Pennsylvania Hospital v. City of Philadelphia

Constitutional law — Obligation of contracts — Impairment—Eminent domain — Opening city street. 1. The constitutional inhibition upon any State law impairing the obligation of contracts is not a limitation upon the power of eminent domain. The obligation of a contract is not impaired when property rights acquired from the State by contract are appropriated to a public use and compensation made therefor. 2. There enters into every contract, whether between the state and an individual or between individuals only, the unwritten condition that it is subordinate to the right of appropriation- to a public use. 3. Where, the Act of April 11, 1854, P. L. 385, provided that no streets should be opened through the property belonging to a certain hospital -without its consent, and thereafter the city within whose limits the hospital was located commenced to open a street through the hospital’s property, a bill in equity alleging that the act constituted a contract between the State and the hospital which would be impaired by the opening of a street without plaintiff’s consent, and praying for an injunction to restrain the city from proceeding with the improvement, was properly dismissed.

Appeal, No. 155, Jan. T., 1916, by plaintiff, from decree of C. P. No. 5, Philadelphia Co., Dec. T., 1915, No. 2883, in equity, dismissing bill in equity for injunction in case of the Contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital v. City of Philadelphia, Thomas B. Smith, Mayor; George E. Datesman, Director of the Department of Public Works, and William H. Connell, Chief of the Bureau of Highways of the said city. Bill in equity for injunction to restrain defendant from opening 44th street through the grounds of the Pennsylvania Hospital in the City of Philadelphia. The Act of April 17,1854, P. L. 385, entitled “An act to prevent streets being laid out through, the grounds of the Pennsylvania Hospital without the consent of the managers,” provided as follows: “Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, That no streets, alleys, roads or lanes, shall ever be opened through the property belonging to the corporation of the contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital, situate in the twenty-fourth ward of the City of Philadelphia, without the consent of the said corporation, so long as the said property is used for the purposes of their insane department, any law to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, That said corporation shall contribute one-half the ground, for an avenue, on their east, one on their west line, each one hundred feet in width, without charge to the city and County of Philadelphia.” Thereafter, in 1913, the City of Philadelphia passed an ordinance opening 44th street from Market street to Haverford avenue and on January 27, 1914, plaintiff was informed that the avenue would be opened through its property for public use. Such ordinance was passed under authority of the Acts of June 8, 1881, P. L. 68, and May 23, 1874, P. L. 230, giving the municipal authorities the right to open streets, “Any private or special statute to the contrary notwithstanding.” Plaintiff’s bill in equity averred that such acts did not empower the State to take away the right and privilege granted to the plaintiff by the Act of 1854, and that the ordinance is illegal under the Constitution of Pennsylvania and the Constitution of the United States forbidding laws which impair the obligation of contracts. Other facts appear in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The lower court dismissed the bill. Plaintiff appealed. Error assigned, among others, was the decree of the court.