TaiLexi AI U.S. Case Law

Binghamton Housing Authority v. Douglas

In the Matter of Binghamton Housing Authority v. Marshall E. Douglas (Stroud)

Binghamton Hous. Auth. v. Douglas, 217 A.D.2d 897 (1995)
Download
Format
Include

Star paging (*137) is kept for pin cites.

Court
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · State Appellate Courts
Decided
July 27, 1995
Judges
Peters
Citations
217 A.D.2d 897630 N.Y.S.2d 1441995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8137

Opinion of the Court — Peters

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Peters, J.

Appeal from an order of the County Court of Broome County (Smith, J.), entered October 26, 1994, which, in a proceeding pursuant to RPAPL article 7, affirmed an order of the City Court of the City of Binghamton in favor of respondent.

Petitioner is a public housing authority subject to Federal regulation and operates Carlisle Apartments in the City of Binghamton, Broome County. Respondent has been a tenant in such apartment since 1991. In March 1993, petitioner commenced a summary proceeding to evict respondent and her family for the failure to pay rent. In the petition, recovery of *898 back rent and "added rent”, consisting of late fees, utility fees and maintenance fees, was sought. City Court awarded petitioner the back rent requested but not the "added rent”. Petitioner appealed to County Court which affirmed City Court. This appeal ensued.

The property at issue is part of the Federal public housing program which places limitations on the amount of rent which can be charged (see, 42 USC § 1437a [hereinafter the Brooke Amendment]). According to the Brooke Amendment, monthly rent is limited to the highest of 30% of the family’s monthly adjusted income, 10% of the family’s monthly income or an amount established by the public agency which grants welfare payments to the tenant (see, 42 USC § 1437a [a] [1]). Pursuant to regulations, petitioner is further allowed to add certain fees to cover excess utility use, late payments and maintenance charges, if appropriate (see, 24 CFR 913.107, 966.4 [b] [l]-[3]; [f] [10]). Based upon these regulations, we find that County Court correctly recognized that petitioner has the right to collect these additional charges.

The issue thus becomes whether such charges are deemed "rent” and can therefore be collected through a summary proceeding. Noting that through such a proceeding a landlord may typically seek judgment for money owed as rent, but not other charges (see, RPAPL 741 [5]; Cotignola v Lieber, 34 AD2d 700 ; 2 Rasch, New York Landlord and Tenant—Summary Proceedings § 32.9, at 509-510 [3d ed]) unless such additional charges are clearly and expressly designated as "rent” in the governing document (see, Perrotta v Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 98 AD2d 1 ; Matter of Petrakakis v Crown Hotels, 3 AD2d 635 ), we find that petitioner may not recover these charges through this proceeding by defining them as "added rent” in its lease with respondent.

Despite the clear lease provisions, the property at issue is governed by standards different from those applicable to private landlord/tenant relations. Pursuant to the Brooke Amendment, as implemented by the public housing regulations, the total tenant payment allowable as rent is only that amount designated by the guidelines therein (see, 24 CFR 913.107 [a]) and does not include "charges for excess utility consumption or other miscellaneous charges” (24 CFR 913.102; see generally, 24 CFR 966.4). Accordingly, since the Federal regulations fully govern the amount that petitioner may charge as rent, we find that City Court, affirmed by County Court, correctly determined that the regulations, rather than the lease provisions, constitute the governing document. Ac *899 cordingly, City Court properly limited petitioner’s judgment to past due "rent”.

As to petitioner’s contention that it would be precluded from instituting a separate proceeding to collect such amounts deemed "added rent” pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see, e.g., Liss v Trans Auto Sys., 68 NY2d 15, 22 ), we find no merit. Petitioner’s monetary recovery in the summary proceeding is limited to those amounts statutorily defined as rent and, therefore, the recovery of the miscellaneous charges is not allowed (see, 24 CFR 913.107, 966.4 [b] [1] [3]; [f] [10]). Accordingly, the institution of a separate proceeding for the recovery of such charges would not be barred.

In light of our determination, we need not address the other issues raised.

Mikoll, J. P., Crew III, White and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.

How later courts describe this case

Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 6 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.

Cited by 15 cases

View all citing references →
2000: 12001: 22002: 22003: 32004: 22012: 12013: 12016: 12017: 220002026peak 2003 · 3

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Watertown Housing Authority v. Kirkland2 Misc. 3d 280 (Watertown City Ct. 2003)
  2. Housing Authority & Urban Redevelopment Agency v. Taylor796 A.2d 193 (N.J. 2002)
  3. 102 West Hudson, LLC v. Cordero54 Misc. 3d 838 (2017)
  4. Sager v. Housing Commission957 F. Supp. 2d 627 (D. Maryland 2013)
  5. Brattleboro Housing Authority v. Parker (In re Parker)269 B.R. 522 (D. Vt. 2001)
  6. In re Marcano288 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)

Most recent

  1. 175 Executive House, LLC v. Elesha Miles156 A.3d 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017)
  2. 102 West Hudson, LLC v. Cordero54 Misc. 3d 838 (2017)
  3. Haywood v. Chicago Housing Authority212 F. Supp. 3d 735 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
  4. Sager v. Housing Commission957 F. Supp. 2d 627 (D. Maryland 2013)
  5. Sager v. Housing Commission855 F. Supp. 2d 524 (D. Maryland 2012)
  6. Acierno v. Faldich4 Misc. 3d 98 (2004)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 4

DepthCaseCited by
Liss v. Trans Auto Sys., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1986) 129
Perrotta v. Western Reg'l Off-Track Betting Corp., 98 A.D.2d 1 (1983) 47
Cotignola v. Lieber, 34 A.D.2d 700 (1970) 16
Petrakakis v. Crown Hotels, Inc., 3 A.D.2d 635 (1956) 12

Keyboard shortcuts

/Focus the search box
j kNext / previous result
EnterOpen the selected result
xAdd / remove the selected result from the download list
n pNext / previous search term in a case
cCopy the citation of the current case
+ −Larger / smaller reading text
?Show this list