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Bartlet v. Delprat

Humphrey Bartlet versus Mary Delprat and Others

Bartlet v. Delprat, 4 Mass. 702 (1808)
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Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
November 15, 1808
Judges
Sewall
Citations
4 Mass. 702
Headnotes
The declarations of a supposed grantor m a deed after the date of the deed, as “ that he had never made the deed,” &c., cannot be given in evidence against the party claiming under such deed after the grantor’s death.
Summary
This was a real action, in which Humphrey Bartlet demanded against the tenants possession of certain lands in Newbury, in this county, and was tried upon the general issue of never disseised, before Sewall, J., at the last April term in this county, when a verdict was rendered for the tenants. The demandant excepted to certain evidence admitted at the trial, and upon that ground moved for a new trial. From the exceptions filed, it appears that the demandant, to prove the issue on his part, relied upon a supposed deed from his father, Moses Bartlet, deceased, (who was also the father of the tenants, and under whose last will they claim and are seised of the demanded premises,) whereby the same tenements, at a date long before the said will, had been conveyed by Moses, the father, to his son Humphrey, the demandant, to hold to him and his heirs and assigns in fee, from and after the death of his father. To prove this deed and conveyance, the demandant offered a copy from the county registry, with certain fragments of a writing purporting to be remains of the original deed there recorded. This mutilated writing contained the signatures of the grantor and the subscribing witnesses, one of whom was the magistrate who took the acknowledgment of the deed; and it was agreed that all the persons named as witnessing the execution were dead, and had died before the registry of the supposed deed. The demandant then gave some evidence to the hand-writing of the signatures, and the copy of the registry and the fragments were permitted to be read and given in evidence to the jury. The tenants, on their part, gave in evidence the will of the father, Moses Bartlet, some testimony respecting the supposed signatures of the grantor, witnesses, and magistrate, contradictory to the testimony of the demandant’s witnesses on that subject. And it appeared that the demandant had never claimed, or intimated, any title in the demanded premises during*the life [ * 703 ] of his father. The tenants were then permitted to give in evidence certain declarations of the father in his lifetime, subsequent to the date of the supposed deed to the demandant; particularly, when speaking of the demanded premises, and the disposal of his estate among his children, “ that he had never made, and had refused to make, to his son Humphrey a deed of the premises in controversy; ” “ had given him his full share in his estate in another manner,” which he mentioned ; “ and intended the premises in controversy for the son and daughter,” to whom he afterwards devised them, viz., the present tenants. The exceptions filed by ’the counsel for the demandant went particularly to the declarations and sayings of the said Moses. The cause stood continued to this term upon the demandant’s motion for a new trial; and now,

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Sewall

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The cause stood continued nisi for advisement, and at the succeeding March term in Suffolk, the opinion of the Court was delivered to the following effect by Sewall, J.

[After stating the evidence admitted at the trial.] Against this evidence of the father’s declarations the demandant objects, on the ground that they are of the nature of hearsay evidence, and are the words of a party to the supposed deed, who, when speaking them, had an interest in declaring as he did.

The ground of admitting this evidence was, that the witnesses spoke to the fact, that declarations had been made by the father, which declarations were inconsistent with the claim and title of the demandant; were made at a time when no controversy existed respecting the land now in question; and were made by the person occupying the land relative to the nature and extent of his oceu pancy and title.

The evidence objected to has some analogy to a sort of evidence sometimes received, and justified by the authorities; particularly the declarations of tenants respecting their occupancy, when the seisin of the proprietor, or the extent of his boundaries, or of the appendages of his estate, are in * dispute ; (20) [ *708 ] and one case has been cited, where a conversation of a supposed tenant, respecting her payment of rent, was given in evidence to prove the seisin of the party to a fine, under which a defendant in ejectment claimed title, although it was decided by the court that the tenant herself was an incompetent witness, because liable for the mesne profits. (21) And it may be observed that, generally, declarations of persons not on oath, when admitted as evidence, are taken as facts in themselves, from which presumptions may arise for or against the facts in controversy. And the evidence objected to in the case at bar seems, at the first view, to be competent for the like purpose.

But no case has been found where the declarations of a supposed grantor, or party in an instrument, and who may be considered as interested, at the time, to declare in the particular manner testified to, have been admitted, even for the purpose suggested. And although we find precedents, in controversies respecting last wills, of declarations by the supposed testators received in evidence, (22) yet we find no instance of the declarations of grantors in deeds admitted as evidence, under circumstances in many respects similar.

And upon the whole, although the other facts' appearing in this case leave very little doubt of the justice of the verdict, yet, as the *620 competency of the evidence excepted to is not supported by any ■ of the authorities we have examined, we think the verdict must be set aside, and A new trial granted.

Note. — At April term, 1809, upon a trial before Sewall, J., a verdict was again found for the tenants, upon which judgment has been rendered.

Walker vs. Broadstock, 1 Esp. Rep. 458. — Auriol & Al. vs. Thomas, 2 Term Rep. 53. — Hindly vs. Rickarby, 5 Esp. Rep. 4.

Fostor vs. Williams, Cowp. 62.

Cowp. 52.

How later courts describe this case

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Cited by 19 cases

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1816–1817: 31824–1825: 11826–1827: 21832–1833: 11834–1835: 11840–1841: 11854–1855: 11860–1861: 21864–1865: 11866–1867: 11872–1873: 11876–1877: 11878–1879: 11894–1895: 11914–1915: 118162026peak 1816 · 3

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Bridge v. Eggleston14 Mass. 245 (1817)
  2. Gibblehouse v. Stong3 Rawle 437 (1832)
  3. McCrory v. Donald68 So. 306 (Ala. 1915)
  4. McGee v. Allison94 Iowa 527 (1895)
  5. Jackson ex dem. People v. Etz5 Cow. 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826)
  6. Burt v. McKinstry4 Minn. 204 (1860)

Most recent

  1. McCrory v. Donald68 So. 306 (Ala. 1915)
  2. McGee v. Allison94 Iowa 527 (1895)
  3. Cook v. Knowles38 Mich. 316 (1878) · Dissent
  4. Asbury Life Insurance v. Warren66 Me. 523 (1876)
  5. Jamison v. Craven4 Del. Ch. 311 (Del. Ch. 1872)
  6. Baker v. Haskell47 N.H. 479 (1867)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

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