Mullen v. Brown

A person who has procured the arrest and imprisonment of another on a lawful warrant is not liable to an action for false imprisonment, although his object in making the complaint upon which the warrant was issued was to enforce the payment of a debt.

Tort for false imprisonment. Trial in the Superior Court, before Blodgett, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows: The plaintiff sold to the defendant a sleigh, and was paid $50 therefor. The sleigh, at the time of the sale, was subject to a mortgage given by the plaintiff to one Daniel H. Murphy, and was taken from the defendant and sold upon said mortgage. Thereupon the defendant made complaint to the Police Court of Lynn, charging the plaintiff, in selling the sleigh, with the offence described in the Pub. Sts. o. 203, § 70. A warrant was issued on this complaint, upon which the plaintiff was arrested; and for this arrest the plaintiff sought to recover damages in this action. The plaintiff was tried and convicted in said Police Court, appealed to the Superior Court, and was tried therein, and acquitted. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that the motive of the defendant in instituting the criminal prosecution was to enforce the payment to him by the plaintiff of said $50; and contended that, if the plaintiff was guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, the fact that he was guilty was not a defence to this action, if the jury found that the motive of the defendant in making said complaint was as before stated. The plaintiff asked the judge to instruct the jury that, “if the plaintiff was arrested under a legal warrant and by a proper officer, yet if one of the objects of the arrest was thereby tó extort money or property from him, or to enforce the settlement of a civil claim, such arrest would be a false imprisonment by all who directly or indirectly procured the same, or participated therein for any such purpose.” The judge declined to give this instruction; and instructed the jury that, “if the plaintiff sold the sleigh to the defendant without the written consent of the mortgagee, and without informing the defendant that the sleigh was mortgaged, although the motive of the defendant in making said complaint was to enforce payment of said fifty dollars, this action could not be maintained.” The jury returned a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions. N. D. A. Clarke, for the plaintiff, cited Hackett v. King, 6 Allen, 58; Taylor v. Jaques, 106 Mass. 291, 295.