Farnham v. Camden & Amboy Railroad

1. A common carrier may by a special contract and, perhaps, by notice, limit his liability as to every cause of injury, excepting that arising from his own or his servants’ negligence. 2. A bill of lading, limiting the responsibility of the carrier, signed by his agent, delivered to the shippers, accepted by them and sent to their agent as authority to receive the goods, was the terms on which the shippers shipped the goods and on which they were received. 3. By the common law the carrier is an insurer of the goods intrusted to him, excepting as damaged by the act of God or the public enemy. 4. Under a contract limiting his liability, the carrier is an insurer to the extent of its terms, unless it be shown that the loss has occurred through his wilfulness or negligence. 5. With certain exceptions as to innkeepers and common carriers, the burden of proof of negligence is on the bailor, and proof merely of the loss is not sufficient to put the bailee on his defence. 6. The common-law presumption is that every person is presumed to do his duty until the contrary is proved. 7. It is a sufficient defence if the bailee accounts for a loss in a way not implicating himself in negligence unless the bailor proves negligence. 8. A carrier by condition in the bill of lading limited his responsibility as insurer, — the goods were transported by him to the place of destination, put into his shed on his wharf where he had four watchmen ; a fire, from an unknown cause, took place in his steamboat lying at the wharf (the boat being fully manned), which consumed the goods in the shed. Held, that the proof of negligence was on the shipper, yvoodwaed, C. J., dissenting.

Certificate from Nisi Prius. This was an action to January Term 1864, by Farnham, Kirk-ham & Co. against the The Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, in which the following case was stated for the opinion of the court in the nature of a special verdict. The defendants are a corporation under the laws of New Jersey, and all laws referring to the said corporation may be considered as if herein fully set forth. The defendants are engaged in the business of transporting freight from Philadelphia to New York, via railroad from Camden to Amboy and steamboat from Amboy to New York. On the 8th day of July 1864, the plaintiffs, who were merchants in the city of Philadelphia, and regular shippers of freight to be transported by the defendants, delivered to the defendants for transportation to New York, the hales of goods mentioned in the bill of lading — a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked “ Exhibit A,” and that the said bill of lading was then signed by a duly authorized agent of the defendants and delivered to the plaintiffs, by whom the same was accepted and transmitted to their agent in New York, as his authority to receive the goods. The said goods weighed 3220 pounds, and were of the value of $6778.24. On the day when the goods were delivered for transportation, there was placed in a conspicuous place in the receiving office of the defendants, in 'the city of Philadelphia, and also at the receiving offices at Camden, New York and intervening points', a notice, of which the paper hereto annexed, marked “ Exhibit B,” is a copy, wherein the law of the state of New Jersey, therein referred to, is correctly and at large set forth, which notice had been thus placed since the passage of said act. The aforesaid bales of goods were in due course of transportation safely transported to the defendants’ wharf in the city of New York, where they arrived on the night of Saturday, July 9th, or on the morning of Sunday, July the 10th 1864, and were placed under a shed on the wharf ready for delivery, and while there and before the plaintiffs had notice of their arrival or opportunity to remove them, a fire broke out on board a steamboat called the John Potter, belonging to the defendants and then lying at the wharf, which totally consumed the steamboat and her cargo, and also the defendants’ wharf and sheds and all the goods thereon and thereunder, including the plaintiffs’ twenty-four bales of goods, the origin of which fire is totally unknown. Four watchmen employed by the defendants were on duty at the time on the wharf and boat, and .the crew was on board the steamboat. The defendants have paid to the plaintiffs without prejudice the sum of $3220, being at the rate of $1 per pound — the amount for which they admit their liability under the bill of lading. If the court shall be of opinion that the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs for the full value of the goods, then judgment shall be entered for the plaintiffs in the sum of $7422.17 (being the value of all the goods with interest to this date), less the sum of $3525.90 (that being for 3220 lbs. at one dollar per pound, with interest to date), but if the court shall be of opinion that the defendants are not liable for more than $100 per 100 lbs., amounting as above to $3525.90, which has been already paid, then judgment shall be entered for the defendants. Exhibit A. Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company. ***** *** Philadelphia, July 8th 1864. Received from Farnham, Kirkham & Co. Twenty-four Bales I) Goods. (The numbers follow.) Marked T. W. S., New York, which we promise to deliver (subject to the conditions expressed on the back of this receipt) to T. W. Shannon or order, at our office in New York, upon payment of freight therefor. Freight $9.00, paid. W. I. Way, Receiving Clerk. (In order to avoid detention of draymen, shippers are requested to fill up receipt and duplicate.) Conditions or Shipment. The responsibility of the company as carriers of the within named goods is hereby limited so as not to exceed $100 for every 100 lbs. weight thereof, and at that rate for a greater or less quantity, the shipper declining to pay for any higher risk. The company will insure to any amount if desired. In case of loss or damage, due proof of the amount thereof' to be made by the claimant without delay. Looking-glass plates, &c., * * and all other fragile articles, will be taken only at the owner’s risk of breakage. No allowance will be made for deficiency of * * fruit, unless the packages are in perfect shipping order — if casks, barrels or kegs, to be head-lined; if boxes or baskets, to be securely covered with canvas ; nor for loss of hats, &e., * * unless the cases are properly strapped when shipped ; or for damage or loss of perishable articles by heat, cold, unavoidable accidents or delays, nor for leakage of liquors or liquids of any kind, nor for rust on iron or other metals. Exhibit B. Notice. Responsibility of the Company as Carriers limited to $100 per 100 lbs. The Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company Hereby give notice, in pursuance of law, that they have limited, and do hereby limit, their responsibility as carriers of goods, so as not to exceed one hundred dollars for every one hundred pounds weight thereof, and at that rate for a greater or less -quantity; but will insure goods, if desired, at the rate of eight cents per ton per mile for the distance carried, for every $200 insured on 100 pounds of goods, and at that rate for a greater or less quantity. Goods carried from New York to Philadelphia, or from Philadelphia to New York, will be insured (if desired), at the rate of sixteen cents for every $100 insured. Copy of the law of the state of New Jersey, in reference to the liability of railroad companies, passed March 10th 1853. “ Any railroad company of this state may, by giving notice to any person or persons offering goods, merchandise or baggage, for transportation on the railroad, or in the boats or vessels of such company, limit their responsibility as carriers thereof, to $100 for every 100 pounds weight of such goods, merchandise or baggage, and at that rate for a greater or less quantity, unless such person or persons so offering such goods, merchandise or baggage, for transportation, shall pay to said company, by way of insurance, for any additional amount of responsibility to be assumed, such rate or rates as may be charged by said company therefor, not to exceed the legal rates for transporting 100 pounds of goods or merchandise on such railroad, or in such boats or vessels, for every $200 of additional responsibility, assumed on each 100 pounds of such goods, merchandise or baggage, and at that rate for a greater or less quantity; and a general notice of the limitation of such company’s responsibility, placed in a conspicuous place, at or in the receiving office of such company, where goods, merchandise or baggage are usually received by them for transportation, and inserted in the bills of lading or receipts given for such goods or merchandise, and in the tickets delivered to passengers, shall be deemed sufficient notice under this section.” On the 17th of March 1866, the Court of Nisi Prius (Strong, J.) entered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs removed the case and assigned for error thus entering judgment. — At common law it is the duty of a common carrier to transport goods. He is legally responsible for all losses, from whatever cause arising, the acts of God and the public enemy alone excepted. As an insurer he may demand a premium proportioned to the hazard of his employmentCoggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 ; Lane v. Colton, 1 Id. 646, 655, 1 Salk. 143; Riley v. Horn, 5 Bing. 217; Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 10 Wright 151. Agreements to avoid their common-law liability as insurers will not excuse them from gross carelessness or negligence ; and the onus of showing 'that the cause of the loss was within the terms of the exception, and also that there was no negligence, lies on the carrier: Angelí on Carriers, §§ 267, 268, 275 ; Hollister v. Nolen, 19 Wend. 234; Cole v. Goodwin, Id. 251; Sager v. Railroad Co., 31 Maine 228 ; Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Richardson 286; Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio 133; Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill 623, 2 Kent 607, note c; Camden and Amboy Railroad- Co. v. Baldauf, 4 Harris 67? decided in 