Schlichter v. Keiter

[Marked to be reported.] Church law — Constitution—Confession of faith — Alteration. Under the constitution of the “ Church of the United Brethren in Christ,” adopted in 1841, providing that “no rule or ordinance shall at any time be passed to change or do away with the confession of faith as it now stands, nor to destroy the itinerant plan,” the confession of faith is not absolutely unchangeable in its manner of expressing the doctrines of the church, but it can be changed in the interest of clearness of expression or fulness of statement of the accepted doctrines of the church. Alteration of constitution — Election—Title to property. The constitution of the United Brethren in Christ provided that: “ There shall be no alteration of the foregoing constitution unless by the request of two thirds of the whole society.” The general conference of the church formulated certain changes in the constitution, and submitted them to the members of the church generally, who numbered about 200,000 persons. Of this number 51,070 signified their desire for the proposed changes by an affirmative vole. Those voting against the changes were 8310. Those who preferred another mode of proceeding than that which had been taken, and petitioned a general conference accordingly, were 16,187. The total number of those who expressed themselves upon the subject was 70,567. The general conference, assuming that the consent of the church had been obtained, adopted the new constitution by a large majority, and promulgated it as the law of the church. A small minority withdrew and organized another conference. Defendants, who were adherents of the minority, took possession oí a certain church and refused to surrender it to the majority of the congregation who adhered to the general conference which had adopted the new constitution. Held, (1) that a majority of the whole number of persons voting was sufficient to adopt the new constitution, and that it must be assumed that those who did not vote were either favorable or indifferent to the proposed changes; (2) that the “request” of two thirds of the whole society had been sufficiently manifested in favor of the proposed change; (3) that the persons who withdrew from the conference were an ecclesiastically distinct body, and had no title to the prop-' erty owned by the church prior to their withdrawal from it.

Appeal, No. 193, Jan. T., 1892, by defendants, M. F. Keiter et al., from decree of C. P. Franklin Co., Dec. T., 1889, Ko. 1, on bill in equity, in favor of plaintiffs, H. A. Solilicbter, Presiding Elder of the Cbambersburg District of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ; Theophilus Wagner, Preacher in Charge and Superintendent of the Sunday School; Henry Strealy, Class Leader, and J. F. Fisher, J. N. Sheeley, J. F. Wilt, C. R. Hoover, Simon Burns, E. Bovey and J. Hellane, Trustees of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ at Greencastle, Pa. Bill in equity to restrain defendants from any interference with the services or church property of “ The United Brethren in Christ,” at Greencastle, Pa. The bill alleged that H. A. Schlichter was the presiding elder of the Chambersburg district of the Church of the United BretU ren in Christ, of which district the Greencastle circuit forms a part; that Theophilus Wagner was the preacher in charge of said church at Greencastle, duly and regularly assigned, and the duty appointed superintendent of the Sunday school; that Henry Strealy was the duty and legally elected class leader of said church, and the said J. F. Fisher, J. N. Sheeley, J. F. Wilt, C. R. Hoover, Simon Burns, E. Bovey and J. Hellane the trustees of said church. It then set forth the action of the general conference of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ held in 1885, looking to an amendment of the constitution and a revision of the confession of faith of the church; the action of the general conference of 1889 and of the board of bishops in relation to the amended constitution and revised confession. That after proclamation had been made by a majority of the board of bishops declaring said amended constitution and revised confession of faith to be the constitution and confession of faith of the church, a minority of the bishops and delegates to said conference withdrew therefrom and proceeded to organize another conference, claiming that the}r were and are the only tr.ue Church of the United Brethren in Christ. That, M. F. Keiter, one of the defendants, claiming his authority from said seceding body, was undertaking to exercise the office of presiding elder of the said Chambersburg district of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ; that Peter Nieklas, another of said defendants, claiming authority from the same body, was undertaking to exercise the office of preacher in charge of the said Greencastle circuit; that the other defendants were claiming to exercise the offices, respectively, of trustees of the church at Greencastle, class leader and Sunday school superintendent; and that the defendants were hindering and obstructing the plaintiffs in the exercise of their said offices. The prayers of the bill are that the defendants be restrained and enjoined from such interference and from exercising the said offices which they respectively claim as aforesaid; and for other relief. The defendants