Summary
Criminal law. Before Judge Clark. Macon Superior Court. May, 1871.
Holsenbake was indicted for murdering George W. Fish, in said county, on the 28th of February, 1871, by shooting him. He was tried in May, 1871.
Jacob Odom, a negro, testified that he was at the train about 2 o’clock, A. M., of said day, when Fish came on it to bis home, Oglethorpe; that he took Fish’s papers to carry for him, and, as they were walking near the Courthouse door, some one shot a gun from it, and Fish fell. He added that he ran off for help, told several persons that Fish was killed, and begged them to go to see him. They went, and found him dying from the effects of bullets in his head and neck.
What Odom said and did, as aforesaid after the shooting, was objected to by prisoner’s counsel, but the objection was overruled. The parties whom Odom called up testified that Fish died in a few minutes from the effects of said wounds.
One McNeil testified that, in January, 1871, he was talking with Holsenbake, and that Holsenbake said that, if Fish was having improper intimacy with his (Holsenbake’s) former wife, it would do Fish no good. Further he testified as follows: On the 10th of April, 1871, at night, he and the deputy sheriff happened to be near the jail together. Holsenbake and Loyd (who was indicted with him as accessory,) were in the jail up-stairs, in different rooms, and one Stubbs was in jail below Holsenbake. He heard Stubbs ask Holsenbake if Loyd were not the instigator of that matter, and Holsenbake said Loyd was, and charged Stubbs to tell no one of it. He did not suppose Holsenbake was aware that he (O’Neil) was there. Though he remained there about an hour, he did not remember any more of said conversation.
It was agreed that defendant’s counsel might move to rule out this evidence, after they had examined the facts and circumstances under which Holsenbake so spoke to Stubbs.
Another witness testified that, two or three weeks before Fish’s death, prisoner took a drink at a well; said it would be the last he would ever take there, and that something would soon happen which would not be agreeable news to the Jones family. (Jones was the father of Mrs. Holsenbake, and she and her child resided with Jones.) Another negro testified that Holsenbake several' times consulted him as a fortune-teller; and, about two weeks before the killing, asked him if Fish was in the way of his reconciliation with his wife, and whether he (Holsenbake) would ever kill anybody. Stubbs was examined, and testified to a general conversation between himself and Holsenbake, in the evening before Loyd was put in jail, in which Holsenbake told him that he (Stubbs) was in no danger, for he knew nothing about the killing, but that he (Holsenbake) was in danger of being hung, for parties would swear lies against him ; that he staid all night that night at Loyd’s, but did not know whether Loyd and his wife knew it or not; that he was looking for Colonel Farrow to come down, and wished Stubbs, if Farrow asked him who killed Fish, to say he did not know; that he (Holsenbake) would bring some things to light before Court which would relieve Stubbs, but could not yet. This appearing to be substantially all that occurred between Stubbs and Holsenbake prior to said conversation heard by McNeil, McNeil’s testimony was held competent over the objections of defendant’s counsel. Prisoner’s counsel reserved the right to move to rule out Stubb’s testimony, when it should appear why Holsenbake so addressed him.
Colonel Farrow, Attorney General, was introduced. He produced a letter from Holsenbake, not dated, addressed to the civil authorities of Georgia, and turned over to Farrow by the Governor, on the 25th of April, 1872, with instructions to proceed to Oglethorpe, and try to find out whether there was a conspiracy to kill Fish, and who was concerned in it. This letter was introduced as evidence over prisoner’s objection. It stated nothing to the purpose, but that prior to Fish’s death, Jones, son of Jones, who had been elected to the State Senate as a radical, was discussing the probability of his father being unseated, and said, if he were, Bullock would appoint him District Judge; that when Holsenbake suggested that Fish would likely be appointed, he replied that his father could hire a negro to kill Fish, and it would be charged to some democratic Ku-klux, and his father would get the place at last. (Fish had been appointed District Judge before he was killed.)
Farrow testified that, with this letter, he saw Holsenbake and asked him to explain it, and told him, in presence of Mr. Wallace, his attorney, that he (Farrow) would not give a cent for any confession of his own guilt, but, if he would disclose who else was engaged in it, he would recommend the Governor to pardon him, and he believed the Governor would regard his recommendation favorably. The record does not show when this was, nor that it was prior to the statement made to Stubbs. Farrow also said that it was arranged, on the day he spoke with IL, in Wallace’s presence, that Holsenbake should make a written statement. Holsenbake made a written statement, at Farrow’s request, but what that was does not appear. Mr. Wallace testified to the remarks of Farrow to Holsenbake about as Farrow did. And Wallace offered to read a letter from Holensbake, written to him on the 20th of April, 1871, and his reply of the 26th, in which reply he stated that he had no doubt Farrow would keep his promise, and urged him, meanwhile, to get ready for trial, especially to get ready to prove that he anticipated living with his wife again, and that Fish’s designs upon his wife were bad. This evidence was all offered to show that the confessions were made under the influence of hope of relief. The Court rejected Holsenbake’s letter to Wallace, and Wallace’s reply.
