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Lyons v. Desotelle

John Lyons v. Alfred Desotelle

Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387 (1878)
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Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
May 3, 1878
Judges
Morton
Citations
124 Mass. 3871878 Mass. LEXIS 330
Headnotes
If a man travels on the Lord’s day in violation of the Gen. Sts. c. 84, § 2, and, while so travelling, fastens his horse at the side of a road, and the horse is injured by the negligent act of another in driving against it, the unlawful travelling necessarily contributes to the injury, and an action of tort for such injury cannot be maintained.
Summary
Tobt for injuries to the plaintiff’s horse caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant. Trial in the Superior Court, before Bacon, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows: It appeared in evidence that the plaintiff hired a horse and carriage on Sunday, August 1, 1875, for the purpose of going from Chicopee to Springfield, to attend a camp-meeting. Upon reaching the camp-ground, the plaintiff hitched his horse at the side of the road behind the defendant’s buggy, and the injury was caused by the defendant’s horse backing the buggy against the plaintiff’s horse. The evidence was conflicting as to whether this backing was caused by the defendant’s negligence, or by his horse being suddenly frightened by a buffalo robe hanging from a seat of a passing wagon. The defendant requested the judge to instruct the jury as follows: “ 1. If the jury believe that the accident happened through the negligence of the defendant, while the plaintiff was unlawfully travelling on' the Lord’s day, and that the accident would not have happened if the plaintiff had not been so travel-ling, he cannot recover.” “ 2. If the plaintiff was travelling for pleasure on the Lord’s day, and such travelling contributed to the injury which befell him, he cannot recover.” “ 8. If the jury believe that the accident happened through the negligence of the defendant, not resulting from the wilful conduct of the defendant, while the plaintiff was unlawfully travelling on the Lord’s day, the plaintiff cannot recover.” The judge refused so to instruct the jury, but did instruct them as follows: “ It makes no difference whether the plaintiff was then in violation of the law relating to the Lord’s day or not. If I am travelling on the wrong side of the road, contrary to law, and a man carelessly and negligently runs into me, I can recover, unless my carelessness contributed to the injury. If the plaintiff went up there for pleasure and received injuries by the defendant’s negligence, he can recover, unless his own carelessness or negligence contributed to the injury.” The judge gave general instructions on the matter of negligence, to which no exceptions were taken. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and found specially that the plaintiff did not go to the camp-meeting with a bond fide intention of attending religious services there. The defendant alleged exceptions.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Morton

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Morton, J.

In an action of tort for injuries to the plaintiff’s person or property, if his own illegal act or other negligence contributed to his injury, he cannot recover. But he is not precluded from recovering by the fact that he is at the time doing an illegal act, if such illegal act did not contribute to his injury. McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass. 467 , and cases cited.

When a man in travelling sustains an injury from a defect in the highway or from an accidental collision with the vehicle of another traveller, his act of travelling is necessarily a contributing cause of the injury. If the act of travelling is unlawful, then his own unlawful act is a contributing cause of his injury, and prevents his recovery.

The statute prohibits any person from travelling “ on the Lord’s day, except from necessity or charity.” Gen. Sts. e. 84, § 2. Whoever travels on the Lord’s day, except from necessity or charity, is acting in violation of the law. Such act of travel-ling itself is unlawful, and if, in the course and as an incident of such travelling, the traveller sustains an injury, his unlawful act necessarily is a contributing cause of the injury. It has, therefore, been uniformly held in this Commonwealth that in such a case the plaintiff cannot maintain an action for his injury. Smith v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 120 Mass. 490 , and cases cited.

In the case at bar, the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that “ if the plaintiff was travelling for pleasure on the Lord’s day, and such travelling contributed to the injury which befell him, he cannot recover.” The court refused this request, and instructed the jury that “ it makes no difference whether the plaintiff was then in violation of the law relating to the Lord’s day or not.” The defendant was entitled to the instruction requested by him, and it was not covered by any of the instructions given. It is true that the court instructed the jury, that “ if the plaintiff went up there for pleasure and received injuries by the defendant’s negligence, he can recover, unless his *390 own carelessness or negligence contributed to the injury,” implying that, if his own negligence contributed to the injury, he could not recover. But the whole instructions, taken in connection with the refusal to give the instruction requested, would naturally lead the jury to understand that if the unlawful act of the plaintiff in travelling on the Lord’s day contributed to his injury, yet he could recover unless some other negligence on hie part was a contributing cause.

A majority of the court is therefore of opinion that the instructions were erroneous. Exceptions sustained.

How later courts describe this case

Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 1 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.

1880–1881: 11882–1883: 21888–1889: 11904–1905: 11906–1907: 11910–1911: 11924–1925: 12004–2005: 118802026peak 1882 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Wallace v. Merrimack River Navigation & Express Co.134 Mass. 95 (1883)
  2. Bourne v. Whitman95 N.E. 404 (Mass. 1911)
  3. Newcomb v. Boston Protective Department16 N.E. 555 (Mass. 1888)
  4. McNeill v. Railroad Co.67 L.R.A. 227 (N.C. 1904)
  5. Lawson v. Hoke119 P.3d 210 (Or. 2005)
  6. White v. Lang128 Mass. 598 (1880)

Most recent

  1. Lawson v. Hoke119 P.3d 210 (Or. 2005)
  2. Overmoe v. J. C. Penney Co.202 N.W. 648 (N.D. 1925)
  3. Bourne v. Whitman95 N.E. 404 (Mass. 1911)
  4. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Leyda128 Ill. App. 66 (1906)
  5. McNeill v. Railroad Co.67 L.R.A. 227 (N.C. 1904)
  6. Newcomb v. Boston Protective Department16 N.E. 555 (Mass. 1888)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 2

DepthCaseCited by
McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass. 467 (1873) 30
Smith v. Boston & Me. R.R., 120 Mass. 490 (1876) 22

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