Davidson v. Little

1. A conveyance of land, free from actual fraud, is not void merely because the price was shockingly inadequate. 2. Though an unexecuted contract will not be enforced in a Court of Equity, if it seems to be unconscionable, yet after it is executed by the parties it will not be declared void on that ground alone, except in the ease of an heir expectant. 3. An heir in tail who is entitled to immediate possession of one-half of the land, and to the other half on the death of a tenant by the curtesy, is not an heir expectant. 4. Gross inadequacy of price is only evidence of fraud. 5. But even if the conveyance were void for gross inadequacy of price, it cannot he disputed by mere possessors of the land without title, neither the party who conveyed, nor any one claiming under him, nor his creditors disputing it.

Error, to the Common Pleas of Fayette county. This was an action of ejectment instituted in February 1849, in favor of James B. Davidson v. Hope Little, John Bradman, and Aaron Moore, for about 160 acres of land in Luzerne township, Fayette county. Hope Little died before the trial. The plaintiff claimed under a conveyance from Aaron Norris. On the trial he showed title from the Commonwealth in Thomas Scott, to a tract of land containing 307-J acres and allowance, of which the land in controversy was a part; also a deed by Thomas Scott to Esther Little, for the whole tract during her natural life, with cross remainders in fee tail to Fanny Little and Abraham Little, dated November 21, 1791. The death of Abraham Little without issue (his widow and devisee was Hope Little). The marriage of Fanny Little, first, to David Norris, by whom she had as her eldest son David Norris, the younger, who died, leaving his eldest son Aaron Norris, with a younger brother and several sisters. Fanny afterwards married John Harper, who yet survived her, and held the moiety of the land as tenant by the curtesy. Also deed by Aaron Norris to the plaintiff in fee, to bar the entail ; dated October 21, 1847, for the whole tract. Consideration stated $350. Duly acknowledged and recorded, as directed by the Act of Assembly of 16th January, 1799. The defendants did not show any title in themselves, but under a rule of Court there was filed on the 31st of August, 1850, an abstract of title, wherein Hope Little, one of the defendants, claimed the possession of one-third of the land as widow of Abraham Little, who held under a deed from Thomas Scott. She claimed also absolute title and right to the possession of the whole property by deed from Aaron Norris, dated February 14, 1850 (this suit was brought February 13, 1849), which said Norris was alleged to be sole heir to the fee simple of the land, under the aforesaid deed of conveyance from Thomas Scott. Defendants also claimed right of possession as against plaintiff, who it was alleged had neither right of possession nor any other right, but whose title, whatever it may be, was alleged to be fraudulent.” On the 7th of June, 1851, after plaintiff had taken several depositions proving the legitimate descent of Aaron Norris, as the heir in tail, the defendants, on leave given, amended their abstract by striking out the words in italics and claiming Aaron Norris to be the sole heir in tail, and that the deed of February 14, 1850, was in fee to bar entail. Upon the trial the case was made to turn upon the questions:—1st. Whether the plaintiff’s deed from Aaron Norris was obtained by actual fraud. 2d. Whether the price paid him by the plaintiff for the land, was so grossly inadequate as to make the contract unconscionable and void. It was testified on part of the plaintiff, that before Aaron Norris conveyed to Davidson, the plaintiff, he took the advice of counsel as to the title, and was advised that be was sole heir in tail to the premises in dispute; entitled to the Hope Little part at once, and to the Harper part at the death of John Harper, who was tenant by the curtesy. It was testified that before conveying to the plaintiff, he had applied to others to purchase, and that he said he was not able to go to law about the property, and was thinking of going to the west; that he valued the property at from $8000 to $10,000. It did not appear that he took any part in the, defence. As to the amount paid by the plaintiff, it was proved that he had paid $200 at the date of the deed, and given bond to pay $150 more at some future period, when he recovered the land. After the evidence had closed,- the defendants paid into Court for the plaintiff, $252, debt and interest on the amount paid by plaintiff to Aaron Norris. The defendants’ counsel requested the Court to instruct the jury:— 1st. That if they are satisfied that there was fraud by the plaintiff, in taking advantage of the ignorance or weakness of Norris, their verdict must be for the defendants on that ground, without requiring them to refund the plaintiff’s money and interest. 