Read v. Clearfield County

Statutes — Constitutional law — Miñes and mining — Act o/T893, P. L. 52. The title of the Act of May 15, 1893, P. L. 52, relating to bituminous coal mines and providing for the lives, health, safety and welfare of persons employed therein, does not bffend against the 3d section of article 3 of the constitution which forbids a bill to be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title. There is nothing in the statute that does not relate solely to its main subject, to wit: providing for the health, safety and welfare of persons employed in bituminous mines; and there is nothing in the title to mislead one who reads it into the belief that it did not intend to provide for the care of those injured by accident. Statutes — Sufficiency of title — Constitutional law. A title to an act is sufficient if it shows that a duty is imposed to render a service for which it would reasonably and in the nature of things be expected that compensation would be made; the act is not necessarily void because the title does not declare how and by whom it is to be made. Mines ancl mining — Constitutional law — Bituminous coal act. The power of the legislature to define and classify coal mines as it has done, and to legislate for each class separately must be regarded as settled on the authority of Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193. The bituminous coal Act of May 15, 1893, P. L. 52, does not offend the constitution in being either local or special legislation, nor in containing more than one subject.

Appeal, No. 95, Oct. T., 1899, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Clearfield Co., Feb. T., 1898, No. 92, in favor of plaintiff on case stated. Case stated. Before Mestrezat, P. J., of tbe 14th judicial district, specially presiding. The following facts appear from the case stated: F. B. Read, the plaintiff above named, bases his right to recover upon an act of assembly entitled “ An act relating to bituminous coal mines and providing for the lives, health, safety and welfare of persons employed therein,” approved May 15, 1893, P. L. 52, and especially upon Rule 40 of said act. On June 8, 1897, Robert Gunn, a miner working in Decatur township, Clearfield county, was injured in Reading colliery by having his shoulder dislocated and receiving other injuries by being caught between a mine car and the coal. The injury came within the knowledge of Cornelius Meagher, the mine foreman, who was of the opinion that the said Robert Gunn required medical treatment. He called upon the plaintiff, Dr. F. B. Read, who is a regularly licensed and registered practitioner of medicine and surgery, to render the necessary medical services, and in due course reported the accident to the mine inspector of the district. The plaintiff accordingly attended from the 8th to the 25th days of June, 1897, and his bill for the services so rendered is 132.00, and Gunn, the person injured, was and is unable to pay said bill or any portion thereof, wherefore the plaintiff seeks to recover from the county under the act above cited. The defendant contends that the portion of the act quoted, under which the plaintiff seeks to recover, is unconstitutional and void;, first, because it offends against article 3, section 3 of the constitution of 1874, and second, because it offends against article 3, section 7, clause 26 of the constitution. If the court be of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, then judgment to be entered in Ms favor for the sum of $32.00, with interest from December 25, 1897, and if not, then judgment to be entered for the defendant, the costs to follow the judgment, and either party reserving the right to sue out a writ of error or appeal therein. The court entered judgment on the case stated in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of $32.00, with interest. Defendant appealed. Error assigned was entering judgment in favor of plaintiff on case stated. -The general rule with reference to titles of acts of assembly, as laid down by a long line of authorities, is: “ While it may be difficult to formulate a rule by which to determine the extent to which the title of the bill must specialize its objects, it may be safely assumed that the title must not only embrace the subject of the proposed legislation, but also express the same so clearly and fully as to give notice of the legislative purpose to those who may be specially interested therein. Unless it does this it is useless:” In re Road in Phcenixville, 109 Pa. 44; Com. v. Samuels, 163 Pa. 283; Quinn v. Cumberland County, 162 Pa. 55; Mt. Joy v. Lancaster Turnpike, 182 Pa. 581; Pierie v. Phila., 139 Pa. 573; School District’s Appeal, 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 4. This legislation made radical changes in the law. It attempts to relieve the various poor districts from liability for the support of their indigent,,and places this liability upon the county, thereby, affecting the liability of the taxpayer and of his property to taxation. The sources of revenue by taxation for poor and county purposes are different. The same kinds of property are not taxable for each. It gives no notice to the county that relief is being, or will be furnished, and that it will be called upon to pay the same. The county is given no voice or say in