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Cook v. Catlin

Cook and wife v. Catlin and others

Cook v. Catlin, 25 Conn. 387 (1856)
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Court
Supreme Court of Connecticut · State Highest Courts
Decided
October 15, 1856
Judges
Hinman
Citations
25 Conn. 387
Headnotes
A testator, possessed only of personal property, bequeathed the residuum of his estate to his heirs. At the time of the execution of the will, and of his death, the only persons standing in that relation to him were the children of deceased brothers and sisters, and the representatives of such children. Held, that the nephews and nieces, under this bequest, took per stirpes, and not per capita. In England, and in most of our sister states, under their statutes of distribution, nephews and nieces thus situated, take per capita, as next of kin in equal degree; but in this state, an early decision, giving a construction to our statute, and a long practice under it, have established a different rule.
Summary
This was an appeal by Randall Cook and Eliza his wife, from decrees of the court of probate for the district of Litchfield, ordering a distribution of the estate of Abel Catlin, and accepting a distribution made under such order. The facts were found by the superior court at its session for the county of Litchfield, in September, 1856, and the case reserved for the advice of this court. Abel Catlin died, testate, in January, 1856, leaving no heirs except the children of deceased brothers and sisters, and the representatives of such children. The will was executed on the 3d day of June, 1853, at which time the last survivor of his brothers and sisters had been dead more than ten years. By this will he gave one-half his property to his widow, certain legacies, amounting in all to $>4,421, to certain of his nephews and nieces, and the remainder of his estate to his heirs; the language used by him in the last bequest being, “ The remainder of my estate I give to my heirs.” The whole question in the case was whether the nephews and nieces, under this clause of the will, took per stirpes or per capita. The distribution, under the order of the court of probate, had been made, as to them, per capita. The said Eliza Cook was the only child of Truman Catlin, the brother of the testator. By the distribution as made, her distributive share was but one-fifteenth of the residuum. If she took per stirpem, she was entitled to one-fourth. The whole estate, at the time of the execution of the will, and at the decease of the testator, consisted of personal property.

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Opinion of the Court — Hinman

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Hinman, J.

The testator by his will, after disposing of the bulk of his estate in making provision for his widow, and *391 in legacies to nephews and nieces, and others, gave the remainder to his heirs in these words : “ The remainder I give to my heirs, excepting, however, that part of said remainder intended for Eliza Cook and Mary M Call, I give and bequeath to Cyrus Catlin and Guy Catlin, in trust for the sole and separate use of said Eliza and Mary, during their respective lives, and then to be paid to their heirs at law.”

The testator’s only heirs were his nephews and nieces and their representatives, being the children and grandchildren of his three deceased brothers, and of a sister also deceased ; and the question is whether the nephews and nieces take equal shares per capita, or whether they take, by right of representation, the share a brother or sister of the deceased, whose children they are, and whom they therefore represent, would take if living.

There is no doubt that in England, and probably in most of the states, under their statutes of distribution, nephews and nieces thus situated, as next of kin, would all take equally per capita, being all in equal degree of relationship to the deceased. 2 W’ms on Ex., 1080, 1081. 1 Sw. Big., 115.

But as our statute of distributions provides, in case there are no children or any legal representatives of them, that the residue of the estate not given to the wife, “ shall be distributed and set off equally to the brothers and sisters of the intestate, of the whole blood, and those who legally represent them and it is only after the failure of any representatives of brothers and sisters, of the whole or half blood, and where there are no parents to take, that the estate is given to the next of kin, in equal degree, it has been supposed that the legislature did not intend that nephews and nieces should, in any case, or under any circumstances, take as next of kin, but should take as representatives of their parents; and accordingly, as early as 1786, the superior court, in the case of Kenedy v. Kenedy, cited in 1 Sw. Dig., 115, and more fully reported in 1 Sw. Syst., 286, which is a case in all respects like this, decided that brothers’ and sisters’ children represent their parents, and take per stirpes the share their parents would take if living ; thus making the shares of the *392 nephews and nieces to vary according to the number of children of each brother or sister. And Judge Swift remarks that as the statute on the subject has been repeatedly revised without making any alteration since that decision, it' must be considered that this construction has received the sanction of the legislature. He also says, in his System, (vol. i., p. 288,) that “ the decision of our courts is as correct as that of the English courts, and a more just and equitable construction of the statute.” However this may be, it certainly ought to require the strongest reasons for disturbing an ancient decision, under which estates have been settled and distributed for so long a period. We are not satisfied that any such reasons exist; and we therefore advise the superior court to reverse the decrees of probate appealed from.

In this opinion Storrs, J. concurred. Waite, C. J., was absent.

Decrees of probate to be reversed.

How later courts describe this case

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Cited by 13 cases

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1860–1861: 11878–1879: 11886–1887: 11888–1889: 11892–1893: 11896–1897: 21898–1899: 11916–1917: 11922–1923: 21932–1933: 11992–1993: 118602026peak 1896 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Winthrop142 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1923)
  2. Woodward v. James22 N.E. 150 (N.Y. 1889)
  3. Jackson v. Alsop34 A. 1106 (Conn. 1896)
  4. Johnson v. Bodine79 N.W. 348 (Iowa 1899)
  5. Ruggles v. Randall38 A. 885 (Conn. 1897)
  6. Raymond v. Hillhouse45 Conn. 467 (1878)

Most recent

  1. Citytrust v. Farmer, No. Cv90 269875 (Oct. 19, 1992)1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 9480 (1992)
  2. Daniels v. Daniels161 A. 94 (Conn. 1932)
  3. New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Winthrop142 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1923)
  4. Stamford Trust Co. v. Lockwood119 A. 218 (Conn. 1922)
  5. Harvey v. Johnson71 So. 824 (Miss. 1916)
  6. Johnson v. Bodine79 N.W. 348 (Iowa 1899)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

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