Stubbs was again introduced by the State over prisoner's objection. He then testified that since the conversation formerly detailed, Holsenbake told him that he, Holsenbake, killed Fish because of bis, Holsenbake’s wife, and that Loyd instigated him to do it. He admitted that detectives sent from Atlanta had promised him, Stubbs, a pardon if he would tell all he knew about the matter. Another witness testified to hearing this last conversation.
Here the State rested its case. Prisoner’s counsel said they would introduce no evidence, but would read prisoner’s statement. The Solicitor General asked if the reading of that statement would deprive defendant’s counsel of the concluding argument. The Court said it would not, but that the State might rebut the statement by evidence. Prisoner’s counsel then read a written statement by prisoner. In it he said nothing about killing Fish. He stated in it that during his long absence of four or five years from his wife, she frequently wrote him to return and live with her; that, after his return, he watched Fish going to her room, (as he supposed,) giving this in detail; stated that this made him almost a maniac, and under this influence he might have made improper threats against Fish; that any confessions made were in hope of Executive pardon.
The State introduced a record showing that Holsenbake’s wife had been divorced from him, but when the divorce was granted does not appear. Several witnesses testified to Mrs. Holsenbake’s chaste and ladylike conduct. While one of them was being examined, defendant’s counsel, on cross-examination, asked him what was Fish’s character for libertinism. This was objected to. The Court said the question might be asked, but if prisoner cross-examined the witness they would lose the conclusion of the argument. Upon reconsideration the Court said he would not allow the question answered, but would withhold any decision as to the effect of cross-examination of the State’s witness upon the right to open and conclude the argument until the point arose. The prisoner’s counsel did not cross-examine the witness. Mrs. Holsenbake testified that Fish never had been in her company except in the presence of other persons. Here the evidence was closed. Defendant’s counsel opened and concluded the argument.
The Court charged the jury as follows, reading the sections of the Code cited therein defining murder, etc:
Gentlemen: You are called to the discharge of a most solemn duty; one that no good citizen should seek, but one that all good citizens who have at heart the well-being of society, and the faithful maintenance of the law, should discharge with faithfulness and fidelity, so as to vindicate the law, acquit their consciences, and measure out justice to those accused of crime.
The defendant is charged, before the bar of the county, with the high crime of murder. If he is guilty of the charge, he has forfeited his life. The law makes that the penalty of the transgression; it lays its powerful and strong hand upon him, and calls upon him in a most solemn form to answer the charge; it gives him every advantage of counsel, and the privilege of selecting the men as jurors who shall pass upon his guilt or innocence.
This grave responsibility is cast upon you, and you alone can discharge it. If he is guilty, you will, without regard to consequences, go forward and meet the result like honest men. If he is innocent, you will, with equal firmness, throw the protection of the law around him by a verdict of not guilty.
The wisdom of the world has demonstrated that society cannot protect itsself against the crime of murder, otherwise than by taking the life of .the offender. No other punishment seems adequate to the enormity of the crime, and it is only in those countries where this penalty is promptly inflicted upon the guilty, that human life is protected. It is the certainty of the punishment that deters offenders. That mistaken or misapplied clemency which shields the offender and protects the guilty — which shrinks back from the consequence of verdicts of guilty — inflicts a fatal blow at the best interest of society, gives license to crime, and leaves the peaceable and unprotected citizen at the mercy of every desperado who may seek his life.
Still, in the maintenance of the law and the protection of the community, the vindication of the innocent is a duty as sacred and binding as the punishment of the guilty. While you should set your face against crime, and sternly and unflinchingly bring the criminal to justice, you should stretch forth your hand to save the innocent from harm.
The great questions for your deliberate consideration are these:
1. Did the deceased, George W. Fish, come to his death in the manner set forth in the bill of indictment?
2. Was the crime committed in this county?
3. Did the defendant, Holsenbake, commit the crime?
Murder, Code, sections 4254, 4255, 4256. Malice is the main ingredient of murder. In every killing the law presumes malice, and if the accused is identified as the slayer, it is incumbent on him to show there was no malice: 3739.
Code, section ... Confessions of guilt should be received with great caution. But when the proper caution has been observed in the reception of the testimony, if it appears that the confessions were deliberately made, that they were made freely and voluntary, without being induced by another, by the slightest hope of benefit, or remotest fear of injury, they are the most effectual proofs in the law; their value depends on the supposition that they are deliberate and voluntary, and on the presumption that a rational being will not make admissions prejudicial to his interest and safety, unless when urged by the promptings of truth and conscience. A confession alone, uncorroborated by other evidence, will not justify a conviction : section 3739.
The question for your consideration is, what “other evidence” is corroborative?
The corroboration contemplated by law, in this case, is that of the death of Fish, and that he came to his death by gunshot wounds. This is what is called in law the “corpus delicti.” These facts must be made out before you can convict upon the confessions of defendant, however deliberately made. The reason of this wise rule is, that persons have been convicted and executed upon their confessions, and afterwards the supposed dead man was found alive.