in their answer alleged that the amended constitution and revised confession of faith as adopted by that portion of the general conference of 1889 to which the plaintiffs adhere were radically different from the old; that the attempted change of the constitution was not made in conformity with the method therein provided; and that said amended constitution is therefore void and of no effect; that the confession of faith cannot be changed at all so long as the constitution remains unchanged ; and that the action of the general conference of 1889 was therefore revolutionary, and that the people of the church were not bound to render obedience thereto. The cross bill set forth that the said M. F. Keiter is the presiding elder of the Chambersburg district of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ, duly and regularly appointed, of which district the Greencastle circuit forms a part; that said Peter Nicklas is the regularly assigned preacher in charge of the said United Brethren Church at Greencastle; that Peter G. Strine is the legally elected class leader and superintendent of the Sunday school of said church; and that the said Peter G. Strine, Adam Bear, Sr., Adam Bear, Jr., Samuel Crist, David Smith, F. W. Barnhart, and Frank Yates, the other defendants, are the legally elected trustees of said church; that the plaintiff's, above named, claiming the right to exercise the aforesaid offices respectively, are hindering, obstructing and interfering with them (the complainants in the cross bill) in the exercise and discharge of the duties of their said respective offices; and prayed that they, the said H. A. Sc^lichter and others, be enjoined and restrained from such interference. The case was referred to W. U. Brewer, W. K. Sharp and H. J. Plough, Esqs., as masters, who found the facts as stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court. They further reported that “ the revised confession of faith contains no doctrine that was not taught in the church prior to its adoption, unless it be the doctrine of sanctification, and with respect to this doctrine the church seems to have no well defined belief.” The masters reported a decree in favor of plaintiffs. Exceptions to the master’s report were overruled in an opinion in part as follows, by Stewart, P. J.: “ [The interpretation of the constitutional provision was a proper subject for the judicial action of the general conference. If susceptible of different constructions, it had the right to say what it meant — whether two thirds of all the members of the society, or two thirds of those voting at the election; and, acting strictly within its powers, it did decide that it meant two thirds of those voting. From that decision no appeal lies; for there is no higher tribunal within the church, and we cannot rejudge its decrees.] [2] The law upon this subject is aptly and concisely expressed in Watson v. Jones, Í3 Wall. 679: ‘The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual numbers, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body, do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent, and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts, and have them reversed. It is of the éssence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions -should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.’ “ This same doctrine has repeatedly been held by our own Supreme Court. Indeed, it has long since passed beyond discussion intp the settled law of the land. It is sufficient to refer to the cases of Ger. Ref. Church v. Seibert, 8 Pa. 291, and McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. 10, without quoting therefrom. . . . “ It seems to have been mistakenly assumed by the general conference, that the provision in the constitution for a change of that instrument applied as well to the confession of faith, and the same procedure was resorted to in making the change. The confession of faith is no part of the constitution, and the latter makes no provision for the change of the former; it simply forbids the general conference to pass any rule or ordinance changing or abolishing it. With this limitation upon the power of the general conference, a change was impossible under that constitution. To effect a change by constitutional methods, regular procedure would have first required a change in the constitution itself. The mistake that was made is obvious ; but whatever effect it may have upon the authority and binding force of the new confession,- — upon which we express no opinion, — we cannot allow it the significance in this contention which defendants’ counsel claim for it. [It can serve no purpose here to inquire into the regularity of the procedure by which the change in the confession was effected. We made the inquiry with respect to the constitution, only that we might determine the identity of the organic structure ; on no other-grounds would the inquiry have been pertinent. We could have no such reason for investigating the procedure, as it relates to the confession, for, even though the irregularity be established, — and we concede as much, — the identity of the organized society remains. The latter is not affected by a change of faith.] [3] If the contention were, that the new had not supplanted the old confession, because of the irregular-procedure in its adoption, and we were competent to pass upon