Learned v. Bellows

In an action of trespass, de bonis, sued at the county court, where the ad - domnum exceeds one hundred dollars, and the county court refuse to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, the value of the property being less than one hundred dollars, this court have no authority to reconsider the'decision. In a case refered by agreement of parties, it is no ground of setting aside the report that the referees admitted irrelevant or illegal testimony, if it had no tendency to mislead their minds, and did not in fact mislead them. Reports of referees are not to be set aside foa^every. circumstantial error, but only where they adopt a rule of action and misapply it; and in this respect it is immaterial whether it be a rule of law or of equity or of arithmetic. A general release of all “demands, notes and accounts,” will not be construed to include a suit pending, especially when, from testimony aliunde, it is apparent such was not the intention of the parties.

This case comes here on exceptions taken to the decision of the court below, in accepting the report of referees. The action was trespass, brought originally at the county court, demanding in damages more than one hundred dollars. The referees report, that there was no testimony on the part of the plaintiff tending to show the oxen (which is all plaintiff claimed) of greater value than $53 50. The defendant moved the county court to dismiss the action. The report further shows, that defendant claimed to hold the oxen by virtue of certain executions, as the property of one Joseph Learned, the defendant being a legal officer and having levied the executions upon the oxen. The defendant having given'in evidence certain admissions of plaintiff tending to show, that the oxen belonged to Alanson Learned, a son of Joseph Learned, and not to plaintiff. The referees permitted plaintiff to show that, at other times and places, he had made declarations directly the reverse, these declarations not being accompanied witli any act of plaintiff. The referees further report, that during the pendency of this suit, plaintiff and defendant executed to each other mutual receipts, of which plaintiff's to defendant, the following is a copy : . “Received of James Bellows ten dollars, which is in fnll of all “ demands, notes and accounts, up to this date. (Signed) FRANKLIN LEARNED.” “Fairfax, August 14, 1834.” The referees add, that “in all things they intended to decide according to law.” The report was in favor of plaintiff and accepted by the county court, and the motion to dismiss the action for .want of jurisdiction overruled. — Although referees are not bound to follow the law, yet, if they attempt to decide according to law and err, their decision will be corrected by the court. — Johns vs. Stevens et al. 3 Vt. Rep. 303, and a case then cited by Ch. J. “When from, the writ the court prima facie has jurisdiction, but from the plaintiff’s own showing, it appears on the trial that his debt or demand is not sufficient in amount to give the court jurisdistion,. the course is to dismiss the action on motion. Such has always been the practice,, and if it did not prevail, it would be in the power of the plaintiff to give the court jurisdiction in evasion of the statute, in any case, by merely declaring for or demanding a sum exceeding one hundred dollars.” — Southwick et al. vs. ■Merrill, 3 Vt. Rep. 320. But it is , said in the same case, that “in actions of tort, when the damages are uncertain and rest in the' decision of the jury, the damages demanded must be the criterion of jurisdiction. But how are the words, “uncertaim, damages” and “-jurys’ discretion,” • to be understood ? , There must be some limit to such phrases. • Fór a trifling trespass, inadvertantly committed, an action might be sustained; but for such, w.hen the actual damage does not exceed a few shillings, or at most a dollar, would a jury be justified in giving more than a hundred dollars ? I think not. Neither do I think a jury would do it; and if a jury would not, can it it be competent for courts to set up a jurisdiction which no honest and rational jury can .follow out, or common justice sanction ? All- that was meant, then, by. the above expression of the court in the case cited, was, that when it was uncertain, whether a sound discretion might not say, the damages were a little less or a little more than a hundred dollars, the court would nof be quibbled out of their jurisdiction. In cases like the present, there is but little uncertainty as to the amount of damages, the statute declaring that no more than actual damages shall be recovered; and the case shows that the oxen were a middling or an ordinary pair, and no witness calculated them higher than fifty-three dollars. 2. It appears from the report, that the plaintiff was permitted to show his own declarations unaccompanied by his acts, and not made in the presence of the adverse party, nor at the times spoken of by the defendant’s witness. It does not require an argument to show the absurdity, of such a doctrine. 3. It is insisted, that the receipt being in full of all demands, discharges the suit; for in Swift’s Dig. Vol. 1, p. 300, it is said, that “the word demand is of the most extenáive import, and a release of all demands discharges all manner of actions, real, personal, and mixed, rights and titles, conditions before or after breach, Executions, Covenants and Contracts.” And again, p. 301 it is said that “when the parties intend to settle every matter between them, the release should use the words, all demands: if it is not intended to be a general release, it should comprehend only the particular matter to be discharged.” If all claims except a particular one are to be discharged, the release may be general with the exception of the matter not meant to be discharged. — Three exceptions are taken to the Referees Report filed in this case. ]. That the County Court had not original jurisdiction of this cause. 2. That the Referees permitted the plaintiff to prove his own declarations, unaccompanied by his acts, and'not made in the presence of the other party. 3. That the receipt referred to in the report, operated to discharge the suit. 1. As to the first exception, it is sufficient to say, that the question of jurisdiction, cannot be made to depend upon the amount of damages recovered. In all cases of uncertain damages, if the sum found in damages, be within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, the County Court is not thereby ousted of jurisdiction. Gale vs. Bongea. 1 Chip. Rep. 208. 2. There does not sufficient appear in the Report on which to ground this exception. 1. It does not appear' that the testimony admitted by the referees had any possible bearing, or connexion, in the trial of the case, or that the referees were in any degree influenced by it. 2. Referees are not bound by the same strictness of rules, in regard to the admission of testimony, that the courts of law are. 3. The Report does not show any thing from which the Court can determine that another hearing would avail' the defendant, or that the triers would not probably come to the same result, without that testimony or that any injustice has been done. As to the last ground of exception to the Report we are unable to discover, what the Court have to do with it, until it is properly placed upon record by plea. But suppose the question arising upon the receipt tobe properly presented. It has no reference to this suit. In the first place James Bellows has no interest in the subject matter of this suit, except what results from being nominal defendant on the record. Beeman is the party in interest. Hence it is not to be supposed the parties to the receipt, had this suit in view at the time of its execution. Again, the words all demands, are limited in their operation, by the words notes and Book Accounts, which serve to show what was intended in their settlement. It appears also that they executed mutual receipts of the same description, which shows that they had mutual claims against each other, different from the present suit, and the legal presumption is, that these only were intended to be embraced in the settlement, and covered by the the receipt.