Wood v. Bayard & Black

1. For the purpose of avoiding a deed to bar an entail, evidence is admissible to show that the grantor was non compos mentis, or that being weak minded was imposed on. 2. A common recovery is by the judgment of a court of record, and the infancy or insanity of the party suffering it cannot be set up against the record! 3. Such judgment is regular and valid until reversed, and cannot be impeached collaterally. 4. A deed to bar an entail is a matter in pais.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Greene county: No. 171, to October and November Term 1869. This was an action of ejectment by Edward Wood against Thomas Bayard and William Black for 20 acres of land. The land in dispute was part of the real estate of Isaac Wood, deceased, who left to survive him three sons, John, Edward and Thomas and one daughter, Elizabeth. Isaac Wood by his will, proved April 9th 1852, devised part of his farm to Thomas and Elizabeth, adding: — “ If either of my children Thomas and Elizabeth, should depart this life without issue, his or her or their share or shares shall go to the other surviving brothers and sister, or as the case may be.” On the 2d of October 1858, Thomas Wood and Elizabeth Wood executed and delivered to Edward Wood, the plaintiff, a deed for the land devised to them, for the consideration of $800, “ and also for the purpose of barring the estate tail.” The deed was duly acknowledged by the grantors before a justice of the peace on the day of its date, and on the 27th of the same month, on motion of E. Sayers, Esq., in open court, “ was duly ordered to be entered among the records thereof in the manner commonly used with respect to sheriffs’ deeds, in pursuance with the Acts of Assembly relating thereto, entitled an act to facilitate the barring of estates tail — which is accordingly so done in sheriff’s deed book.” The land in dispute is part of the tract mentioned in the deed. The defendants are in possession under John Wood, one of the brothers of Thomas and Elizabeth. The plaintiff having closed his case, the defendants offered to prove “ the incapacity of the grantor to make a deed for any purpose, at the time this deed was executed, and before that date and since. “ The plaintiff objected to the evidence on the ground that no evidence can be received to show incapacity in making a deed to bar an estatetail.” Thé court (Gilmore, P. J.) admitted the evidence, saying: — “ We think it competent for the defeat of the deed barring the estate tail, to show either that Elizabeth was non compos mentis at the time the deed was made, or that being weak minded she was imposed upon.” A bill of exceptions was sealed for the plaintiff. A number of witnesses were examined as to the capacity of Elizabeth, and the jury rendered a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff took out a writ of error and assigned for error the admission of the evidence.