Montague v. Richardson

The statute, which exempts from warrant, or execution,“bedding, and household furniture necessary for supporting life,” (Rev. Stat. Tit. 1. Ch. 14. §179,)isare-medial one, passed for a humane purpose, and ought to be liberally expounded, in furtherance of the benevolent objects, for which it was enacted. The term “ necessary” in such act, while it excludes superfluities and articles of luxury, was not intended to denote those articles of furniture only, which are indispensable to the bare subsistence of the debtor and his family,—but to embrace those things, which are requisite in order to enable them to live in a convenient and comfortable manner. Nor is that term confined to such articles, as were necessary, at the time when it was passed. In an action of trespass, for talcing, upon a process of attachment, household furniture, claimed by the plaintiff to be exempt from execution, the court instructed the jury that said act exempted only such articles of furniture, as are indispensably requisite for supporting the lives of the debtor’s family. Held that this construction of the term “necessary,” was too rigid, and that a new trial should be granted.

Trespass against John Richardson and Benjamin Webster, for taking and.carrying away certain articles of household furniture, the property of the plaintiif. The cause was tried before the superior court for the county of New Haven, at the term holden in October, 1855. On the trial, it was admitted that at the time when the trespasses, alleged in the declaration, were committed, Benjamiri Webster, one of the defendants, was a constable of the town of New Haven, and as such had in his possession, for service, a bill in equity, in which the defendant Richardson and others were plaintiffs, and commenced by a process of attachment, and that, with said process, he entered the dwelling-house of the plaintiff, and took and removed therefrom, the following articles of household furniture: two sofas, two mahogany tables, one cherry table, two dress-stands with glass, one writing desk with the contents, eight cushioned chairs, two divan stools, one bedstead, one Brussels carpet, two rocking chairs, one small mahogany stand, one dress stand, six cane-bottom chairs, one washstand with pitcher and bowl, six flag-bottom chairs, seven silver tea-spoons, three table-spoons, one butter knife, six mantel ornaments, two plated tea-pots, one glass pitcher, one glass lampshade, one egg shell, one lot of shells, one work basket, two tea-salvers, one bed spread, two looking-glasses, two portraits, one picture, one duster, five books, two small lamp-mats, two lamp-mats, eight table-cloths, twenty-three pieces of linens, one piece of stair carpeting, two hall carpets, one chamber carpet, one sitting-room carpet, one stove and pipe, one looking-glass, one piece of zinc. Said articles were subsequently, within a few days, released by a bond, pursuant to the statute, and said process was duly returned to court. It was proved and admitted, that the plaintiff’s house contained a keeping-room, usually occupied by the family as a sitting-room, a parlor, a kitchen, a bed room, and several chambers, all of which contained appropriate furniture, and that, at the time of said alleged trespasses, the plaintiff had in his kitchen an apparatus called a Culver’s half range, with which the cooking for the family was done; and that, in the said sitting-room, he had a stove which was then in use, and was then taken away by said Webster and said Richardson; and that, with the exception of this stove, the plaintiff had ño stove at all in his house, unless the said range was a stove, within the meaning of the statute specifying property exempt from execution. And in reference to said range the defendant introduced evidence tending to prove, and claimed that he had proved, that it was not a stove, but was merely a cooking apparatus fastened into the fire-place of the kitchen by masonry, and was not capable of giving comfortable warmth to the kitchen, and was not capable of imparting any warmth to any other part of the house ; but the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove, and claimed that he had proved, that said apparatus was not then fastened into said fire-place, but was standing out in the kitchen, and was a stove, to all intents and purposes, and was at all events, even if fastened as aforesaid, capable of being brought out, and had been frequently so brought out into the room, and when so brought out was like a cooking stove, capable of imparting warmth to the room and of being used as a stove, and was therefore a stove within the meaning of said statute. And the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove, and claimed that he had proved, that the defendant stripped the plaintiff’s house of all its furniture except a few chairs, insufficient to seat the plaintiff’s family; a small table, insufficient in size to enable all the family to sit together around it; a few knives and forks, and a few other articles of furniture; and that before and at the time of said alleged trespasses, the furniture of said house was sufficient and suitable for the plaintiff’s condition. The defendants, in committing said alleged trespasses, took a large quantity of such furniture as is, in common parlance, called necessary household furniture, and so reduced the quantity and limited the descriptions of the plaintiff’s furniture, that it would have been impossible for the plaintiff, or his family, to live without great privation and distress with so little furniture as the defendants left; and that the health of the plaintiff’s yvife and grand child was injured by the removal of said stove, and that the health of the plaintiff and his family would have been necessarily impaired by their continuing to live in the destitute condition, in which the defendants left them with respect to furniture, and that in that condition, the plaintiff and his family could not enjoy, at any time, the ordinary comforts of life. And thereupon the plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury, that, in determining what was household furniture necessary for supporting life, they were not to restrict that term to that furniture, without which a man’s existence could not be preserved, but that they must give the term a liberal interpretation, and must consider it as embracing