2d. That the inadequacy of price paid the plaintiff is so gross as to shock a correct mind, and is evidence of that presumptive fraud which vitiates the contract; and upon this ground alone, 'although the jury are not satisfied there was actual fraud, the verdict must be for defendants. But if the jury find on this ground, they must say that defendants shall refund the plaintiff the money he has paid with interest. 3d. That plaintiff’s contract and deed embracing the whole land, one-half of which being an expectancy in fee tail upon the death of John Harper, the contract is void, unless the plaintiff has shown that he has paid a full and fair price; that plaintiff has not shown this, and therefore cannot recover. The answers of Gilmoke, J., were as follows :— “ To the first point he charged, that if there was actual fraud practised by plaintiff in procuring the conveyance, then the law is as stated in this point. But actual fraud must be proved, and cannot be presumed. If the jury are satisfied that Aaron Norris either from ignorance or weakness was incapable of comprehending his rights, or the plaintiff in the transaction was guilty of misrepresentation, or withheld facts which he was bound to communicate, this would constitute actual fraud. “ To the 2d: We are of opinion that notwithstanding the possession was not delivered, and is now resisted, yet that this is an executed contract, and that therefore, according to all the authorities, mere inadequacy of price is insufficient to set it aside and rescind the contract. But the Court charge that there may be such gross inequality between the price given and the property conveyed, as would amount to presumptive or legal fraud, although the jury might be fully satisfied that there was no actual fraud in the whole transaction. But this inadequacy must be such as would confound and shock the judgment of every man of common sense, and would produce surprise on hearing that such a contract had been made. If you believe that in respect to this case, the land was worth twenty times as much as was given for it, or ten times as much (unless this great inequality was produced by some supposed or anticipated defect of the title, such as a supposed or suspected illegitimacy), then the inequality would create a presumptive fraud which would avoid the conveyance; and the defendants having paid into Court the amount actually paid by plaintiff, with interest, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. “ To the 3d: In answer to this point we say, that dealings with young heirs for reversionary interests are to be watched with the utmost jealousy, and form another exception to the general rule, that an executed contract cannot be set aside for mere inadequacy of price ; and where this is the case, inequality of price is sufficient to set aside a conveyance. Here, a part of the interest was still reversionary, and the heir was not more than 23 years old, having been born on the 10th of May, 1824, and the deed executed on the 21st of October, 1847. This instruction is likewise subject to the fact whether this inequality was occasioned in consequence of a doubt as to the title, and there could be no other doubt unless it was created by a suspicion as to the legitimacy of the father of Aaron Norris, who was David Norris, jr.; and on this point we have already referred you to the evidence. Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 25; Evans v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 512.” To which charge both plaintiff and defendants excepted. January, 1852, verdict was rendered generally for the defendants. . The following were the assignments of error:— The jury having cleared the case of actual fraud, the answer of the Court to the first point may be assumed to be correct. The whole of the answer to the 2d point is erroneous; especially in that the Court, although conceding that this is a case of a contract executed, and therefore not voidable upon mere inadequacy of price; yet says “ that there may be such gross inequality between the price given and the property conveyed, as would amount to presumptive or.legal fraud, although the jury might be fully satisfied that there was no actual fraud in the whole transaction.” And again: “ If you believe that in respect to this case, the land was worth 20 times as much as was given for it, or ten times as much (unless, &c.), then the inequality would create a presumptive fraud, which would avoid the conveyance, &c. The Court erred in their answer to the 3d point, in saying that “ dealings with young heirs for reversionary interests form another exception to the general rule, that an executed contract cannot be set aside for mere inadequacy; and where this is the case, inequality of price is sufficient to set aside the conveyance.”