Bowman v. Bradley

Contract of hiring—Right of employee to possession of house. Where a contract of hiring provides for a certain money compensation per day to the employee and a house to live in, the employee has no distinct right of possession of the house, for his possession is that of the employer, and it cannot survive the hiring to which it is incidental, or under which it is part of the contract price for the service performed. It is not necessary that occupation of a house, or apartments, should be a necessary incident to the service to be performed in order that the right to continue in possession should end with the service. It is enough if such occupation is convenient for the purposes of the service and was obtained by reason of the contract of hiring.

Appeal, No. 11, May T., 1892, by defendant, Patrick P. Bradley, from judgment of C. P. Dauphin Co., June T., 1890, No. 317, on verdict for plaintiff, Henry Bowman. Trespass for an alleged unlawful entry into dwelling-house. The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court. The court charged in part as follows, by Simonton, P. J.: [“ Endeavor to ascertain, in the first place, whether this was a renting for a year or not. Did the plaintiff rent that house for a year? Was the contract between the parties that he was to be employed for a year? And in connection with that a question of law has been raised as to the legal position of the parties towards each other with respect to whether the plaintiff was tenant of the defendant, or whether he was merely in his employ; and that question is one which we shall leave to you to determine, for the reason that if he was a tenant in the legal sense of that term; if he had rented the house; if he had made such a contract with respect to the house that he became his tenant for the year, then the defendant had no right to turn him out before the year was up, and the plaintiff’s right would be different from what it would be if he was not a tenant, but simply in the employ of the defendant. So it becomes a question for you to determine, and it depends upon the nature of the contract and the nature of the employment. We leave it to you, then, to find whether he was a tenant or an employee,] [1] and that involves the question whether the occupation of the house was for the purpose of his employment; whether the occupation of the house was a necessary incident to the employment and the work he was engaged to do ? If it was; if the house went with the employment, in the sense that it was reasonably necessary that the person who was employed to do the work should occupy the house; if that was the purpose and use of the house, then he would be an employee and not a tenant; whereas, if that was not so, if the occupation of the house was an independent matter and if he contracted for it as an independent matter, then he would be a tenant. [If the occupancy of the house was not necessary, in other words, to the employment, then he would be a tenant; and you will have to determine then, from the terms of the contract as you find them to be, from the nature of the employment and the situation of the premises and all that, whether the occupation of the house was necessary to the employment. If you find that it was, then he would be an employee, and if it was not, then he would be a tenant.] [2] If you find that he was a tenant, then you- would have to find what the contract of the tenancy was—whether it was for a year or for a less time, with the right on the part of the defendant to terminate the tenancy, for whatever reasons. If the contract was a contract of tenancy for a year, if that would be a correct description of the bargain between them, then the plaintiff had a right to stay in it for a year, and if the defendant put him out before the year was up, then he would be liable for whatever damages were occasioned by putting him out. If you should find that he was not a tenant for a year, then you would have to consider whether whatever conditions there were, which gave the defendant the right to put him out, had occurred or not. [If you find that the plaintiff was an employee; that he was what in legal phrase is called a ‘ servant; ’ if you find that the plaintiff was simply employed by the defendant, then you will have to determine what the contract was as to the employment. Was he hired for a year without conditions, or was he hired for a year subject to the condition that if he did not give satisfaction he could be discharged; or, if he was hired for a year, did he fail to perform his duties to such an extent as to give the defendant a right to discharge him before the year was up ? All these matters you will have to consider; and if he was an employee and not a tenant, then, whenever the time would come that the defendant had a right to discharge him, the defendant at that time would also have the right to give him notice to leave the house; and if you find that he was employed for a year and that it was not an employment as long as he gave satisfaction to the defendant, then you would have to determine whether he did or not fail in performing his duties.] [3] If he was employed simply so long as he gave satisfaction to the defendant, then you would have to determine whether he did give satisfaction or not. Defendant’s points were as follows, among others: “ 4. Even if the jury should find that the hiring was for an entire year and without the qualification that the plaintiff might be discharged by the defendant whenever his services proved unsatisfactory to the defendant, yet if the jury find that the plaintiff refused or failed to obey and carry out the lawful orders of the defendant with respect to the employment, or, in material matters, negligently, carelessly and unskillfully performed his services or omitted to perform the services he was, under the contract, bound to perform, the defendant had a right to discharge him, and upon such discharge had the right to peaceably repossess himself of the house in question. Answer: To that we say that if the hiring was for a year and without the qualification referred to, then, if the plaintiff failed to perform his part of the contract in any substantial matters, the defendant would have the right to treat the contract as at an end, and if he did have the right to treat it as at an end, then he would have the right to discharge the plaintiff, and if he had the right to discharge him, then he would have the right to take possession of the house if he did it without doing any unnecessary damage to the person or goods of the plaintiff; and it is a question