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Fenner v. Lewis

Fenner against Lewis

Fenner v. Lewis, 10 Johns. 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813)
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Court
New York Supreme Court · State Trial Courts
Decided
January 15, 1813
Citations
10 Johns. 38
Headnotes
Husband and eies of^agree-Muted to°iJvé separate, and C executed the agreement suretySfor the ' veMntcd To r to .the certain sum of deUvmng'to the wife, for her separate use, a coachee and horses, &c. In an aet:on of covenant brought by the husband against C. to recover the money, it was held that evidence of the declarations and confessions of the wife, as to the delivery of the coachee and . horses, was admissible. It seems, that where a husband permits his wife to act in any particular business, he is bound by her acts and admissions, which may be given in evidence against him. Where a party asks a witness as to what another person confessed, the whole'of the confession ov declaration, as stated by the witness, is evidence, and must be taken together»
Summary
THIS was an action of covenant. The cause was tried at the Nem-York sittings, in Jimc, 1812, before the Chief Justice. The cause came' up on a bill of exceptions, taken at the trial, The facts contained in the bill of exceptions, which are material * 7 to be stated, were as follows: Tjhe plaintiff gave in evidence articles of agreement, made the 22d of November, 1806, between *;'ie °f d"18 first part, Dorothy, the wife of the plaintiff, of the second part, and the defendant, of the third part; reciting, that whereas the plaintiff,. and Dorothy, his wife, had agreed t° live separate, and'the defendant had agreed to be bound for performance of the terms on the part of the said Dorothy, * i ,, &c. The plaintiff covenanted with the defendant to permit the x A said Dorothy to live separate and apart from him, &c. And in consideration .of the premises, the defendant covenanted, on the part of the wife, to pay the plaintiff “ 3,800 dollars, the plaintiff delivering to the said Dorothy, for her separate use, the coachee and horses which he has lately purchasedand further, that the said Dorothy shall suffer the plaintiff to live separate from her, &c. and for the punctual performance of the agreement, the plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to each other, in the penal sum of 25,000 dollars. The plaintiff offered Robert Jackson, as a witness, to prove certain declarations and confessions of Dorothy, the wife of the plaintiff, relative to her acceptance of the coachee and horses, and which declarations rvere made in the presence of the defendant. The evidence was objected to by the defendant’s counsel, and the objection was overruled by the judge;' and his opinion excepted to by the defendant’s counsel. The witness being admitted, testified, that he had let a stable to the plaintiff, before the separation of the plaintiff and his wife, in which the coachee and horses were kept. After the separation, in the fall of 1806, the plaintiff removed to jPoughkeepsie, and the witness called on the wife for the rent of the stable, and she told the witness that she had the coachee in the stable and used it, but not the horses; that she had sent them to the plaintiff at Poughkeepsie, to be kept during the winter. The witness requested her to give up the stable, but she refused, saying she should want it for the horses in the spring. She afterwards took away the coachee. The defendant produced as a witness, a coachman who lived with the plaintiff, who testified, that he took the horses to Poughkeepsie, by order of the plaintiff? in the autumn of 1806; and that early in the next spring, he brought the horses to New-York, by direction of the plaintiff^ who sold them; and that the witness was never spoken to by Mrs. Fenner relative to the horses. John Robertson, witness for the' defendant, testified, that he saw the horses in the spring of 1807, in New-York ; and being questioned by the defendant, whether the plaintiff had not acknowledged that he wanted to sell them, the witness answered, that the plaintiff told him “ that he wanted to sell the horses, for he had offered them to Mrs. Fenner, and she would not receive them, and he must do something with them.” The defendant’s counsel objected to any evidence of the declarations of the plaintiff, in the absence of the defendant; but the Chief Justice ruled that the evidence was admissible, as coming from the defendant’s own witness, on his direct examination, and being part of the conversation about which the defendant inquired. To this opinion the defendant^ counsel excepted., The defendant then offered a witness to prove the declarations of the defendant, at different times, in the winter of 1806, but the evidence was objected to by the plaintiff’s counsel, and overruled by the Chief Justice. , The plaintiff produced two other witnesses to prove the acknowledgments of Mrs. Fenner, in presence of the plaintiff, one of whom testified, that being present at the house of Mrs. Fenner, in the spring of 1807, the plaintiff came there and told her he had brought down the horses in good order; and she said it was no time to talk about them. This evidence was objected to but admitted, and an exceptiop taken. The Chief Justice charged the jury, that the delivery of the coachee to Mrs. Fenner was admitted, and that thé testimony given by three witnesses of the admission of Mrs. Fenner, that she had sent the horses to Poughkeepsie, was sufficient evidence of the fact of her having received the horses in the fall of 1806, after the separation; and that the defendant having covenanted to pay the plaintiff 3,800 dollars, on his delivering the coachee and horses to his wife, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and the jury accordingly found a verdict for the plaintiff.

