Brown v. Commonwealth

1. An indictment was found in the Quarter Sessions, but entitled as in the Oyer and Terminer, where it was tried. Held, that the caption might be amended after trial, conviction, sentence and writ of error, but before the record had been returned. 2. The indictment was not certified into the Oyer and Terminer, Held that after trial, conviction, sentence and writ of error, it might be certified nunc pro tunc into the Oyer and Terminer. 3. Where a lower court has power of amendment and exercises it properly the Supreme Court will not inquire into the state of the record before the return of the writ of error, but will look only at its condition when returned. 4. On a question of prisoner’s insanity the court charged “ if he had power of mind enough to be conscious of what he was doing at the time, then he was responsible to the law for that act.” Held, not error. t 5. Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 26 P. P. Smith 414, followed.

Error to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Bradford county: Of January Term 1875, No. 132. Albert Brown was indicted at the September Term 1874, of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Bradford county, for the murder of Cora Greenleaf. The indictment contained two counts: one, in the ordinary form, for the murder of the deceased, and the other, for her murder in perpetrating a rape upon her. The caption of the indictment entitled it in the Court of Oyer and Terminer. The venire for the grand jury, issued out of the Quarter Sessions; the indictment was not certified into the Court of Oyer and Terminer before the trial. The records of all the proceedings on the trial, were contained in the Quarter Sessions docket. The cause was tried before Morrow, P. J., and his associates, in the Oyer and Terminer. The evidence was that the prisoner had ravished the deceased, and afterwards cut her throat. The defence was that the prisoner was insane, and evidence was given in support of it. On the defence of insanity, the court charged: * * * “ Now with regard to the law upon that subject, we shall not undertake to enter upon a discussion of this subject in general, but lay down to you only such few rules as we think will enable you to determine the question raised by this defence. 1st. The law presumes every man to be sane; that is the presumption of law. It also presumes that every man possesses a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, and that presumption continues until the contrary be proven. To establish a defence upon the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing the act, the prisoner was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. This is the general rule, but we will more particularly say that ‘ when the reason is dethroned, when a man has not power to distinguish right from wrong, or lacks power to adhere to the right and abstain from the wrong, he is not accountable to criminal law.’ Or if the prisoner was actuated by an irresistable inclination to kill, ‘had murder in his heart,’ and was utterly unable to control his will or subjugate his intellect, and was not actuated by a wicked purpose, or intent to indulge in this depraved propensity to have sexual connection with the deceased, was not actuated by anger or revenge or kindred passions, he is entitled to be acquitted; provided the jury believe that the state of mind, now referred to, has been proven to have existed by satisfactory evidence, at least by preponderating evidence. “ The presumption of law is that he is sane; that he is responsible for any act he may do. The burden then is upon him to show that he was not responsible, by reason of inability to commit crime, and in connection with this, we cannot say, as a test, that because a man is of w'eak mind, that therefore he is excused from the commission of crime; such is not the law. If he has sufficient strength of mind to form a purpose and intent, to know and distinguish between right and wrong, to know the act is wrong, and power to abstain from it, if he had that power, although his mind was as weak as testified to by Dr. Shultz, and was not compelled, as it were, by some power outside of himself to commit the act, then he is responsible. “It makes no difference whether the evidence indicating insanity is brought out by the testimony on the part, of the Commonwealth, or proved directly on the part of the prisoner; but one thing is certain: it must be proved in some way, or at least the weight of evidence that such is the fact must preponderate. * * * The prisoner must here set up positive, actual proof of the existence of insanity upon his part, of an irresistible power controlling him. * * * Now, under all the evidence in the case with regard to the cause of this crime, the time and manner when it was committed, and everything as shown by the evidence, does all this establish the fact that this man had not power to control himself? Is it satisfactory and preponderating evidence to establish the fact that at the time he committed this act, it was not his act but the act of some power controlling him, an irresistible power ? If so, then you should acquit him. It would be monstrous to convict a man of any crime he is not capable of committing, and who does not know right from wrong, and has no moral sense or convictions about it. But, on the other hand, if this evidence does not preponderate and satisfy you that at the time he committed this act he was insane and unable himself to do it, it is clearly your duty to convict him of such crime as in your judgment, under the law, he has committed. The presumption of law is that every person charged with a crime is innocent until he is proven guilty. In this case, the prisoner admits the fact that he committed the crime, and the only question, therefore, for the jury to determine is, was the prisoner capable of committing a crime ? Did he know the act was wrong ? Did he know the nature and character of it ? Was he conscious of what he did at the time? If he was, although he is a person of weak mind, although he is addicted to bad vices-, although he is afflicted with disease, [yet if he had the power of mind enough to be conscious of what he was doing at the time, then he is responsible to the law for that act.”] * * * December 11th, the jury found the prisoner guilty of murder in the first degree. After overruling a motion in arrest of judgment, the court on the 16th of December' 1874, pronounced sentence of death on him. On the 22d of December, the clerk of the Court of Oyer and Terminer transmitted an exemplification of the^ record to the governor. On the 25th of January 1875, a writ of error was filed and its service accepted by the district attorney. On the 10th of February 1875, the Court of Quarter Sessions granted leave to the district attorney to amend the caption of the indictment nunc pro tunc as of September 8th 1874, by striking out “ Oyer and Terminer” and inserting “ Quarter Sessions,” and also to amend the record by striking out all that part of the record made subsequently to return of the bill a “ true bill,” as having been erroneously made by.the clerk by transcribing it into the record of the Quarter Sessions. On the same day, the court directed that the case be certified, nunc pro tunc as of September 8th 1874, from the Quarter Sessions into the Oyer and Terminer; on the same day, the case was certified according to the order into the Oyer and Terminer; and the Court of Oyer and Terminer ordered that the indictment as certified from the Quarter Sessions, be filed nunc pro tunc as of September 8th 1874, in the Court of Oyer , and Terminer; it was accordingly filed as of that day. There was a large number of specifications of error. Those considered by the Supreme Court related to the amendments of the record and to the portions of the charge on the question of the burden of proof of insanity. ■ ■