1851; Penna. Railroad Co. v. McCloskey’s Administrator, 11 Harris 526; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Read, 37 111. Rep. 37; Hooper v. Wells, Am. Law Reg., vol. 5 N. S., 16; Owners of the Mary Washington v. Ayres, Am. Law Reg., Sep. 1866, 692; Beekman v. Shouse, 6 Rawle 179 ; Clark v. Spenee, 10 Watts 337. The statute of New Jersey cited cannot govern in the courts of Pennsylvania. The contract was made in this state and the suit was brought here, the interpretation of the contract and the rule for its government must be the lex loci: Story on Conflict of Laws, § 272; Bank of the United States v. Donnally, 8 Peters 361; Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Id. 378; Hale v. The New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., 15 Conn. 539. — 1. The limitation of responsibility in the bill of lading and the printed notices was legal. 2. The plaintiffs must be presumed to have known and acquiesced in the limitation when their goods were delivered for transportation. 3. In view of the facts ascertained by the case stated, the-responsibility of the defendants cannot be enlarged through any presumption of negligence or misconduct on their part. One who has intrusted goods to a common carrier cannot be permitted to say that he had no notice that the acceptance was qualified, when notice was given, not only by a placard which he could not fail to see, but by a paper actually put into his hands. The non-delivery of the goods intrusted to a carrier’s charge is alone sufficient to render him responsible, .but where the nondelivery is accounted for, and it does not appear that there was any negligence on the part of the bailee, the maxim quod non apparet, non est, will apply as in other cases: The Railroad Co. v. Baldauf, 4 Harris 67; Beekman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle 189; Clark v. Spence, 10 Watts 335 ; Goldey v. The Pa. Railroad Co., 6 Casey 242; The N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. The Merchants’ Bank, 6 Howard 384; Marsh v. Horne, 5 B. & C. 322 ; Harris vf Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264; Angelí on Carriers, § 276; Story on Bailments, § 573 ; Greenleaf on Evidence, § 218 ; Sager v. The Railroad Co., 31 Maine R. 228; Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 460. The case is in all material respects identical with that of a carrier offering to transport goods of a.certain value at one rate, and those of a higher value at a higher rate. The common-law liability of a common carrier may be limited, qualified and restricted, either by a special acceptance from, or by a special contract with the owner or shipper ; provided such special acceptance or special contract do not attempt to screen Nthe carrier against losses by his own misconduct or negligence: VAngell on Carriers, chap. vii.; Cole v. Goodwih, 19 Wend. 251; 'c., Angelí on Carriers, Appendix, p. 32, 2d ed.; Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co., 23 Vermont 186, 1851; Carr v. The L. & Y. R. W., 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 340; Story on Bailments, § 549, § 549 a, 549 b, 7th ed.; Southcote’s Case, 4 Coke’s Rep. 84; Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co., 16 Verm. 52, 18 Id. 131, 23 Id. 205; Paradme v. Jane, Aleyn 26-7; Morse v. Slue, Ventris, part 1, pp. 190, 238; S. c., 2 Lev. 69, 3 Id. 268, Show. 29, Dyer 190, Raym. 220, 1 Mod. 85, 3 Keb. 72, 112, 135, 2 Id. 866, Molloy 4, 9, 10,11, 203 ; Kenrig v. Eggleston, Aleyn 93 ; York Co. v. The Central Railroad Co., 3 Wallace 107; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251; Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill 623; The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand, 11 Jurist 771; Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., 1 Kern. 484; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merch. Bank, 6 How. 382; Story on Bail., § 549 ; Chitty on Cont. 152 ; 2 Kent Com. 606 ; Angelí on Carriers, §§ 59, 220, 221; Bingham v. Rogers, 6 W. & S. 495; Laing v. Colder, 8 Barr 479; Chouteaux v. Leech, 6 Harris 224; White-sell v. Crane. 8 W. & S. 373; Van Toll v. S. E. Railway Co., 12 Scott 87, s. c. 104 E. C. L. R.; Hale v. N. J. Steam Nav. Co., 15 Conn. 539. The doctrine that the carrier is legally responsible for all losses, from.'whatever cause arising, the act of God and the public enemy alone excepted, has no application in this case, where the parties have expressly provided a different rule of liability: Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 475; Shields v. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 161; Wilson v. Brett, 11 Exchequer 116; Grill v. Iron Screw Coll. Co., 1 Law Rep. 612; O’Brien v. The Phila., Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Co., 6 Am. Law Rep. 364; Duff v. Budd, 3 Brod. & Bing. 177; Riley v.. Horne, 5 Bing. 217 ; Batson ¶. Donovan, 4 B. & Aid. 21; Citizens’ Insurance Co. v. Marsh, 5 Wright 394; Hays v. Kennedy, Id. 378; Thorogood v. Marsh, Gow R. 105; Story on Bailment, § 551; Peck v. N. Staffordshire Railway, 32 Law J. R. 241; Pa. Railroad v. Henderson, 1 P. F. Smith 315.