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Opinion of the Court

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Per Curiam.

The principal point in this case is, whether the declarations of Mrs. Fenner, relative to the delivery of the horses, Were competent evidence. By the articles containing the covenant on which the suit is brought, the plaintiff and his wife agreed to a separation, and the defendant became a party to the agreement as her trustee. Provision was made for her maintenance and enjoyment of separate property. She was to live, thereafter, as a feme sole, and was to receive from the plaintiff, “ for her separate use, the coachee and horses which he had lately purchased.” Both parties, by the covenant, concurred in her capacity to receive these articles, and she became, for that purpose, their mutual agent. Her declaration or confession that the act was done,- became legal evidence of that fact, as a necessary consequence of her authority, under the articles, to receive the coachee and horses; for no prin_-, ciple would seem to be more clear than that the person to whom performance of an act is agreed to be made, is competent to acknowledge such performance. If she was competent to receive, she was. competent to give a receipt for them, and if her receipt would have been good evidence of the delivery, her parol admission must be equally so. The marriage union had, by the articles of separation, essentially ceased, and the law would so, far recognise such a separation, as not to hold the husband any longer liable for her support. (Baker v. Barney, 8 Johns. Rep, .72.) The policy of the rule excluding the husband and wife from being witnesses for or against each other, is founded, according to one opinion, (Lord Kenyon in 3 Term Rep. 678.) on the supposed bias arising from the marriage; and, according to another opinion, (Lord Hardwicke in Baker v. Dixie, Cases temp. Hardw. 252.) on the necessity pf preserving the peace of families. Neither pf these reasons for the rulé any longer applied here; and though the i;ule may still exist in the case to some purposes, it ought very readily to be made to yield to those cases which are exceptions to its application. Thus a wife’s declaration of what she agreed to give a nurse, was received as good evidence to charge the husband, because she was his agent in hiring the nurse. (Anon. Stra. 527.) go where the husband permits her to act for him in any *45 particular business, he adopts and is bound by her acts and admissions, and they may be given in evidence against him. (Emer son v. Blanden, 1 Esp. Rep. 142.) The defendant here agreed to be bound by her act in receiving the horses; and, of course, he is bound by her admission of the act, and the plaintiff has as good a right to avail himself of her confession as he would have of her receipt. If her act or admission be good in one case, to charge the husband in favour of a third person, because she was his agent, the rule ought equally to apply in favour of the husband, when he and a third person, by the contract between them, have mutually referred to an ant in which she was to be a party.

The disposal of this point goes, in a great degree, to put an end to all the questions raised in the bill of exceptions, as they principally depend upon it. There was another point, however, on which some reliance seemed to be placed by the counsel, though we cannot perceive any force in it. This was respecting the answer given by John Robinson, a witness on the part of the defendant, to a question put to him on the part of the defendant, as to a confession of the plaintiff. There is no principle in the law of evidence better settled, than that, if you will examine as to the confession of a party, you must take the whole confession together. You cannot take part and reject part.

Judgment for the plaintiff

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Cited by 10 cases

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1833–1834: 11843–1844: 11847–1848: 11853–1854: 11877–1878: 21879–1880: 11885–1886: 11899–1900: 11901–1902: 118332026peak 1877 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Gates v. Brower9 N.Y. 205 (1853)
  2. Foote v. Nickerson48 A. 1088 (N.H. 1900)
  3. B'd Sup'rs of Tompkins Co. v. Bristol1 N.E. 878 (N.Y. 1885)
  4. Dupre v. Rein7 Abb. N. Cas. 256 (1879)
  5. Pickering v. Pickering6 N.H. 120 (1833)
  6. Rolette v. Rolette1 Pin. 370 (1843)

Most recent

  1. Town of Goshen v. Smith61 A.D. 461 (1901)
  2. Foote v. Nickerson48 A. 1088 (N.H. 1900)
  3. B'd Sup'rs of Tompkins Co. v. Bristol1 N.E. 878 (N.Y. 1885)
  4. Dupre v. Rein7 Abb. N. Cas. 256 (1879)
  5. Dupre v. Rein56 How. Pr. 228 (1878)
  6. Nash v. Mitchell3 Abb. N. Cas. 171 (1877)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

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