Brown v. Williams

Atkinson, J.

1. A contract “in general in restraint of trade” is against the policy of the law, and can not be enforced. Civil Code (1910), § 4253. It has been held by this court that a stipulation in a contract of sale of a ticket broker’s business, that the ■ vendor will not engage in a similar business in a named city, which, though unlimited as to time, is in all other respects reasonable, is valid and enforceable. Swanson v. Kirby, 98 Ga. 586 ( 26 S. E. 71 ). It has also been held that where the restraint or inhibition relates to the right of a person to follow a particular profession, and deprives the person from practicing his profession under any and all circumstances for all time in a restricted territory, the stipulation is unreasonable and unenforceable. Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 202 ( 30 S. E. 735 , 69 Am. St. R. 154 ). The principle last above stated will apply where the restriction relates to the right of a barber to carry on his vocation and inhibits him within a named town from carrying on his vocation for all time and under all circumstances.

2. A petition alleged that the plaintiff purchased from the defendant “all of the equipment owned by him in the operation of a barber-shop in the town of Wadley, . . together with the good will of said business” for a stated sum, and that, as a part of the trade and an inducement to petitioner to buy, there “was a mutual agreement between plaintiff and defendant, that defendant after selling out to plaintiff would not again operate a barber-shop in the town of Wadley.” The foregoing allegations are to be construed most strongly against the pleader. When so construed, they mean that the defendant was a barber, and that he had stipulated not to engage in his occupation as a barber in the town of Wadley under any circumstances at any time in the future. The alleged covenant was therefore unreasonable and void; and the judge did not err in sustaining the general demurrer to the petition filed by the plaintiff, seeking injunction to prevent continued violation of *806 the covenant, and to recover damages already accrued from its breach. Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.