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Washburn v. Franklin

WASHBURN a. FRANKLIN

Washburn v. Franklin, 7 Abb. Pr. 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858)
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Court
New York Supreme Court · State Trial Courts
Decided
June 15, 1858
Judges
Ingraham
Citations
7 Abb. Pr. 828 Barb. 27
Headnotes
Pleading.—Contracts regulated bt Statute. In an action on a contract, the form or the making of which is regulated by statute,—e. g., a contract for the sale of stock under 1 Revised Statutes, Í10,—it is not necessary to plead the circumstances of compliance with the statute relied on to take the case out of its operation.* Whether a contract, valid at common law, but prohibited by statute, and entered into while the prohibiting statute is in force, is made valid by a repeal of that statute,—Query ?
Summary
Demurrer to complaint. The action was brought to recover damages against the defendant for not fulfilling a contract for the purchase from plaintiff of certain stock. The time of the making of the alleged agreement was prior to the passage of the act of 1858 (Laws of 1858, 251, ch. 184), repealing the statute prohibiting stock-jobbing (1 Feo. Stats., 710). The complaint did not aver that the plaintiff was, at the time of making the agreement, the owner of the stock, or in possession of it, nor that the agreement was in writing. The defendant demurred, and specified these as the grounds of his objections to the complaint. — —, for the plaintiff.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Ingraham

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Ingraham, J.

defendant demurs to the plaintiff’s com-

—The plaint, upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The action is upon a stock contract, and the defendant’s objection to the complaint is, that it does not aver that the plaintiff was the owner of the stock at the time of the sale, or that the contract was in writing.

■ There is no doubt the statute requires, to make the contract valid, that the party contracting to sell shall either have the certificate or be otherwise entitled to sell the same. (1 Rev. Stats., 710.)

*10 But it never was necessary to aver such possession in the declaration before the Code, nor do I think it necessary now. The fact on which the plaintiff relies is the making of the contract. This is admitted by the demurrer. It must be a legal contract, or it is nothing, and' issue upon the question whether a contract was made or not would involve its legality, and of course would include the requisite facts to make the contract a legal one.

These remarks apply to the objection that the complaint does not allege that the contract was in writing. I adhere to the opinion that it was unnecessary, as held in Stern a. Drinker (2 É. D. Smith, 401). The same rule would apply to cases under the statute of frauds. In such cases it is unnecessary to aver it. If any legal contract is made, it must be in writing. If not a legal contract, it is no contract. The evidence to prove the contract need not be set out, but only that a contract was made. The mode of making is matter of evidence.

The plaintiff suggested that this defence would now be unavailing, as the Legislature had repealed the stock-jobbing act. The statute only applies to contracts hereafter made, which are made valid by the 1st section. Whether the repeal of the statute, by the 2d section, could validate the contract, which was otherwise void, may well be doubted. In the case of contract void for usury, the Legislature have prohibited corporations from setting up the defence. Although the effect of such prohibition is virtually to render the contract effectual, still it does not go so far as to declare a void contract a valid one, and I should hesitate in giving such a construction to the repealing clause. It is unnecessary, however, here to pass upon the question.

Judgment for the plaintiff on demurrer, with leave to defendant to withdraw demurrer and-answer, on payment of costs.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1889: 11974: 118892026peak 1889 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Berrien v. Southack7 N.Y.S. 324 (1889)
  2. United States v. Flemming Anderson, United States of America v. William G. Hale498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

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