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Hill Manufacturing Co. v. Boston & Lowell Railroad

Hill Manufacturing Company v. Boston & Lowell Railroad Corporation

Hill Mfg. Co. v. Boston & Lowell R.R., 104 Mass. 122 (1870)
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Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
March 15, 1870
Judges
Ames
Citations
104 Mass. 122
Headnotes
The successive roads of three railroad corporation*, together with the line of a steamboat company whose boats plied from the end of the third road, constituted a route between two cities. The first corporation had a written contract with the second for mutual transportation of goods over and beyond their roads, having in view transportation between the two cities, and providing that the first corporation might “ bill freight through,” and for any loss of goods beyond its own road the second corporation would indemnify it; and the general course in transporting goods from the first city to the second was for the first corporation to receive and receipt for them, as “ to be forwarded” to the second city; te dispatch them over its own road and the second road, with a way bill in which they were marked for through transportation which way-bill the third road took, with the goods, from the second road, and in its turn delivered, with the goods, to the steamboat company; and to collect the entire freight, not only for the transportation over its own road and the second road, in pursuance of the written, contract, but also over the road of the third corporation and the line of the steamboat company. After deducting from tile freight thus collected a portion fixed in its written contract with the second road as due for its own transportation of the goods, it paid the balance to that road, which, after deducting a portion fixed by oral agreement between itself and the third road, paid the residue to the third road, which divided it with the steamboat line in pursuance of an oral agreement between itself and that line. But between the first corporation and the third corporation and steamboat line, and between the second corporation and the steamboat line, there was no agreement except what may be inferred from this course of business. Held, that these facts warranted the inference that the first corporation was liable as a common carrier over the whole route, to a person from whom, in this course of business, it received goods for transportation from the first city to the second city. A common carrier, who ships goods over part of his route on a vessel which he does not own or charter, is not relieved from liability by the U. S. St. of 1851, c. 43, if the goods are destroyed by an accidental fire on the vessel.
Summary
Contract, to charge the defendants as common carriers with the loss of thirty cases of bleached cottons, delivered to them by the Lowell Bleachery, in behalf of the plaintiffs, for transportation from Lowell to New York City, consigned to the plaintiffs’ factor in the latter place. The case was submitted to the determination of the court on a statement of agreed facts, of which the following are the material parts : The defendants leased and worked the Stony Brook Railroad, which extended from Lowell to Groton Junction and there connected with the Worcester & Nashua Railroad, which extended from Groton Junction to Worcester and at Worcester connected with the Providence & Worcester Railroad, which extended from Worcester to Providence in Rhode Island, where its tracks ran upon the wharf of the Providence & New York Steamship Company, whose steamers plied from Providence to New York. The defendants, and the Worcester & Nashua Railroad Corporation, the Providence & Worcester Railroad Company, and the Providence & New York Steamship Company, were independent corporations, and had had no connection in business except as hereinafter stated. From and after the 1st of January 1868, a contract existed between the defendants and the Worcester & Nashua Railroad Corporation, which on May 20, 1868, was reduced to writing and signed by their proper officers. The material parts of this writing are printed in the margin.* In May 1868 the plaintiffs delivered the goods to the Lowell Bleachery in Lowell, to be bleached and then sent by the Bleachery to the plaintiffs’ factor in New York City, whose name was Josiah Colby. On May 22 the Bleachery delivered the goods, addressed to Colby in New York City, to the defendants’ agent at the freight depot of the defendants in Lowell, and took from him a receipt, which he signed, as follows: “ Received of the Lowell Bleachery, to be forwarded to New York, thirty packages of goods marked, 22, Josiah Colby, H. C. A.; 7, Josiah Colby, H. C. D.; 1, Josiah Colby, H. C. B.” The Bleachery at the same time delivered to the defendants a for warding order, at the bottom of which was printed in red ink, “ Charge freight to Lowell Bleachery,” it being the invariable usage of the Bleachery to give- orders in this form whenever it was to pay the freight on goods sent by it, and the defendants being used, at the end of each month, to present to and collect from the Bleachery a bill of charges on such freight. “ The defendants charged the whole freight on the thirty cases of goods, from Lowell to New York, at the rate of thirty cents per hundred, and at the end of the month presented their bill to the Bleachery Company, which was paid by them June 9,1868. In thus sending goods to the plaintiffs’ agent in New York, the Bleachery Company were acting for the plaintiffs.” “ The goods were forthwith transported from Lowell by the defendants’ agents over the Stony Brook Railroad to Groton junction, and there delivered, with the cars in which they were transported, to agents of the Worcester & Nashua Railroad Corporation, and by them carried over their railroad to Worcester, where they were by them in like manner delivered to agents of the Providence & Worcester Railroad Company, and carried over their railroad to Providence, the defendants’ cars being used until their arrival at the latter place, where agents of said Providence & Worcester Railroad removed the goods from the cars and delivered them in good order to agents of the Providence & New York Steamship Company, by whom they were placed on board one of said company’s boats bound for New York; and this was the only mode in which goods were ever transported from Lowell to New York by this route. The steamer, with these goods on board, arrived at New York on Sunday morning, May 24, about 9 o’clock, the usual hour of arrival, and was laid alongside of the wharf, and no goods were removed from her. The wharf belonged to the steamship company, and at the head of the dock were the company’s offices, extending to within a few feet of the steamer as she lay at the wharf. No person was present in the offices, except one watchman. About twelve o’clock, he was informed by some one in the street that the offices were on fire; on examining, the fire had made such headway inside of the offices that it was impossible to stop it; and in a few minutes it was communicated to the steamer, which could not be moved, having no steam on, and the steamer, with the merchandise on board, was partly consumed. It has never been known what was the cause of the fire in the company’s office, but it was agreed that it was not caused by design of the owners of the steamer. Colby had received no notice of the arrival of the steamer at the time of the fire; and it was not the custom to unload or deliver the goods arriving on Sunday till the Monday following. The plaintiffs’ loss and damage upon the goods by the fire was $4558.24.” “ The course of business which had subsisted since January 1, 1868, with regard to goods shipped by the Bleachery in the manner in which these were shipped, was this: A way-bill containing a list of all goods sent on each day, in the form printed in the margin,* was forwarded with the goods and delivered by the defendants to the Worcester & Nashua Railroad Corporation at Groton Junction, and by them delivered at Worcester to the Providence & Worcester Railroad Company, who delivered it to the Providence & New York Steamship Company at Providence. A duplicate way-bill, a copy of which is printed in the margin,† (and, when freight was paid in Lowell, marked ' paid,’) was forwarded with the goods and delivered by the defendants to the agents of the Worcester & Nashua Railroad Corporation at Groton Junction, and by them delivered to the agents of the Providence & Worcester Railroad Company at Worcester, who delivered the same to the Providence & New York Steamship Company at Providence; and when the freight had been paid in Lowell, the steamship company sent said bill to the consignee, and stamped the name of the steamer bringing the goods and the date upon it, which was delivered to the consignee with the merchandise. This would have been done in the present instance, but for the happening of the fire. “The Worcester 5c Nashua Railroad Corporation, before the sending of the goods sued for in this action, had directed the defendants to ticket passengers and bill freight from stations on the defendants’ line of railroad, to New York, over the Worcester 5c Nashua Railroad, by way of Providence, according to the contract between them ; and had fixed the rate of freight fiom Lowell to New York under said contract; and this was the rate charged by the defendants, and paid by the Bleachery for the goods sued for. The defendants charged and collected the entire freight for said goods, in pursuance of said contract, and received to their own use the price per ton provided in said contract, and paid over to the Worcester 5c Nashua Railroad Corporation the balance. The said balance was divided between the three remaining corporations over whose routes the goods passed, in the following manner and proportions, viz : the Worcester 5c Nashua Railroad Corporation received to its own use 34 per cent, of the whole charge from Lowell to New York, less the amount retained by the defendants, and paid over the residue to the Providence 5v Worcester Railroad Company; and said residue was divided by the Providence 5c Worcester Railroad Company and the Providence 5c New York Steamship Company, in the ratio of 44 to 66. This division of the balance, after paying the defendants, was effected in pursuance of oral agreements between the Worcester 5c Nashua Railroad Corporation and the Providence 5c Worcester Railroad Company, and between the Providence 5c Worcester Railroad Company and the Providence 5c New York Steamship Company; but there was no agreement, oral or otherwise, between the defendants and either the Providence 5c Worcester Railroad Company or the Providence 5c New York Steamship Company, nor between the Worcester 5c Nashua Railroad Corporation and said steamship company.” “ The court, upon the foregoing facts, so far as the same are competent, are to render such judgment as the law requires, it being agreed that they may draw any inferences from the competent facts stated that a jury would be justified in drawing.”