all such furniture as would be necessary to support life in its proper condition of comfort and health, and that, in applying the term to the present case, it would be their duty to consider the age, habits of life, and condition in life of the plaintiff and of his family, and that, inasmuch as the meaning of the term would vary, in order to adapt itself to different cases, the term, when applied to persons in the condition in life in which the plaintiff claimed that he and his family were, would embrace articles of furniture which would not be embraced in the same term, when applied to persons accustomed to poverty and destitution. All these claims in relation to the household furniture were denied by the defendant, who introduced evidence tending to prove, and claimed he had proved, that there was left untouched by said attachment much more than was sufficient for the support of life, within the meaning of the statute, with sufficient chairs, tables, table furniture and chimney furniture, and other articles of household furniture more than sufficient, as he claimed to have proved, for the requirements of the statute. The plaintiff claimed that the several articles of household furniture, and the stove so taken, were exempt from execution; that the letters, books, and other articles not specified, were not liable to attachment, and that the defendants had been guilty of a wanton and unjustifiable trespass, attended with such circumstances of aggravation, as entitled the plaintiff to exemplary damages. Much evidence was also introduced by the plaintiff, for the purpose of showing that other articles had been taken, besides those specified in the return of the officer, and among them the letters, papers, and account books of the plaintiff, and that, in praying out, and procuring the service of said process, said Richardson was actuated by improper and malicious motives, and that said process was colorable, his chief design being to get possession of said letters, papers, and books of the plaintiff. Various questions^ as to the admissibility of evidence, were raised during the course of the trial, but as no opinion was expressed by the court, upon these questions, a further statement of the facts and evidence in the case is unnecessary. The court instructed the jury as follows: “ Your attention will naturally be directed in the first place, to the enquiry, whether any of the articles were exempt, by force of the statute in relation to household furniture, or by force of any of the specific exemptions of the statute. I am not aware, that any article is claimed to have been specifically exempt, except the stove. “ 1. As to the articles of household furniture. The language of the statute is, “ bedding and household furniture necessary for supporting life,” and it is a question of fact for you, whether all, or any, and which, of the articles of furniture taken, were exempt, by force of this statute. But it is proper, and I deem it my duty to make such suggestion to you in relation to the construction of the statute, as will aid you in coming to a correct conclusion. “ This statute, like all others, is to be construed according to the apparent intention of the legislature, which enacted it, gathered from the language used in connection with the subject, and purpose of the law. It is an ancient statute. The language was originally, “necessary for upholding life ;” it was modified in 1821, to “ necessary for supporting life,” but the modification does not appear to alter, essentially, the meaning. You will look first, at the language. This is general ; necessary for supporting life. It is necessary, that is, essential, indispensably requisite for supporting the lives of the family, not according to any social condition in life, nor to any social relation or intercourse with others, but necessary to support the lives of the family, as a family, irrespective of their social conditions or relations, or intercourse with others. The term “ necessaries” in law, used in other cases, where the duty of supporting a person or persons, is thrown by law, upon another, as the support of a child, or wife, or relative, has relation to the social condition of the person; but the words supporting life, in this statute, are words of limitation, and confine the exemptions to such articles as are necessary to the support of the lives of the family. I make these suggestions, because the distinction is not always drawn; and there is some confusion in the public mind, in relation to the extent of the exemption, in consequence of the failure to make the distinction. “It is proper, also, that you should look at the subject and purpose of the law. The subject is an exemption from the great cardinal rule of honesty, which the founders of the commonwealth adopted, that every man should be just, that his property should be subject to the payment of his just debts, and that these should be paid, before he should be generous to himself, or his family. The purpose was to reserve, for the use of the family, however, such articles as were necessary to sustain their lives, from regard for them; for the debtor himself might then have been immured in a prison. It is further proper, that you should look at the state of things when the law was passed,—at the fact that many articles of luxury, convenience and comfort, and necessary in a social point of view, were then unknown, that you should look at the statutes of other States, to which allusion has been made, so far as they show the general sentiment of the age, and to the cotemporaneous and continual practical construetion which has been given to the statute. The great question is not what the law ought to be in the present state of society, and of public sentiment; what may be your opinion or mine, but what was the intention of the legislators who enacted it. If it is not now in conformity to the spirit of the age, it is not our business to make it so by construction; but for the legislature to amend and alter it, and make it conform to the spirit. “ 2. As tó the stove. The law specifically exempts one stove and pipe. It is admitted that one was taken, and claimed that one was left. It is for you to say, whether the range was a stove within the spirit of the law.” The jury, having rendered a verdict of fifty dollars damages againstthe defendant, Richardson, the plaintiff moved for a new trial.