You must be fully satisfied that Colonel Fish was killed, that he was killed unlawfully, while in the peace of State, before you can convict upon the confessions alone of the defendant; but if you are satisfied of these facts, no other corroboration is necessary. That is the only other evidence needed, in order to justify you in finding a verdict of guilty upon the confessions, provided you are satisfied that the defendant has confessed that he committed the crime.
If Mr. and Mrs. Holsenbake were divorced from each other by a decree of the Superior Court of Macon county, the relations of man and wife ceased from the date of the decree, and they were, from that time, no longer responsible for the conduct of each other. Holsenbake ceased, from that time, to have any control over the action or conduct of Mrs. Holsenbake. He was not responsible for her support or maintenance, nor was he responsible, either legally or morally, for any act of hers. It was no concern of his, more than any other man in the county, whether or not she went astray from the path of rectitude. If she had been polluted with shame and disgrace, it is her misfortune; but his hand could not shield her, nor could his arm inflict punishment on the suspected man. He had no right to take the life of Colonel Fish — if he did take it — on account of suspicion, in his mind, of too great intimacy with Mrs. Holsenbake. He had no right to take his life if he had caught him in the act of adultery; and if he had taken his life under such circumstances, it would have been murder. If he could not take life for actual adultery, much less could he take life — if he did take it — upon a suspicion of guilt.
The marriage bed is sacred, and when it has been invaded, society may wink at a swift and terrible retribution upon the offenders, but the martial rights can only attach when the state of marriage exists, and in no case when the parties have been divorced. Society, in its regard for the sacredness of the marriage relations, can go no further than this without breaking down all barriers, and putting itself and the lives of its citizens at the mercy of every jealous-minded and evil-disposed man.
Insanity. The killing must have been done by a person of sound memory and discretion. A'lunatic or idiot, or one who is inflicted with insanity, is not responsible for his acts. He is capable of doing a deed, but is incapable of committing crime — except the offense is committed in a lucid interval — the man who so takes life is not responsible to the law.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind, and responsible for his acts, and that presumption continues until the contrary is shown. If the defendant relies upon insanity to excuse or justify the killing of deceased, he must prove it; it is not a matter of speculation or conjecture, but a matter of proof, like any other fact; and, if the defendant makes the issue, he must prove it to your satisfaction, or you will be bound to discredit it.
If Holsenbake committed the crime charged against him, and if at the time of its committal he had capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the particular act in question; if he had knowledge and consciousnes that the act was wrong, and would deserve punishment, he is responsible for the deed. Upon this question it is for you to look into the testimony, and if the deed was committed in secret, at the dark hour of night, from a place of concealment, with any arrangement and purpose to avoid detection, to say how far an insane mind would have thus deliberated and planned the death of another.
Statement of Prisoner. The prisoner is allowed, under the law, to make his statements to the jury, not under oath, and you can attach such importance to them as you think proper. You can receive them as true in the whole or in part, or you can reject them from your consideration entirely. You should construe any statement thus deliberately made, which may imply guilt, if such exist, most strongly against the defendant.
Doubts. If, after a full and impartial consideration of all the facts in the case, there is a reasonable doubt in your mind as to the guilt of defendant, you will render a verdict of not guilty. Such doubts must not be mere speculations or idle conjectures, but well-founded doubts, growing out of the evidence alone — such doubts as prevent your mind from reaching a safe and satisfactory conclusion. But if, upon a full consideration of the facts, you do, as reasonable men, conclude that the crime was committed, and that defendant committed the crime, you can safely go forward, and you should do so, and find a verdict of guilty. But if, after due deliberation, you cannot come at a satisfactory conclusion, but the mind is still in doubt as to the guilt of defendant, you will find him not guilty.
The jury found Holsenbake guilty. Defendant’s counsel moved for a new trial, upon the following grounds: The Court erred —
1. In admitting the testimony of the witness, Jacob Odom.
2. In admitting the evidence of McNeil as to confessions.
3. In admitting the evidence of Stubbs as to confessions, and in excluding the letter of Wallace.
4. In admitting, in evidence, the letter of prisoner to Governor Bullock.
5. In allowing the State to reopen the case, and introduce new evidence in rebuttal of prisoner’s statement.
6. In admitting evidence to the jury of the good character of Mrs. Holsenbake, in rebuttal of said statement.
7. In its original ruling as to the effect of the cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, in depriving prisoner’s counsel of the concluding argument to the jury, and in the subsequent withdrawal of that decision, and refusal to say whether the Court would reaffirm said decision or not.
8. In refusing to permit prisoner to prove the character of Fish for lechery and libertinism, as above explained and set forth, after allowing the State to show Mrs. Holsenbake’s good character.
9. In the charge to the jury-above set forth — 'the same being, in whole and in part, contrary to law.
10. Because the verdict is strongly and decidedly against the weight of the evidence, unsupported by evidence, etc.
The Court refused a new trial, and error is assigned on said grounds.
cited 21 Ga. R., 227; 28th, 92, 576; Roscoe’s Crim. Ev., 55; 2 Bailey’s R., 569; 4 C. & P., 221; 14 Ga. R., 43; Brasell vs. State, and Banks vs. State, May, 1871.
Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.
