualification of the latter part. That is to sa3q the contention is, that defendant only said that plaintiff was a thief because he wanted to swindle defendant out of his money; and as wanting to swindle does not make a man a thief, therefore defendant did not, in law, call plaintiff a thief; and as wanting to swindle a man out of his money does not constitute a crime, therefore the alleged language is not actionable. There is, no doubt, some authority for this contention; but the complaint minutely and in detail sets forth what defendant meant by the language used, and how he meant to be understood by those in whose presence it was used, and how the latter understood it, and, moreover, that plaintiff, was the secretary of a certain corporation of which defendant was president, and that the language was spoken of and concerning plaintiff as such secretary, for the purpose of injuring him in his said office. This was sufficient to make, the language actionable, and it was not necessary to allege special damages. (Civ. Code, sec. 46; Butler v. Howes, 7 Cal. 87 .)

We see nothing in the points that the complaint was ambiguous, uncertain, or unintelligible.

Judgment affirmed.

Sharpstein, J., and Fox, J., concurred.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1902: 11921: 21961: 11974: 119022026peak 1921 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Douglas v. Janis43 Cal. App. 3d 931 (1974)
  2. Oberkotter v. Woolman202 P. 669 (Cal. 1921)
  3. Williams v. Seiglitz200 P. 635 (Cal. 1921)
  4. Correia v. Santos191 Cal. App. 2d 844 (1961)
  5. Jarman v. Rea70 P. 216 (Cal. 1902)

Most recent

  1. Douglas v. Janis43 Cal. App. 3d 931 (1974)
  2. Correia v. Santos191 Cal. App. 2d 844 (1961)
  3. Oberkotter v. Woolman202 P. 669 (Cal. 1921)
  4. Williams v. Seiglitz200 P. 635 (Cal. 1921)
  5. Jarman v. Rea70 P. 216 (Cal. 1902)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 1

DepthCaseCited by
Butler v. Howes, 7 Cal. 87 (1857) 3

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