Thomeuf v. Knights of Birmingham

Beneficial association — Testamentary character of designation of beneficiary — Test of validity. Thu designation of a beneficiary by a member of a benefit society is in a sense testamentary in character, the claim of the beneficiary being based not on contract but appointment, but the validity of such appointment when authorized by the charter is valid, notwithstanding the statute of wills. The paper may fall short of being a present and irrevocable assignment of the fund and yet be a valid designation of the beneficiary, if so intended. The test lies in the intent. Right of member to designate beneficiary — Act of 1893. Where a member of a beneficial association, when he became such member, had the right to designate as a beneficiary a person who was neither a member of his family nor an heir, nor a blood relation, nor an affianced wife, nor a person dependent upon him, he is not deprived of such right by the Act of April 6, 1893, P. L. 7, which is prospective in its operation.

Appeal, No. 152, Oct. T., 1899, by-defendants, from judgment of O. P. No. 1, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1898, No.. 679, on verdict for plaintiff. Assumpsit to recover $1,000 benefits from the Knights of Birmingham, payable on the death of Henry C. Shoemaker. The trial judge refused defendants’ points for charge, which were as follows: [1. If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant is a fraternal beneficial society, your verdict should be for the defendant, unless the evidence satisfies you that the plaintiff is within the classes to whom death benefits may be paid by law, namely, within the classes “families, heirs, blood relatives, affianced husband or affianced wife, or to persons dependent upon the member ” of the society.] [1] [2. If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff was not.a creditor of Henry C. Shoemaker at the time of the designation of her as beneficiary, she has no insurable interest entitling her to benefits payable by the defendant, and if she is not within the classes limited by law to whom such benefits may be payable, your verdict should be for the defendant.] [2] [3. The designation stating on its face to be for the payment of board and funeral expenses, the plaintiff cannot recover without proof that board was due her by the defendant, and that she has paid the funeral expenses, and, in the absence of such proof, your verdict should be for the defendant.] [3] [4. That the paper offered as a designation is not such a paper, but is simply a will and bequest, and should have been probated in the register of -wills’ office, and cannot be received as evidence in this case of an assignment of said benefits, and therefore, jour verdict should be for the defendant.] [4] [5. Under all the evidence in the case your verdict should be for the defendant.] [5] The court charged the jury as follows: Gentlemen, this is a peculiar case. The facts of the case are admitted, and are stated on a paper which I will hand to the stenographer and which is as follows: “ It is admitted that Henry O. Shoemaker was in 1890 and continued down to the time of his death on the 24th day of July, 1896, a member in good standing of Centennial Lodge No. 7, Knights of Birmingham; that as such member of the said Centennial Lodge No. 7, Knights of Birmingham, he was entitled to the sum of $1,000 to be paid to such person as he should designate under the charter of the Grand Lodge Knights of Birmingham, the constitution and by-laws being as follows: ‘ The purpose of this corporation shall be the maintenance of a society for the mutual benefit and protection of its members and to provide from moneys collected therein, 'such sums as may be fixed by the by-laws to be paid over, upon the death of any member, to such person or persons as the deceased may have designated to receive the same, as appears on the books of the Lodge of which he was a member; if no designation has been made, then to his widow; if no widow then to his child or children; in default of the foregoing, then to his legal representatives.’ That on the 22d day of June, 1896, the said Henry C. Shoemaker signed the following paper: ‘“Monday, June 22, 1896. “ ‘ This day of our Lord I do bequeath to D. Thomeuf this one thousand dollars due to me at my death from the Centennial Lodge No. 7, Knights of Birmingham, for board and funeral expenses. “‘H. C. Shoemaker. “ ‘ Bella Faith. “‘Mart Lex.’ “ That the said Henry Shoemaker on that day forwarded this paper to the secretary of Centennial Lodge No. 7,' Knights of Birmingham; that the said secretary of said lodge, J. B. Jardinelia, in due course received the same, filed it among the records of said lodge, and the following entry was made in the books of the Centennial Lodge No. 7, Knights of Birmingham: “ ‘ He designated on the books of the lodge that his benefit should be paid to Delphine Thomeuf, residence 1304 Melon street. “ ‘ J. B. Jajrjdinella, “‘Secretary of Centennial Lodge No. 7 K. of B.’ “ That the said Henry C. Shoemaker was able to be about his room at the time he signed the said paper, and was subsequently well enough to leave the house; that the said Henry C. Shoemaker died on the 24th day of July, 1896; that the said Grand Lodge Knights of Birmingham was duly notified of the death of the said Henry C. Shoemaker; that proofs of the death of the said Henry C. Shoemaker were furnished to the said Grand Lodge Knights of Birmingham, in accordance with the constitution and by-laws thereof; and that the said Grand Lodge Knights of Birmingham holds the sum of $1,000, with interest, to be paid to such person as the said Henry C. Shoemaker should designate, or who is entitled to receive the same under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania and the charter, constitution and by-laws of the Knights of Birmingham. That the charter and constitution of the Grand Lodge Knights of Birmingham are part of this admission, and that the Grand Lodge Knights of Birmingham is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania. That said plaintiff is not a relative or affianced wife of said H. C. Shoemaker, and no funeral expenses have been paid by her.” Those being the facts, the only question is what, under the law, the verdict should be. I instruct you to find a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,095, that being the amount which she would be entitled to receive if she is entitled to receive anything. I will reserve the question for the determination of the full court as to whether she is entitled to anything at all under those facts. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $1,095. Defendant appealed. Errors assigned were (1-5) refusing to affirm defendants’ points, reciting same. (6) In refusing to enter judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto. There are only two points involved in this case. The first is whether the paper is an assignment or a designation, or, on the other hand, whether it is a testamentary writing and should be duly proven and probated according to law. If the paper is found by the court to be a designation or assignment, it is void as such designation, because it is contrary to the provisions of the Act of April 6, 1893, P. L. 7. -In construing the designation of beneficiaries, courts generally regard the form as secondary to the purposes of promoting the intent of the parties ; nor is any particular form of words necessary to make a valid assignment of a chose in action, nor is any written instrument required: Bispham’s Equity (2d ed.), secs. 167, 168; Bond v. Bunting, 78 Pa. 210; Malone’s Estate, 8 W. N. C. 179; Madeira’s Estate, 16 Phila. 399; Scott v. Dickson, 16 W. N. C. 181. The right of a member of a beneficial society to change at will the beneficiary in his certificate cannot be taken away by subsequent statutes or by-laws, when such right existed when his insurance contract was made: Voigt v. Kersten, 164 111. 314; 45 N. E. Rep. 543. The right of a member of a benefit society to change the beneficiary named in the certificate is not defeated, by the refusal of the society to make the change when requested by him: Voigt v. Kersten, 164 111. 314; 45 N. E. Rep. 543; Fisk v. Equitable Aid Union, 11 Atl. Rep. 84. In Ray v. The West Pennsylvania Gas Company, 138 Pa. 576, it was held that the state could not pass an act which would abrogate an existing contract, nor would the courts reconsider and change a rule of law where property had been vested in accordance therewith. The sound and true rule is that if a contract, when made, was valid by the laws of the state, as then expounded by all the departments of the government and administered in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent act of the legislature, or the decisions of its courts altering the construction of the law. The ruling applies, it will be observed, not to the general law, common to all the states, but to the laws of the state “ as expounded by all the departments of its government,” and it is held that contracts valid by these laws may not be impaired, “ either by subsequent legislation, or bjr the decisions of its courts altering their construction.” The reference is, of course, to the statute law. The act of 1893 was considered in Wolpert v. The Knights of Birmingham, 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 564, and it was held that the act did not apply to the case under consideration, as the act was not retroactive. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment should be affirmed.