Fletcher v. Warren

[In Chancery.] That a judgment at law may have worked injustice between the parties is not, of itself, enough to authorize a court of equity to relieve against it. Hence it is only upon collateral grounds, which were not directly passed upon by the court of law, that a court of equity can proceed in such cases. It is therefore usual to allege and show that the party seeking relief had a just defence, either legal, or equitable, of which, through the fraud, or wrongful act, of his opponent, he was unable to avail himself in time. Mere accident, or mistake, on his own part is rather to be accounted his misfortune, than imputed as a wrong to the other party. If there be sufficient proof that the defendant, in a suit in chancery, has done some act, or pursued some course of conduct, which was designed to be, and in fact was, the inducement to the other party to delay the legal assertion of his claim, the court will deny to him the protection of the presumptive bar arising from the lapse of time.

Appeal from the court of chancery. The material allegations in the orator’s bill were, that on the 19th day of March, 1833, the orator and one Marey, who was then a partner with the orator, executed their promissory note to Darius Blake for $109,15; that, shortly after, the defendant purchased said note of Blake, and executed to Blake therefor his own note, of the same date and amount; that the orator afterwards paid to Blake the amount of said note executed by the defendant, and received the note from Blake; that about the 10th of May, 1833, the orator notified the defendant that he held said note, and informed him that he expected that the two notes would pay each other, and requested the defendant, then, or at some convenient time, to exchange said notes; that the defendant then said that the note which he held against the orator was at his house, and they could exchange the notes at some other time, and expressed no unwillingness to exchange the notes, if he had then had with him the note against the orator ; that the exchange was not then completed, and the matter was suffered to rest until the 12th day of March, 1839, when the defendant sued out a writ of attachment, upon the note which he held, against the orator as surviving partner, — the said Marcy having then deceased, —returnable to the then next term of Windsor County court, but did not cause any service of the writ to be made upon the orator until the 16th day of said May, when the statute of limitations would have run against the note, if the writ had not been previously issued, as above mentioned ; that by the terms of said notes they would both become barred by the statute upon the same day ; that the orator had since requested the defendant to allow the note, which the orator held against him, in payment of the note thus put in suit, and offered to pay the defendant’s cost in said suit, if he would do so; but that the defendant had always refused to make such exchange, and had prosecuted his said suit to effect, and obtained judgment therein against the orator for the full amount of the note and interest and cost. The orator prayed that the defendant might be decreed to discharge the said judgment, without receiving any payment thereon, except the note which the orator held against him, and for such other and farther relief in the premises as to equity might appertain. The defendant insisted, in his answer, that the judgment of the court at law was conclusive against the orator in reference to the offset of the note against the judgment and the validity of the judgment, and also insisted upon the statute of limitations as a bar to the orator’s right to claim any thing by virtue of the note which he held against the defendant. In reference to the conversation, which the orator alleged was had between the parties on the 10th of May, 1833, the defendant answered, that he believed the conversation was had in May, or June, 1834, and after the parlies had had considerable difficulty ; that he could not recollect precisely what was then said between them and therefore admitted, that, being taken by surprise, he might, on that occasion, have made some evasive reply, such as that “the note was at his house,” and that they could talk about exchanging some other time, or the like expressions, but he denied, that, without qualification, he could or did tell the orator that he either could, or would, exchange the notes at any future time. The court of chancery dismissed the.orator’s bill; from which decision the orator appealed. in support of the equity of the bill, cited Hart v. Ten Eyck et al., 2 Johns. Ch. R. 62; 1 Bac. Abr. 18 ; 1 Madd. 29, 32, 42, 64, 69, 209; Pusey. v. Deshouvrie, 3 P. Wms. 316; 1 Har. Ch. 32-34; 1 Chit. Eq. Dig. 682; Story’s Eq. PI. 372; Leigh v. Holloway, 8 Yes. 213 ; Hamilton v. Cummings, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 517 ; Clark’s Ex’rs v. Van Riemsdyk, 3 U. S. Cond. Rep. 319; Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 2 U. S. Cond. R. 518; Ex’rs of Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. R. 210 ; King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384 ; Bell et al. v. Cunningham et al., 1 Sumner’s Rep. 89; Bank v. Lewis et al., 8 Pick. 117. to the point that courts of equity-are bound by statutes of limitation, as well as courts of law, cited 1 Chit. Pract. 77-68, Cork v. Wilcock, 5 Madd. R. 331, Smith v. Bishop, 9 Vt. 110, — and, to the point that the statute may be insisted upon in an answer, as well as by plea, cited Story’s Eq. PI. 588, -§. 760, Jeremy’s Mitf. Eq. PI. 334-6, note D, 1 Atk. 494, and Dey v. Dunham, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 191.