for you to determine under the evidence, if that point becomes material, whether or not the plaintiff did fail in material matters to perform his contract. Whether or not he failed to do the work he was employed to do with reasonable care and diligence. You have heard about the feeding of the cows, the plowing, and in respect to there, being but one horse, and the feed that was furnished; of these you have heard the evidence on both sides, and they are questions for you to determine.” [4] “ 5. If. the jury believe that the use and occupation of the •house in question was a part of the compensation of the plaintiff for services to be performed by him for the defendant, and that the defendant, either under the agreement between the parties or by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to perform such services properly, had the rightto discharge the plaintiff and did discharge him, in such case the defendant was entitled to the possession of said house and had the legal right to take possession of it, provided he committed no breach of the peace and did no wanton damage. Answer: To that we say, gentlemen, if you should find the occupation of the house was a necessary incident to the service, and thus find that the plaintiff was an employee and not a tenant, then if he failed to perform his duty to such an extent, as we have instructed jmu in the preceding .point, as would give the defendant a right to terminate his employment, then the defendant would have the right, when he did terminate the employment, to terminate the possession of the house, provided he did no unnecessary damage.” [5] “ 7. If the jury find that at the time of the alleged trespass, the defendant had the right to the possession of the house in question, and that no injury was wantonly or negligently done to the goods of the plaintiff by defendant or those acting under him, their verdict must be for the defendant. Answer: That point is refused, because it asks us to lay down a wrong measure of what is necessary for damages, and we have explained .that so frequently that we refuse that point.” [6] “ 10. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything in this action for loss of wages, or for the value of the use and occupation of the house in question, qr for the expense of obtaining or moving into another house, or for the boarding of his children; the most that he can in any event recover would be for damage wantonly or negligently done by the defendant, or those acting under him, in setting out plaintiff’s goods. Answer : The answer to be given to that point depends upon what you find to be the contract between these parties. If it was a tenancy for a year and the term had not expired, and the plaintiff, at the time the act complained of was done, was still a tenant with part of his term unexpired, then you would have a right in this case, if you find for the plaintiff, to give such damages as will compensate him for all' the wrong that was done him; damage for the trespass committed upon him in entering the premises; damage for removing his goods; for whatever injury was done to his goods by the way in which they were removed, and up to such reasonable time as he could take care of them after they were removed; to whatever expense he had been put to in reasonably taking care of them, and whatever expense he would be put to in taking them to another place, and to any additional expense he would be put to, to shelter his goods and family. In short, he would be entitled to just such damages as were the actual and probable result of the action of the defendant. This now, gentlemen, on the assumption that he was a tenant for'a year and that the term had not expired. On the other hand, if you find that was not the contract, if you find he was a tenant under such conditions as that right had accrued to the landlord to remove him before the year was up, or if you find that for any reason, if he was a tenant, the tenancy had expired, or if you find that he was an employee and not a tenant, then the damage that he would be entitled to, if any, would be whatever would compensate him for any injury to his property in putting it out and in its being out until he could reasonably take possession of it and find a place for it. Perhaps I. ought to qualify the last part of that phrase, and say, any injury that was unnecessarily done to his property by putting it out, would be what he could recover, if the landlord had the right to put him out, and I change the instruction to that extent.” [7] “ 11. If the jury believe that no damage was wantonly or negligently done by the defendant or those acting under him, to plaintiff’s goods, there can be no recovery in this case. Answer: That we must qualify again. It is not a question of wanton damage. It is a question of carelessness or unnecessary, damage, and we have had to qualify that so frequently that we decline this point, because it does not state the proper ground of damages.” [8] “ 12. Under all the evidence in this case, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.” Refused.” [9] [“ 1. The relation of plaintiff and defendant in this case was that of master and servant, and not that of landlord and tenant; and, upon discharging plaintiff, whether with or without good cause, the defendant was entitled to the occupation of the house in question, and had the right to set out the goods of the plaintiff. Answer: [To that we say, as we have already said, we have left the question to you as a question of fact, to determine whether the relation was that of master and servant, or landlord and tenant, and we have told you what would be the legal effect of the finding in one way or the other.] [11] [“ We are asked, however, further by the defendant to tell you that if you find that the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant, and not his, tenant, the defendant had a right to turn him out without good cause if he chose to take possession of the house, or that if he did turn him out without good cause, he would have the right to take possession of the house. That we cannot say. The defendant could not get any rights to the house by doing that which he had no right to do; and if he had employed the plaintiff for a year, if the circumstances were such that he discharged the plaintiff without having a right to do it, as we understand the point to mean, he could not by so doing get a right to take possession of the house.”] [12]] [10] Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $831.83. Defendant appealed. Errors assigned were (1-12) instructions, quoting them, as above.