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Kittanning Brewing Co. v. American Natural Gas Co.

Kittanning Brewing Company v. American Natural Gas Company

Kittanning Brewing Co. v. Am. Natural Gas Co., 73 A. 174 (Pa. 1909)
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Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · State Highest Courts
Decided
March 15, 1909
Docket
Nos. , No. 43
Judges
Brown, Fell, Mestrezat, Potter, Stewart
Citations
73 A. 174224 Pa. 1291909 Pa. LEXIS 740
Disposition
Record remitted.
Syllabus
Equity — Equity practice — Injunction—Preliminary injunction — Continuing injunction without hearing defendant. 1. It is reversible error to continue a preliminary injunction without hearing defendant's witnesses, if the defendant asks to be heard.- There is nothing in equity rule 81 which will justify such practice. 2. When a preliminary injunction is awarded without notice it is the right of the enjoined to move at once for its dissolution, instead of being compelled to wait for the complainant’s motion to continue at the expiration of five days. Its continuance for even a day may work irreparable wrong to the defendant, whose right to be heard that it be dissolved is no less than the complainant's who procures it without notice on an ex parte hearing.
Summary
Appeal, No. 43, Oct. T., 1909, by defendant, from decree of C. P. Armstrong Co., Dec. T., 1908, No. 263, continuing preliminary injunction in case of The Kit-tanning Brewing Company v. American Natural Gas Company and The Kittanning Consolidated Natural Gas Company. Motion to continue preliminary injunction. Before Patton, P. J. The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case. Error assigned was in continuing preliminary injunction without giving defendant an opportunity of being heard.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Brown

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Opinion by Mr. Justice Brown,

On November 30, 1908, without notice to the appellant, a preliminary injunction was awarded by the court below, restraining it from shutting off a supply of gas to the appellee. Five days afterwards, on December 5, on the hearing of the motion to continue the injunction, the appellee, after offering some documentary evidence, called four witnesses, and, upon announcing its case closed, the appellant offered to produce testimony in answer to that submitted by the appellee, but the offer was refused, on the ground, as it appears from the court’s ruling, that at that time the appellant had no right to offer any evidence. The unchallenged statement in the history of the case is that the practice in the court below is to hear only the plaintiff’s case on the question of continuing a preliminary injunction, and the contention of counsel for appellee is that under equity rule No. 81, such practice is correct.

The awarding of a preliminary injunction without notice is somewhat like judgment and execution before trial, for tern *131 porarily the defendant is damnatus inauditus. It is to be resorted to only from a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be repaired under any standard of compensation. It ought never to be granted except in a clear case of an invaded right, to prevent irreparable mischief; and when the proof as to the right is so equally balanced as to leave it in doubt, the writ should be refused until the rights of the parties are ascertained and settled: The Mammoth Vein Consolidated Coal Company’s Appeal, 54 Pa. 183 ; Brown’s Appeal, 62 Pa. 17 ; Minnig’s Appeal, 82 Pa. 373 .

When a preliminary injunction is awarded without notice it is the right of the enjoined to move at once for its dissolution, instead of being compelled to wait for the complainant’s motion to continue at the expiration of five days. Its continuance for even a day may work irreparable wrong to the defendant, whose right to be heard that it be dissolved is no less than the complainant’s who procures it without notice on an ex parte hearing. To grant the one a hearing and to deny it to the other would be a mockery of justice. The books teem with cases in which preliminary injunctions awarded on bills and affidavits have been dissolved on affidavits of defendants denying the equities of the plaintiffs. Defendants were always so heard, and their right to be heard now is not impaired by rule 81, though under that rule ex parte affidavits will not be received. The rule provides, “Witnesses may be examined orally before the judge, or testimony may be taken on short rule, or, when necessary, testimony may be taken before any person authorized to administer an oath, on notice to the other side to appear and cross-examine. ” If only witnesses for the plaintiff are to be heard on a motion to dissolve or continue an injunction awarded without notice, there is no hearing for the defendant, and he may be compelled to submit to wrong for weeks and months, until on final hearing it is made clear that he ought not to have been enjoined and subjected to injuries for which the plaintiff’s bond gives no adequate reparation. What seems to be the practice of the court below is at variance with every idea of equity.

The question before us at this time is not whether the pre *132 liminary injunction should be dissolved, but whether the court erred in continuing it without hearing the defendant, asking to be heard. After hearing it, the injunction might have been continued; on the other hand, it might have been dissolved and, if so, the defendant’s appeal would not be here. The first, second and third assignments are sustained, and the record is remitted with directions to the court to reopen the hearing of the motion to continue the injunction and permit the defendant to offer testimony.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

Cited by 10 cases

View all citing references →
1928: 11933: 11938: 31939: 11947: 11968: 11971: 11974: 119282026peak 1938 · 3

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Rosenzweig v. FACTOR327 A.2d 36 (Pa. 1974)
  2. Pubusky v. D.M.F., Inc.239 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1968)
  3. Apple Storage Co. v. Consumers Education & Protective Ass'n272 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1971) · Concurrence
  4. Mahanoy Township Authority v. Draper52 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1947)
  5. Rochell v. City of Florence182 So. 50 (Ala. 1938)
  6. Pennsylvania Railroad v. Driscoll198 A. 130 (Pa. 1938)

Most recent

  1. Rosenzweig v. FACTOR327 A.2d 36 (Pa. 1974)
  2. Apple Storage Co. v. Consumers Education & Protective Ass'n272 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1971) · Concurrence
  3. Pubusky v. D.M.F., Inc.239 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1968)
  4. Mahanoy Township Authority v. Draper52 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1947)
  5. Tankin v. Hotel & Restaurant Workers Industrial Union, Local No. 35636 Pa. D. & C. 537 (1939)
  6. Rochell v. City of Florence182 So. 50 (Ala. 1938)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 3

DepthCaseCited by
Mammoth Vein Consol. Coal Co.'s Appeal, 54 Pa. 183 (1867) 7
Appeal of Brown, 62 Pa. 17 (1869) 6
Minnig's Appeal, 82 Pa. 373 (1877) 5

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