McComb v. C. R. Brewer Lumber Co.

Hammond, J.

The declaration contains three counts. The first is contract to recover a month’s salary as the defendant’s treasurer; the second is contract for not complying with certain promises made in the sale of certain stock to the plaintiff by the defendant; and the third is tort for deceit in the same sale. No question was raised as to the pleadings, whether for misjoinder of counts or otherwise, and the case went to trial upon the declaration as it stood. At the close of the evidence the plaintiff waived the second count and the case went to the jury upon the first and third counts, upon each of which there was a verdict for the plaintiff, the damages on the first being the full amount claimed, and upon the third, $1.

*278 The exceptions relate only to the third count, and since the verdict was for the plaintiff on this, they are material only so far as they respect the question of damages. The principal difference between the instructions given by the judge and those requested by the plaintiff is that the judge declined to permit the jury to consider the allegation with reference to the promised use of the $9,000 paid by the plaintiff for the stock. As to this it is contended by the plaintiff that at the time the defendant promised to use the money as working capital it did not intend to keep the promise, and that a representation of a present intention is a representation of an existing fact and therefore may be false and fraudulent. But, without implying that the plaintiff’s contention would be true under any circumstances, the difficulty with his case is that the question is not raised upon the record. The ruling that the jury should not consider the allegation with reference to the promised use of the money appears to have been made with reference to the third count, and, as applied to that, it was correct. An examination of the count will show that it does not contain any allegation that at the time the defendant said that the money should be used for working capital it had not the intention to perform that promise. It first sets out the representations which induced the plaintiff to purchase the stock, then proceeds to state in what respects they were false and fraudulent and the defendant’s knowledge of the falsity, and then follows the only allegation respecting the representation as to the promised use of the money: “ And the nine thousand dollars paid by the plaintiff to the defendant was not put in its treasury and used as working capital, but was, with the approval of the defendant, its directors and manager, used for other purposes than the business of the defendant.” This is an allegation that the defendant failed to carry out its promise, and falls far short of an allegation that the defendant at the time it was made did not intend to carry it out. There is no allegation whatever as to the intent of the defendant at the time the promise was made. Indeed it is difficult to read that count, either by itself or in connection with the other counts, without feeling that the pleader studiously avoided alleging anything as to that intent. While the evidence as to the promised use and the actual use of this money may have been admissible upon the second count, the object of which *279 was to recover damages for breach of the promise, it was not material upon the third count, even upon the question of damages, for the reasons above stated.

It is further contended by the plaintiff that the instructions given by the judge ignored the suppression by the defendant of the fact that a large portion of its capital stock had been used to secure the debt of the old corporation. The short answer to this is that this is not the fraud set out in the count, except so far as involved in the representations actually set out, and so far as involved with them the jury under the instructions were allowed to consider it. The result is that we see no error in the manner with which the court dealt with the requests, or in the instructions given.

As the question concerning the exclusion of the evidence of the amount for which the defendant’s property was finally sold is not argued, we consider it waived.

Exceptions overruled.