that question, an inquiry into all the proceedings which led up to its adoption would be necessary. But both parties to this controversy assume that a valid and binding change was made, and therefore there is nothing left to consider but the effect and consequence of this change. “ The proposition insisted upon by the defendants, and which we are asked to affirm, is, that the new confession of faith differs so radically and materially from the old that by the adoption of the former a new and distinctive church has been established; and that to allow the property involved in the present dispute to be used by such church would be to divert the trust from the purposes intended by its founders. “ So much of this proposition as implies the power and duty of the court to interfere, and require a trust to be administered according to the intention of its founders, when a misapplication is attempted, is conceded, of course. The duty of the court in such case is obvious. The trust which is recognized by the law will be protected by the law, and where the protection of the law is inadequate to the purpose, equity will come to the relief; for has it not been said that ‘ a trust is the child of the law, and more especially the ward of chancery ? ’ “ But the other matters embraced in the proposition invite closer scrutiny. They suggest important azid material izrquiries. “ The existence of the trust, or religious use, is not dezzied. The origizr of the title is fouzid in John Dome, who by his deed declares that the lot was purchased for the purpose of erecting a Church of the United Brethren in Christ, azid who then cozrveyed it to certain parties, trustees of said congregation, for the use aforesaid. “ If the coziclusiozi already reached, viz., that the division of the local church hez'e represented by the plaintiffs, known as the liberals, is the United Brethren congregation of Greezicastle, because it is in cozznection with and in subordinatiozi to the legitimate governznent of the oz’ganized society, it needs no discussion to show that, so far as the will of the fouzzders is expressed in the grazit, they are the true and proper beneficiaries of the use. But it is cozitended ozi behalf of the defezrdants, that it is a necessary implication, derivable from the tezins of this grazrt, that the beneficiary uzzder the trust was to be a cozzgregation of the United Brethren in Christ, distinguished and individuated as such, not only by name, but by adherence to the doctrines held and advocated by that church when the grazrt was made. To state it still more concisely, we give the propositiozr as we find it izr the brief of the defendants’ counsel —‘ that the [constitution and] confession of faith are as fully a part of every trust deed of conveyance as if written therein.’ “ That the founders of this trust could have made adherence to the confession of faith as it then stood a condition of the use, will not be denied, since cujus est dare, ejus est disponere. But we are asked to go beyond this, and hold that, notwithstanding no such condition is expressed in the grant, yet the law implies as much, and imputes to the donor a purpose to impose, as a condition of the enjoyment of his bounty, that the congregatiozr should continue devoted to an unchanging and unchangeable faith. If such be the law, it makes largely for the defenddants’ contention, in spite of the fact, already ascertained, that the legitimate succession is with the plaintiffs. “ The essential elements of every trust are determined by the will of the donor. He it is who founds it, and whatever conditions he has imposed, and whatever purpose he has defined, if lawful, will be enforced, so that the end he had in view may be secured. The maxim of the old feudal system is still applied to modern grants — tenor est qui legem dat feudo. In the present ease the donors or founders are those who contributed to the purchase of the lot, and the effort must be to ascertain the interests they desired to promote, and the purpose they had in view. It is of no consequence that the present house of worship was erected at a much later period by the voluntary subscriptions of members who stood in no relation to the congregation when the lot was purchased. By the common law, even subsequent contributors have no other right of direction than that which the founder has prescribed; for they come in and give their money on a basis already established, and they can neither add to it, nor take anything from it: Pres. Cong, v. Johnston, 1 W. & S. 37. The rules of construction require that we must first have recourse to the instrument by which the trust was created and the use declared. Here, then, it is the deed from Dome to the trustees. If that expresses with sufficient clearness for an intelligent understanding the wishes and intentions of the founders, we are forbidden to look beyond, and must accept what is there declared as conclusive. If its language interprets itself, we have no occasion to resort to rules of art or precedents to guide us. “ The deed is as follows : ‘ Know all men by these presents, that the within described lot of ground, No. 97, was purchased for the purpose of erecting a church for the United Brethren in Christ, and the said John Dome doth, by these presents, release and quitclaim his right of the within lot of ground to George Zeigler, Jacob Wingerd, Samuel Lenhard, and Solomon Moor, trustees of said congregation, for the only use and interest above described, and for no other purpose.’ “ But very little is here expressed. Did the donors intend more ? They intended all that is legally and fairly inferable from the language used, but to what extent does this carry us ? We have a use declared for a particular congregation for the erection of a church for the United Brethren in Christ. That this contemplated that the congregation should be in connection and association with the larger organization, known as the church, is an unavoidable inference. Indeed, it may be said to be expressed, and it is about all that is. A denominational designation is used. What significance attaches to this ? Can we infer from this fact that the distinctive faith, or rather the entire creed, of that particular denomination, whether distinctive or not, was made an essential element of the trust ? Such, as we understand it, is the defendants’ contention, and they would have us read in the words, ‘ United Brethren in Christ,’ the entire Confession of Faith that was adopted in 1815. “ That by the use of a distinctively denominational name very much may be expressed, will not be denied. It is often of great help in determining the proper limits of a grant. In Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 70, it was held that when a conveyance is made to, or a trust created for the benefit or use of a religious society by its denominational name, — which denominational name is descriptive of the fundamental doctrine of the sect to which it belongs, with no other particular designation in the deed of the tenets or doctrines which it is to be used to advance or support, — the denominational name may be a sufficient guide as to the nature of the trust, so far as respects doctrines which are admitted to be fundamental. In the case in which this was said, the denominational name was ‘ The First Unitarian Society of Christians in Dover.’ And it was very properly held that the terms Unitarian and Christian were both expressive of fundamental and essential doctrines, and that, by the use of a denominational name in which both these terms occurred, it was made an implied condition of the grant that the society should avow no doctrines inconsistent with these. “ But of what fundamental doctrine is the denominational name of United Brethren in Christ expressive ? If any, it determines the use to that extent. It helps nothing to inquire what are the distinctive doctrines of the denomination, or whether it has any. What concerns us is to ascertain what distinctive doctrines are expressed in the denominational name. Armenianism may be, and we are told is, one of the fundamental doctrines of the church ; but it is not ascertainable from the denominational name. The name is not contradictory of extremest Calvinism. So, opposition to all secret associations may be a distinguishing characteristic, but the name does not so inform us. If this name indicates anything as to doctrine, beyond the divinity of Christ and the brotherhood of all believers in Him, we fail utterly to see it. As to these doctrines, the name furnishes us with an unerring guide; but its value stops right there. “ The cases all distinguish between a dedication of property to support particular tenets, and a dedication to support such tenets ^in subjection to a particular church government; and the rule is, that, when the cestui que trust is a congregation, indicated by its denominational name, the law will make it a condition of the grant that the congregation maintains the appropriate ecclesiastical connection; but when nothing appears in the grant except the church name to indicate the form of belief, the law will make conditions only of those fundamental doctrines which the name clearly expresses. In Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio, 510, it is said: ‘There may be a support o£ tenets without subjection to any ecclesiastical power which upholds them ; but it may be a condition of grant of property* that a trust is to be maintained in subordination to a particular power; as, if a church be established in connection with a particular ecclesiastical body, a severance from that body would be a violation of the trust.’ “ In our own state we have entire unanimity of decision on the general principles which govern in these cases; and while we find no single one — where matters of faith were the disturbing cause — which turns upon a declaration of use so meagre as this, yet they all accord with the authorities cited, and sustain the rule as we have stated it. That subordination to a particular church government may be made a fundamental condition, is the doctrine declared in Pres. Church v. Johnston, 1 W. & S. 37. It is repeated and emphasized in Means v. Pres. Church, 3 W. & S. 303. In App v. Luth. Cong., 6 Pa. 201, where the grant is almost identical with this, it is not only decided that it may be, but that it is, an essential condition; and in that case there is nothing from which such condition could be inferred but the denominational name. So, too, in Roshi’s Appeal, 69 Pa. 465, where the dedication was almost exactly similar — 1 in trust for the use of the said German Reformed Church.’ “ ‘ The principle which governs in all such cases,’ says Mr. Justice Shabswood, ‘is old and well established, and has frequently been asserted by this court. Whenever a church or religious society has been originally endowed in connection with, or in subordination to, some ecclesiastical organization and form of government, it can no more unite with some other organization, or become independent, than it can renounce its faith or doctrine, and adopt others.’ McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. 14, and Schnorr’s Appeal, 67 Pa. 146, are to the same effect. “ These authorities all recognize this ecclesiastical connection, implying submission, as a fundamental condition, and several of them, as we have indicated, infer this condition from the use of the denominational name in the grant. And however much any of them may seem to emphasize adherence to faith and doctrine, as a condition, it will be found to be only in cases where there is an expressed condition to this effect; and, even in such, they limit it to doctrines which are distinctive and fundamental. In those of our state cases where the grant most resembles this one, the effort was to carry away the local church property, or at least to secede from the original organization. In Schnorr’s Appeal, supra, one party having declared themselves independent of all synods, and absolved from the government of the church of which they had been a part, claimed the local church property, notwithstanding the fact that it had been conveyed ‘for the use of the congregation of the German Evangelical Reformed Church, and with the condition that no chauge shall be made in said congregation for any other denomination.’ It was in this case, and with reference to this positive prohibition in the grant, that Justice Sharswood, in expressing his dissent from the language used in McGinnis v. Watson, supra, uses the emphatic language which is so much relied upon by the defendants. He says: ‘ Courts which have the supervision and control of all corporations, and unincorporated societies or associations, must be guided by surer and clearer principles than those to be derived from the nature of intellectual and spiritual life. • The guarantee of religious freedom has nothing to do with the property. It does not guai-antee freedom to steal churches. It secures to individuals the light of withdrawing, forming a new society, with such ends and government as they please, raising from their own means another fund, and building another house of worship ; but it does not confer upon them the right of taking the property consecrated to other use, by those who may now be sleeping in their graves.’ “ What is this but saying that the will and intentions of the donor alone determine the limitations and conditions of the tnust, and that, when these are clearly expressed, the law of the land, which is superior to any supposed ‘ law of intellectual and spiritual life,’ in its operation on property rights, at least, will enforce them. “ In App’s Appeal, supra, the bequest was claimed by a congregation which did not belong to the old Lutheran church, was attached to a new synod, and not under the same ecclesiastical government that ruled when the bequest was made. McGinnis v. Watson, supra, was a case of secession. In Pres. Church v. Johnston, supra, there was no ecclesiastical connection prescribed. And so we might distinguish all the cases from the one we are now considering. None of these suggest anything inconsistent with the rule of the interpretation as we have stated it; while in several, as we have shown, it has been applied in a most conclusive way. “ Confining our search, then, for the intentions of these donors, to tlie words of the conveyance from Dome, can we discover any intention to impose other conditions than that the beneficiary must be a congregation in connection with the Church of the United Brethren in Christ? That it must be distinctively Christian in faith, and accept the doctrine of the brotherhood of all believers in Christ ? “ If more was intended, could it not have been easily expressed? As was said in Princeton v. Adams, 10 Cushing, 129, it is perfectly easy for persons giving their own private property to a religions use, to limit that use, and devote the property to a particular faith. And as was said in the Dublin Case, 86 N. H. 510, ‘ they need no professional assistance or technical learning to supply tliem with a peculiar phraseology ; any intelligible language will answer the purpose. They can have no difficulty in saying in some comprehensible form, that they intend the dissemination of the thirty-nine articles of the English Church, ■or the Westminster Cateehism; the doctrines of Luther, or ■ Loyola; of Edmonds, or Channing, or Jefferson ; the tenets held by some sect at a certain time, or such as it may bold from time to time in the course of its existence in a changing world. If they intend a theological limitation, they will express it; and then the court may be'called upon to decide, by legal rules settled by the wisdom of ages, not what the faith is, but what limitation is expressed by the words used.’ “ If, by our interpretation, we have confined this trust within limits too narrow, to what extent are they to be opened up ? ■ Can it be maintained, for a moment, that they are to include, as an essential condition, the entire confession of faith which • was recognized by the denomination when the trust was created ? ■If so, it must be bj1- necessary intendment, from the single fact that there was such a confession in existence. Any such view not only imputes to the donors what they did not express, and ■which could have been readily expressed, if intended, but it ignores what we have tried to show was the paramount purpose, because it is expressed, to wit: to place the subject of the trust in a congregation in subjection to the general order and government of the church at large. The United Brethren in Christ •were an organized body long before the trust was created. So, too, the Greencastle congregation had an earlier existence, and •was in ecclesiastical connection with the general body, and subject to its authority and legislation, when the property was dedicated to its use. This much the donors knew, and are presumed to have had in contemplation. Is it reasonable to suppose, under such circumstances, that they intended a use ■inconsistent with the submission of the congregation to established authority ? “ We think it evident that the paramount purpose was to - secure the property to the local society, in subordination to the higher authority of the church, whereby the regular connection and relation of the parts to the whole would be secured. And ■sureiy, if this be correct, such a qualified use as is here contended for would be inconsistent with this purpose, except upon the theory that it is beyond the power of the church to change its creed — an assumption which we cannot allow. Why cannot the church .change its creed ? It made it; and why cannot the same power which made, unmake ? It can change its name, its order of worship, its discipline, its government; then why not its creed ? To deny it this right, is to deny its existence as an organized society, or else deny it the freedom of conscience which is guaranteed to the individual. The power to make, implies the power to change; it is inherent and inextinguishable as well in churches as in individuals. We are not denying that certain legal consequences affecting property rights may result from a change of creed; what we are saying is, that the power to change the creed is implied in the very existence of the church, and that this power inhered in the church before, and at the time when this particular property was dedicated to a local congregation in connection with the church. This the donors are supposed to have known, and to have indicated the use accordingly. With this knowledge, either actual or imputed, of the inherent power of the church over its creed, is it not, and ought it not to be, a controlling circumstance in the case, that no condition whatever in regard to faith or doctrine, be.yond what is expressed in the denominational name, can be found in the letter of the grant? We certainly so regard it, and in this view we are largely supported by the case of Gibson v. Armstrong, 7 B. Monroe, 481, which stands out with the prominence of a guidepost. “ lb is no answer to say that it was in the belief that the church would adhere to its confession of faith as then written, for all time to come, that the dedication of the property was made. That is assuming a fact in support of which there is no evidence at all. But grant it to be a fact; what have we to do, in determining this question, with the belief and inducements which operated on the minds of the donors, when they have expressed in the grant itself the use they intend ? If the grant were doubtful or uncertain, — which it is not, — we could resort to extrinsic circumstances, and consider perhaps the belief and motive of the grantors as aids, but not otherwise. “ This grant cannot be regarded as requiring extrinsic evidence to construe it, simply because it may be thought by some from the circumstances under which it was made, and its brevity, that more was intended than is expressed. Any such rule would open the way for extrinsic evidence to disturb, if not destroy, anjr trust in existence. “ And when a church, in the exercise of its undoubted right, in a legal and sufficient way, changes its creed, what property rights are affected thereby? It unquestionably forfeits its right to all property, the use of which was conditioned by the donor, in his grant, on an unchangeable creed; but nothing beyond. We have argued to show that the conditions in the present case are, that the property be used by a Christian congregation in connection with a particular denomination, holding to the doctrine of the brotherhood of all believers in Christ. Any connection with a different denomination, or the avowal of a faith inconsistent with the doctrines of the Christian religion, or the brotherhood of believers in Christ, would be a perversion of this trust, such as the law would forbid and correct; but until such radical and fundamental perversion as this is attempted, those whom we have found to compose the true and real congregation at Greencastle, and here represented by the plaintiffs, are entitled to the undisturbed possession and enjoyment of the church property. “In the view we have taken of this, any further examination into the changes made in the confession of faith is unnecessary. It remains distinctively and unequivocally Christian in its character. So much is conceded; and it is all that concerns us to know. We may, however, be permitted to add that in comparing the new with the old, we fail to see how anyone professing his belief in