the furnishing of medical attendance, or whether the injured person is a proper subject of county aid, nor the kind and extent of aid the injured persons should receive. Such legislation should have required, and no doubt would,have received, the severest scrutiny and strongest opposition on the part of the counties, had any notice been given to them through the title of the act of assembly at the time it was being passed by the legislature. This legislation cannot now be sustained unless it clearly meets the requirements of the constitutional provisions with reference to its title. By this legislation a special privilege and immunity is conferred upon a particular class of citizens in violation of the constitutional provision, and, under the decisions of the courts, such legislation is unconstitutional and entirely void. In the case of Strine v. Foltz & Bro., 113 Pa. 349, it was held that the Act of March 23, 1877, P. L. 25, entitled “ An act to empower the sheriffs and prothonotaries of the several counties .... to sue for their fees,” was special legislation and void. See also Sayre Borough v. Phillips, 148 Pa. 482. A number of recent acts of assembly providing special privileges for special classes of persons have been held to be unconstitutional by our lower courts. The Act of June 6,1893, P. L. 328, “ An act providing for the relief of needy, sick, injured, and, in case of death, burial of persons whose legal settlement is unknown,” has been held to be unconstitutional, on the ground that it is class legislation, by Judge Cbaig: Conyngham Township v. County of Luzerne, 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 183. The Act of May 26,1897, P. L. 106, prohibiting the discharge from public positions of union soldiers without a reasonable ■cause, has been held to be unconstitutional as class legislation, by Judge Peushing : Brower v. Levan, 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 702. The Act of July 2, 1895, P. L. 434, amending the Act of April 18, 1893, P. L. 23, relative to nonresident children of soldiers of the late war of the rebellion attending school in the common schools of districts outside of those in which their parents, guardians, or others entitled to their custody, may reside, has been held to be unconstitutional on the ground of class legislation, by Judge Ewing : Sewicldey School District v. Osborne School District, 6 Pa. Dist Rep. 211. And also by Judge Bittingeb : York City School District v. West Manchester School District, 8 Pa. Dist. Rep. 97. The court below rested its decision of this case upon the case of Com. v. Jones, 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 362. The appellant contends that the decision of that case does not rule the present case. In that case the court considered the act with reference to the mine operators and the miners in their employ, as an act of assembly regulating the duties and obligations of the employers, for the purpose of protecting the health and securing the safety and welfare of the employees. In this case the real purpose is the protection of the lives, health, safety and welfare of those employed in bituminous coal mines. All these purposes are expressed in the title. The clause under fire in the present case is germane to the subject-matter and is manifestly cognate to the subject of legislation. In Com. v. Jones, 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 362, Judge Smith, in commenting upon this same act of May 15,1893, says: “ Everything which the nature of the subject of a title reasonably suggests, as necessary or appropriate for the accomplishment of its expressed purpose, is sufficiently indicated by such title,” and “ There is nothing in the statute that does not relate solely to its main subject.” Assuming, however, that there is an additional burden, an examination of the decisions of the higher courts fails to lead to the conviction that this objection is of any force: Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349. Reverting to the argument that there should be some distinct and special notice of the fact that a burden is to be imposed upon a county, appellee would say that the payment by the county for services rendered in conformity with Rule 40 of the Act of May 15, 1893, P. L. 52, is merely an incident, a detail necessary for the effective accomplishment of the measures designated by the act: Com.'v. Sellers, 130 Pa. 32; Com. v. Lloyd, 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 6; Hays v. Cumberland Co., 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 159; Baker v. Warren Co., 11 Pa. Superior Ct. 170; Overseers v. Armstrong Co., 11 Pa. Superior Ct. 175. Even less merit is there, in the position that Rule 40 is an offense against article 3, section 7, clause 26 of the constitution of Pennsylvania. Appellant holds that Rule 40 confers upon miners injured in and about bituminous coal mines a special privilege, not enjoyed by any other class of citizens of the commonwealth. He forgets that Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, and Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, have held it competent to define and classify coal mines and to legislate for each class separately. It is precisely in line with this power of classification that the legislature passed the act of May 15, 1893.