City of Philadelphia v. Penna. Hospital

[To be reported.] 1. While there are decisions which hold that a state may by contract divest itself of the right of taxation as to a particular subject, it is an improvident and dangerous exercise of power, and the intention thus to grant an irrevocable exemption from the imposition of taxes ought never to be evidenced by mere implication, but should be expressed in the clearest manner. 2. When, by statutory provision, the property of an existing charitable corporation is exempted from taxation so long as it shall be used for the purposes of the charity, “ any law to the contrary notwithstanding,” the clause quoted cannot be held to apply to subsequent legislation, hut indicates simply that the intention expressed is not to be interfered with by other laws then in existence. 8, At all events, such a grant of exemption cannot bind the state, so as to prevent the subsequent imposition of taxation, unless made for a consideration; and, neither the fact that the property exempted is applied to charitable uses, in relief of the publie, nor the fact that, subsequent to the statute, contributors have made large gifts to the charity, will furnish such consideration.

APPEALS BY DEPENDANT EROM THE COURT OE COMMON PLEAS NO. 3 OE PHILADELPHIA COUNTY. Nos. 115, 116, 117, 118 July Term 1889, Sup., Ct.; court below, Nos. 273, 274, 275, 276 September Term 1888, C. P. No. 3. To tbe numbers and term in the court below, the city of Philadelphia brought four actions of scire facias against The Contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital,” upon municipal claims filed against four lots of ground belonging to the defendant for the laying of water pipes in front of said properties. The defendant filed an affidavit and supplemental affidavit in each case, averring that the claim for laying water pipe was' a tax assessed against the defendant, and stating the following matter as a defence thereto. 2. That the said defendant was incorporated by an act of the general assembly of the province of Pennsylvania, passed May 11, 1751, entitled “ An Act to encourage the establishing of a hospital for the relief of the sick poor of this province and for the reception and cure of lunaticks,” [1 Sm. L. 208,] and it is one of the provisions of the said charter “ that no general meeting of the said contributors, nor any person acting under them, shall employ any money or other estate, expressly given or added to the capital stock of the said hospital, in any other way than by applying its annual interest or rent towards the entertainment and care of the sick and distempered poor that shall be from time to time brought and placed therein, for the cure of their diseases, from any part of this province, without partiality or preference.” 3. That by an act of assembly, approved March 19, 1845, entitled “ An Act to exempt from taxation the estate of the Pennsylvania Hospital,” P. L. 187, which is made part of this affidavit, it is enacted that its property and estate, real and personal, should be and remain free from the payment of taxes of any kind whatsoever, provided that nothing in said act should exempt from the assessment and payment of road and poor taxes, any part of the property of said Pennsjdvania Hospital located in Blockley township. 4. That by the seventh section of the act of April 18, 1853, P. L. (1854) 834, it was enacted “ that the estates and property, real and personal, belonging to the contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital, shall be and remain free from the payment of taxes of any kind whatsoever, as long as the income from said estates and property is used for the relief of the sick and insane poor, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.” 5. That the real estate, against which said claim for water-pipe or tax sued for is levied and assessed, is part of certain real estate formerly situated in Blockley township and which was acquired by the corporation defendant by deeds from various persons, all prior to April 18, 1853. Said corporation defendant is, therefore, by the express terms of the legislation above referred to, exempt from the payment of all taxation. 6. Defendant further avers that the real estate in question forms part of its capital investments, and the whole of the net income from the said real estate, as well as all the rent and profit-producing property of the defendant, ooth real and personal, has been and is appropriated exclusively for the purposes specified in its act of incorporation, viz., the relief of the sick, and insane poor; and neither the president nor any of the directors of the corporation get any salary or emolument of any kind for managing and superintending the affairs of the institution. 7. That the said corporation has no capital stock, and no profit nor other benefit or advantage is in any way derived by any of the contributors thereto from any moneys received by the corporation from any source; but, on the contrary, there is annually more money expended by the institution in carrying out the purposes of its incorporation than is received from all sources of its income, including the rents and profits from the real estate hereinbefore specifically mentioned, and this deficit is made up by annual contributions and donations made to it, from time to time. 8. That the said corporation is maintained by voluntary contributions from its members and others, and from the income derived from the capital accumulated from time to time by gift, devises, and bequests. 9. That no distinction is made in the reception of patients by the defendant, on the ground of sex or color, and the said corporation is a charitable trust, open to the public indefinitely, and conducted without a view to corporate or individual profit, and is an institution of purely public charity, founded, endowed, and maintained by public and private charity; and this defendant is therefore advised and believes that the real estate, hereinbefore specifically described, is exempt by law from the payment of each and all of the sums assessed against it for the taxes aforesaid. Upon the filing of these affidavits, the plaintiff took rules for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence; and after argument, the court, without opinion filed, made the rules absolute, entering judgments for the plaintiff for the amounts of the claims.* Thereupon the defendant took these appeals, specifying that the court erred: 1. In entering judgment against the defendant. 2. In entering judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence.