McDonald v. State

Prosecution against Unlicensed Railroad Engineer. 1. Constitutionality of statute requiring examination and license of railruad engineers. — The act approved February 28th, 1887, requiring railroad engineers to be examined and licensed by a board appointed by the Governor, and making it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or hard labor for the county, one or both, for any engineer to operate an engine on any railroad without having been examined and duly licensed (Sess. Acts 1886-7, pp. 100-2), is amere internal police regulation, and not an unauthorized interference with inter-state commerce, though incidentally affecting that commerce; uor is it objectionable on constitutional grounds, either as conferring judicial powers on the board of examiners, or as depriving the citizen of any natural right without due process of law.

Appeal from the City Court of Montgomery. Tried before the Hon. Tejos. M. Arrington. The appellant, Lorenzo -D. McDonald, was prosecuted for, and found guilty of, a violation of the act entitled “An act to require locomotive engineers in this State to be examined and licensed by a board to be appointed by the Governor for that purpose,” approved Feb. 28, 1887.- — Acts of 1886-7, p. 100. The first section of the act provides, “that it shall be unlawful for the engineer of any railroad train in this State to drive or operate or engineer any train of cars or engine upon the main line or road-bed of any railroad in this State which is used for the transportation of persons, passengers or freight, without first undergoing an examination and obtaining a license as hereinafter provided.” The subsequent sections of the act provide for the appointment by the Governor of five skilled mechanics as a board of examiners, to examine such engineers “in practical mechanics and concerning their knowledge of operating a locomotive and their competency as engineers,” and if found competent, to license such engineers on payment of a fee of $5; and in addition to the examination, it is further made the duty of the board of examiners, “ before issuing the license, to inquire into the character and habits of ail engineers applying for license;” and to issue no license “if the applicant is found to be of reckless or intemperate habits.” It is further provided, “that any engineer, who, after procuring a license as required in this act, shall at any time be guilty of any act of recklessness, carelessness or negligence, while running an engine, by which any damage to persons or property is done; or who shall within six hours before, or during the time he is engaged in running an engine, be in a state of intoxication, shall forfeit his license, with all the rights and privileges acquired by it, indefinitely or for a stated period, as the board of examiners may determine after notifying such engineer to appear before the board and inquiring into his act or conduct;” and that “itshall be the duty of the board to determine whether the engineer is unfit or incompetent by reason of any act, or habit unknown at the time of his examination, or acquired or formed subsequent to it, and if it is made to appear that he is unfit or incompetent from any cause, the board shall revoke or cancel his.license, and shall notify every railroad in this State of the action of the board.” The penalty for a violation of the provisions of the act, is a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, and the offender may, also, be sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than six months. It was proven that the appellant had never applied for or obtained a license as required by this act, and that he operated an engine and'train, which was a through train, for the transportation of freight from Atlanta, Ga., to Montgomery, Ala., and for points beyond on the Western Railway of Alabama, a railroad in this State from .West Point to Montgomery, and that this railroad was operated under one management with the Atlanta and West Point railroad in the State of Georgia, and these two roads formed a continuous line from Montgomery, Ala., to Atlanta, Ga., for the transportation of freight and passengers and the United States mail. contended that the act was unconstitutional, because, first, it was a regulation of interstate commerce; and, second, it conferred judicial power on the board appointed by the Governor and deprived the citizen of his liberty and property, without due process of law. The following authorities cited and discussed : State. Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 282, 276, 279, 280; Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 ; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 282; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 493; Wabash, dec. R’y Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Picleard v. Pullman, dec. Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; R. R. Co. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Fargo v. Stevens, U. S. S. G, April 4, 1887; 1 Kent Com. 389, 391; 95 U. S. 485 ; 15 Wall. 557. in addition to the above propositions, urged the following : “ 1. The act makes an unauthorized delegation of legislative power. It does not prescribe any rule of conduct — -does not define or determine, with any certainty, any qualification; but leaves it in the arbitrary discretion of each examiner to erect his own standard of qualification, and then to judge of the fitness of applicants, according to the standard which the examiner and not the law prescribes. These qualifications may vary with each examiner; and the statute furnishes no certain rule by which any tribunal on earth can determine whether an applicant is entitled to a license— even when the facts as to the extent of his knowledge are undisputed. The act, § 2, provides for examination by two or more members of the board, and then by proAÚso to § 6, that “ any one of the said board may license ? &c. All that the act says about qualification, even by implication, is that the engineer “ shall be examined ” in practical mechanics, and concerning his hioivledge of operating a locomotive engine, and his competencig as an engineer.” What quantum' of knowledge is requisite in “ practical mechanics ? ” The term takes in a very wide range in the domain of science. We suppose the term here used means “the practical application of the laws of matter and motion to the construction of machines — mechanical construction or labor.” This is one of the definitions we find in the dictionary. Can an engineer, otherwise competent, be rejected because he was not competent to build an engine? If he knows how to build one, but is not a practical “boiler maker,” and therefore could not construct a “ boiler,” is he so deficient in “practical mechanics,” as to be uufit to be entrusted with running the engine ? If he does not know what is the best iron to be used in boilers, or for flanges of the wheels, is he to be rejected ? How far is his knowledge of the best pattern of locomotive, to be potent in rejecting the applicant ? If the practical mechanic is unskilled in chemistry, and does not know with accuracy the chemical action of different waters on the boiler, is tbat to reject him ? If he is not skilled as to the best test for ascertaining the number of pounds of pressure that the engine will carry, will that reject him ? These questions might be multiplied all through the domain of “ practical mechanics,” and the only answer, under this law, would be lodged in the breast of the individual examiner. So again, concerning his “ kuowledge of operating a locomotive engine,” and so again his competency as an engineer ? What amount of visual power is required? What age will disbar? Must the applicant have served as a fireman ? What amount of general education is requisite ? What physical powers must the engineer possess ? If he has lost some of his fingers, will that disqualify him? Is a man with one good eye competent? Throughout all the numerous conditions or qualifications prescribed, the law lays down no rule. Every one may be determined by each examiner according to his own discretion. The law furnishes no rule to guide him. There may be as many different rules as there are examiners ; and each examiner may change his rulings as often as he pleases; and each may differ from the other. There is no appeal to any tribunal; and no way to revise an erroneous judgment of the examiners.” — Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.