Holden Taft & Co. v. Pike

Where an adult hired a minor to work for him by the month, and the minor labored a given time and received of the adult certain articles of property on account of his labor,'it was held that the minor could not retain the property so received, and recover the full value of his services. In such case the articles received by the minor should be allowed against him for what they are reasonably worth, without regard to the contract of the minor. Interest, on an account, not allowed against a minor.

This was au action of book account, in which judgment .o account was rendered in the county court, and an auditor appointed, who afterwards reported as follows:— ‘ The plaintiffs’ account is allowed at the sum of one hun1 dred forty-one dollars and thirty cents, and the defendant’s ‘ at the sum of one hundred dollars and fifty-five cents, which ' leaves a balance of forty dollars and seventy-five cents due £ from the defendant to the plaintiffs to balance book ac-c counts between them ; subject to the opinion of the court £ upon the following facts : £ On the 20th day of March, 1839, the defendant, a minor, £ having neither father nor guardian, being at the time in the c seventeenth year of his age, entered into the service of the £ plaintiffs as a pedlar,for an indefinite period; and the plaintiffs ‘ agreed to pay the defendant, for himself and team, ten dollars per month; and, on the 4th day of July following, ‘ raised the defendant’s wages to twelve dollars per month. £ The defendant continued in the service of the plaintiffs ‘ until the 24th day of November, making in all eight months ‘and four days. ‘ Sundry items in the plaintiffs’ account were allowed at ‘ $45.29, inclusive of interest, which were delivered by thp ‘ plaintiffs to defendant with an express agreement that they ‘ were to apply in payment of defendant’s wages on settle- ‘ ment, and were charged on book with defendant’s assent. ‘ The remaining items charged in the plaintiffs’ account ‘ were delivered from time to time by the plaintiffs, and re- ‘ ceived by the defendant, with the expectation ,and under- ‘ standing that they were to apply in payment of defendant’s ‘ wages, but there was no express agreement between the ‘ parties to that effect. The plaintiffs delivered defendant, ‘ during the time he continued in their service, necessaries ‘ to the amount of $39.19, inclusive of interest. ‘ The defendant received from the plaintiffs, previous to ‘ October 5, 1839, enough to pay him for his services during ‘ the whole time. ‘ Subsequently to the 5th day of October, 1839, the plain- ‘ tiffs delivered to defendant necessaries to the amount of $15.86, including interest thereon. ‘ It did not appear that the defendant had offered to return ‘ any portion of the property received of the plaintiffs either ‘ before or after the commencement of this suit.’ The county court decided that, from the facts reported, the defendant was entitled to recover the amount of his account, deducting, therefrom only the charges in the plaintiffs’ account for necessaries, and rendered judgment for the defendant to recover the balance due to him after making such deduction. The plaintiffs excepted. The auditor finds the fact that all of the items in the plaintiffs’ account were delivered to the defendant with the understanding of both parties that they were to apply in payment of defendant’s wages. Therefore it is insisted that the defendant, having purchased the property and received the full benefit of the contract, cannot avoid it on the ground of infancy, without restoring to the plaintiffs the property which he received. He ought, at least, to account for it at its actual value, as found by the auditor. 6 Mass. It. 78. Abell v. Warren, 4 Vt. R. 149. Farr v. Sumner, 12 Vt. R. 28. McCoy v. Hoffman, 8 Cowen’s R. 84. Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. R. 359. jRoofv. Stafford, 7 Cowen’s R. 179. Holmes v. Blogg, 4 Com. Law R. 189. Payment of money to an infant, on a debt, is a good discharge of the same. 1 Swift’s Dig. 56. The defendant having received, previous to the 5th of October, 1839, enough to pay him for his services during the whole time, the plaintiffs ought to recover the amount of necessaries received subsequently to that time. From the facts reported by the auditor, the question arises whether the plaintiffs can recover against the defendant for that portion of their account which is not for necessaries. It is one of the most familiar principles of law that an infant is not bound, except for necessaries. Abell v. Warren, 4 Vt. R. 149. If there was no account in offset to the plaintiff’s, there would be no pretence that the plaintiffs could recover more than $39.19. The defendant was not bound to plead his work and labor in offset to the plaintiffs’ account. The accounts are separate and independent of each other, and each must stand or fall on its own merits. Wood, adm’r, v. Barney, 2 Vt. R. 396. The plaintiffs insist that the items allowed at $45.29 should be applied in offset to the defendant’s work, as the auditor finds that it was agreed that the same should be so applied. An infant is incapable of making a contract except for necessaries. The plaintiffs cannot apply that in offset which they cannot recover in an action. The plea of infancy is as good in the one case as the other. Wood, adm’r, v. Barney, 2 Vt. R. 396. The plaintiffs insist that if the property delivered is not necessary for the infant, and they are prevented from recovering on that account; still, they can have it applied on what they owe the defendant, and that it is the duty of the court to apply the articles, not necessaries, in payment of the debt, and suffer him to recover for the balance of necessaries. If the court should take this view of the case, they would protect the rights of infants in a singular manner, and leave him at the mercy of every knave who could palm off on him property, and get payment in money or labor, and retain the same with impunity. Bent v. Manning, 10 Vt. R. 225. It was not necessary for the infant to return the property. He has not yet become of age; and if he had it would not be necessary. The cases where it is necessary to return the property are when an infant has exchanged property, and, after coming of age, seeks to avoid the contract, and recover back the property. Abell v. Warren, 4 Vt. R. 149. The infant cannot disaffirm his contract until he comes of age. Farr v. Sumner, 12 Vt. R. 28. At law, an infant is not liable for money, though expended in necessaries. Bent v. Manning, 10 Vt. R. 225. Probart v. Knouth, 2 Esp. 472. 10 Petersdorff, 543, in notes.