either could he denied membership or fellowship, in the society which professes belief in the other. Literally, they are not the same ; but if inconsistent with, or repugnant to, each other with respect to any doctrine which has ever been made the basis of separate denominational existence, such fact has not been brought to our notice. The school men may have made some of the points of difference the subject of their violent polemics ; and it may interest the student of history or science to know just how they were regarded- by these men who were so wasteful of their learning and zeal; but in modern Christian thought, they are not considered of sufficient importance to disturb the unity of the faith. “ Since, then, the liberal congregation at Greencastle, here represented by the plaintiffs in the original bill, is in connection with and subordinate to the authority of the legitimate Church of the United Brethren in Christ; and since none of the conditions of the grant under which it holds the property now in dispute have been violated, it follows that these plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for, and that the defendants’ cross bill must be dismissed. The following decrees are now entered: Decree. “ [Now, 25th of August, 1891, this cause came on to be heard, and was argued by counsel. And thereupon, upon consideration thereof, it is adjudged, decreed, and declared: “ I. The said H. A. Schlichter was, at the time of the filing of the plaintiffs’ bill, presiding elder of the said Chambersburg district; the said Theophilus Wagner was the preacher in charge of the Greencastle circuit, and superintendent of the Sunday school of said church at Greencastle ; and said Henry Strealy was leader of the class there.] [4-7] “ [II. The said J. F. Fisher, J. N. Sheely, J. F. Wilt, C. R. Hoover, Simon Burns, E. Bovey, and J. Hellane were, at the time of the filing of the plaintiffs’ bill, and still are, the board of trustees of the said congregation of the Church of the United Brethren of Christ at Greencastle, exclusively entitled to exercise the rights, powers, and duties of trustees of said lot of ground and meeting house mentioned and described in paragraph XVII of the plaintiffs’ bill.] [8] “ [HI. The said lot of ground belongs to, and is the exclusive property of, the plaintiffs and the other members of said congregation of the United Brethren in Christ at Greencastle commonly called ‘ Liberals,’ who, with the plaintiffs, recognize the authority of, and as a congregation are in ecclesiastical connection with, the general conference of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ, as constituted of a majority of the delegates thereto after the session of fifteen of the members thereof at York, Pa., on the 18th day of May, 1889.] [9] “ And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed : “ [IV. That the said M. F. Keiter, and any other person claiming or to claim to exercise the office of presiding elder, under and by virtue of an election or appointment by any annual conference or other body or person except in Pennsylvania Annual Conference, subordinate to the said general conference, constituted as aforesaid, be, and they are hereby, perpetually enjoined and restrained from exercising any authority whatever as presiding elder of the said Chambersburg district.] [10] “ [V. That the said Peter Nicklas, and every other person acting under any appointment by any annual conference or other body or person other than the proper annual conference subordinate to the said general conference, be, and they are hereby, restrained from exercising the office of preacher in charge of said Greencastle circuit.] [11] “ [VI. That the said Peter G. Strine, Adam Bear, Sen., Adam Bear, Jun., Samuel Crist, David Smith, F. W. Barnhart, and Frank Yates, and every one of them, be, and are hereby, enjoined from acting as trustees of said lot of ground and meeting house in the plaintiffs’ bill mentioned, and from exercising any of the rights, powers, and duties of trustees with respect thereto, and from interfering with or in any way hindering the persons hereinbefore declared to be the board of trustees, in the possession and control of the same, and they and every one of them be, and hereby are, enjoined and restrained from using and occupying the said meeting house and lot for public worship, or for religious or devotional exercises, or any other purposes whatever, and from exercising an}>- control over the said church building, property, or grounds.] [12] “ [VII. That the said defendants be, and hereby are, commanded to restore the plaintiffs and those whom they represent in this cause to the exclusive and uninterrupted enjoyment of said lot and meeting house. And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that a writ of injunction do issue forthwith against the defendants, commanding them to comply with all and singular premises so enjoined upon them.] [13] “ [And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the cross bill do stand dismissed, with costs to be paid by the plaintiffs therein to the defendants therein.] [14] “ [And it is further ordered and decreed that the plaintiffs do recover their costs in the premises, to be taxed by the masters sec. reg.] ” [15] Errors assigned were, (1-3) portions of the opinion in brackets above; (4-15) portions of decree; quoting them as above.