Jackman v. City of Gloucester

A statement, filed in the registry of deeds, by a person claiming a mechanic’s lien, and subscribed and sworn to by him, in accordance with the Pub. Sts. c. 191, § 6, is not invalidated by the omission of the magistrate by whom the oath was administered to add the title of his office after his signature; and evidence is admissible to show that he held such office at the time he administered the oath.

Petition to enforce a mechanic’s lien for labor performed or furnished, under an entire contract, by the petitioner, on a house for one Crispen, who was acting under a contract with the respondent. Trial in the Superior Court, before Pitman, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows: Several issues of fact were submitted to the jury, the first of which was as follows: “Was the certificate of lien filed within thirty days after Jackman ceased to labor or furnish labor on the building?” To prove the affirmative, the petitioner introduced in evidence a certified copy of a document on file in the registry of deeds, purporting to be such certificate of lien; but the certificate of the oath of the petitioner on said certificate of lien was as follows: “State of Massachusetts. Essex, ss. Gloucester, July 13, 1885. Then personally appeared the above-named Eli Jackman and made oath that the statement above subscribed by him is true, before me. William A. Pew, Jr.” The respondent objected to the admission of this document, because it did not show that the oath was administered by any magistrate or person legally authorized to administer oaths. The petitioner then offered to prove that said William A. Pew, Jr., who executed said certificate of the oath of the petitioner, was, at the date of the same, a justice of the peace for said county. To this the respondent objected, but the objection was overruled, and the respondent admitted that said William A. Pew, Jr. was, at the time of making said certificate, a justice of the peace for said county. The above issue was submitted to the jury, who found that the certificate of lien was filed by the petitioner within thirty days after he ceased to labor or furnish labor in said building; and, on the whole case, the judge found the lien to be established. The respondent alleged exceptions.