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Hastings v. Stetson

Lucia M. Hastings v. James Stetson

Hastings v. Stetson, 130 Mass. 76 (1881)
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Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
January 6, 1881
Judges
Ames
Citations
130 Mass. 761881 Mass. LEXIS 6
Headnotes
Evidence is competent to prove that the adverse party in an action attempted to bribe a juror at a former trial of the case. In an action for slander, a repetition by the defendant of the slander is admissible to show malice. In an action for slander, the plaintiff may recover damages for the mental distress naturally resulting from the publication of the slander. In an action for slander, evidence of the bad character of the defendant is inadmissible in mitigation of damages.
Summary
Tort in five counts, for slander, in accusing the plaintiff oi the crimes of adultery and fornication. Answer, a general denial. After the former decision, reported 126 Mass. 329, the case was tried in the Superior Court, before Brigham, C. J., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows: The evidence was conflicting as to whether the alleged slan derous words were spoken or not. One of the jurors at the former trial was called by the plaintiff, for the purpose of show ing liability and the truth of the allegations of the plaintiff’s declaration, and was permitted, against the defendant’s objection, to testify that, after this case had been opened to the jury at the former trial, the defendant said to him, “ You go for me,” or, “You do what is right, and I will pay you for it;” and that afterwards the defendant again approached him, while the case was in progress, and before it was given to his jury, and pulled out money and held it out to him.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Ames

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Ames, J.

As the evidence upon the question whether the defamatory words imputed to the defendant had in fact been uttered by him was conflicting, his deportment and conduct at the former trial of the case may have become proper matters of consideration. It was decided in Egan v. Bowker, 5 Allen, 449 , that evidence that a party to a suit had suborned a witness, • under an assumed and false name, to give a deposition in his favor, was admissible and competent, as having a tendency to prove that the cause of action or ground of defence relied upon by that party was false and dishonest. The jury may fairly decide that fraud and deceit would not be made use of in support of an honest claim. We do not see any reason why a private attempt by one of the parties to a suit to corrupt a juror by direct bribery does not stand upon the same ground. We see *78 no error in the admission of such evidence, and m allowing fcha jury to give some consideration to such a fact.

It is well settled that the pain and mental distress which would naturally result from a malicious slander are among the elements of damage for which the plaintiff may claim compensation. If what the defendant said to the witness, Smith, was meant to apply to the plaintiff, it was admissible as a repetition of the slander, and so as evidence of deliberation and malice. Bodwell v. Swan, 3 Pick. 376 . That it did apply to her, the jury could hardly have had any doubt.

Under the rule established in Stone v. Varney, 7 Met. 86 , the defendant would have the right to show, if he could, that the plaintiff’s general reputation for integrity and moral worth was so bad that any damage done by the slander uttered by the defendant would be but nominal. But he could hardly rely on his own bad character in mitigation of damages. We find nothing in the paper offered by him that can have any weight in diminishing his responsibility for any wrong which he has done to the plaintiff, or affecting the amount of damages which the plaintiff is entitled to recover.

Exceptions overruled.

How later courts describe this case

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Cited by 20 cases

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1881–1882: 11883–1884: 11885–1886: 11891–1892: 21895–1896: 11897–1898: 11899–1900: 11901–1902: 11905–1906: 21909–1910: 11913–1914: 11919–1920: 31921–1922: 11949–1950: 11973–1974: 11999–2000: 118812026peak 1919 · 3

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Pennington v. Kansas City Railways Co.213 S.W. 137 (Kan. Ct. App. 1919)
  2. Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co.13 L.R.A. 97 (Mass. 1891)
  3. Nolin v. Pearson77 N.E. 890 (Mass. 1906)
  4. Boyle v. Columbian Fire Proofing Co.64 N.E. 726 (Mass. 1902)
  5. Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc.310 N.E.2d 343 (Mass. 1974)
  6. Shafir v. Steele727 N.E.2d 1140 (Mass. 2000)

Most recent

  1. Shafir v. Steele727 N.E.2d 1140 (Mass. 2000)
  2. Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc.310 N.E.2d 343 (Mass. 1974)
  3. Mendelsohn v. Leather Manufacturing Corp.93 N.E.2d 537 (Mass. 1950)
  4. Zandan v. Radner136 N.E. 387 (Mass. 1922)
  5. Suick v. Krom177 N.W. 20 (Wis. 1920)
  6. Henderson v. Dreyfus191 P. 442 (N.M. 1919)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

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