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Opinion of the Court — Ames

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Ames, J.

The law applicable to the conveyance of goods by successive carriers over connecting but independent lines of transportation has recently been very fully considered by this court. The case now before us does not appear to call for anything more than the application of the rules laid down in Darling v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Co. 11 Allen, 295 , and Burroughs v. Norwich & Worcester Railroad Co. 100 Mass. 26 . It is well settled that a railway company may by contract assume to carry goods beyond, as well as within, the limits of its own line of road ; and the claim of the plaintiffs is, that the de *134 fendants have made such a contract in this instance, and have rendered themselves liable as common carriers for the entire distance.

The case finds that the defendants, by means of their written contract with the Worcester & Nashua Railroad Corporation, had secured the means of placing themselves in connection with an established line of transportation, partly by railroad and partly by steamboat, between Lowell and New York. They had no contract themselves with the proprietors of any part of the line beyond the city of Worcester; but the corporation with which they were immediately dealing had such contracts. The manner in which the freight money should be apportioned among the successive carriers was fully arranged and agreed upon. There can be no doubt that the object to be gained by their written contract with that corporation was to form a connection with the city of New York, and in that way to extend their business and increase their profits. Their arrangements had made it substantially certain that all goods forwarded over and beyond their line would ordinarily go and be delivered at their place of destination in the regular course of business. By the sixth article of the written contract with that corporation, the latter undertakes to indemnify the defendants against a., losses and damages happening in any part of the joint line, beyond the limits of the defendants’ own road. The defendants were therefore in a position in which, without any great or extraordinary risk, they might assume the responsibility of common carriers for the entire distance. The precise and well considered precaution which they had taken, to be secured against all the risks of accident or mistake beyond their own limits, is a plain indication that they considered all goods, so transported, at their risk, as between them and the owners of these goods. If they were under no liability beyond their own termini except that of forwarding agents, they needed no such promise of indemnity. It is a matter of no consequence that the owners of the goods sent were not parties to this particular arrangement, or that it was not a thing of which they had any knowledge. The question is, What was the contract which the *135 defendants made with the plaintiffs on receiving the goods? The plaintiffs do not claim that it was reduced to a formal shape, and so expressed in apt words as to define with technical precision the exact rights and liabilities of each party, but they insist that the general character of the defendants’ arrangements concerning the transportation of goods, and their general course of business on the subject, were perfectly well known to the Bleachery Company, who for this purpose were the plaintiffs agents; and that this course of business was implied in and made a part of the contract under which the goods were received and forwarded; that is to say, that the contract was made with reference to that course of business, and to the practice which the defendants had adopted under it.

The case is submitted with an agreement that the court may draw any inferences from the competent facts stated that a jury would be justified in drawing; and the only matter in controversy is the question, What was the defendants’ contract upon the receipt of the goods? They had placed themselves in a position to do New York business, by having established a through joint line, under a written agreement with the Worcester & Nashua Railroad Company. It was a part of the agreement, that they were authorized by the latter corporation to give way-bills for freight for the entire distance, or, in the language of the contract, “ to bill freight through.” It was also a part of the agreement, not merely that all goods after they had left the defendants’ line should be at the risk of the Worcester & Nashua Railroad, but that this latter corporation should indemnify the defendants and save them harmless against loss or damage happening beyond their limits. The true interpretation of the facts then seems to be, that the defendants were to contract in the first instance with the owner or consignor of the goods, for the entire distance, and were encouraged and induced to do so by the assurance that they should really lose nothing in so doing. Such being their position, they offer to receive goods to be carried to New York; they receive them to be delivered there; they give a way-bill for the entire distance; they take pay for transportation . over the whole of the line; the *136 whole course of proceedings is exactly what it would be if they meant to contract for the whole distance; and to all appearance, as between them and the owner, the freight money is one indivisible item. We think these circumstances justify the inference that they assumed the liability for the entire transit, relying upon a third party for indemnity against all risks occurring beyond their own limits.

If the defendants incurred the liability of common carriers for the entire journey, as in our judgment upon the agreed facts they did, their liability as such did not cease upon the mere arrival of the steamboat at the wharf in New York. No notice had been given to the owner of the goods of their arrival. No reasonable time (as they arrived on Sunday morning) had been allowed for their removal. They had not been landed from the vessel, but still continued, in law and in fact, in the possession of the last carrier in the line, at the time of the fire. There was neither actual nor constructive delivery of them to the consignee. Hy de v. Trent & Mersey Navigation Co. 5 T. R. 389. Chickering v. Fowler, 4 Pick. 371 .

The statute of the United States, relied upon by the defendants, does not apply to cases like the present. It undertakes to exempt the owners of vessels from responsibility for losses arising from accidental fires, and it provides that charterers, who man, victual and navigate vessels, shall be deemed the owners within the meaning of the act. But these defendants are neither owners nor charterers of the steamboat, and do not come within the terms of the act. It certainly was not the intention of congress to extend the exemption, provided for by the statute, to expressmen or other common carriers who may avail themselves of the facilities afforded them by steamboats or other vessels for the transportation of packages in the fulfilment of contracts under which they assume the well known common law liability. The result therefore must be Judgment for the plaintiffs for the amount agreed, with interest

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Cited by 20 cases

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1871–1872: 21873–1874: 21875–1876: 11881–1882: 21885–1886: 21895–1896: 21901–1902: 11905–1906: 21909–1910: 21913–1914: 11915–1916: 21919–1920: 118712026peak 1871 · 2

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Burroughs v. Norwich & Worcester R.R., 100 Mass. 26 (1868) 34

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