TaiLexi AI U.S. Case Law

Treat v. Jones

William Treat v. Joseph S. Jones

Treat v. Jones, 28 Conn. 334 (1859)
Download
Format
Include

Star paging (*137) is kept for pin cites.

Court
Supreme Court of Connecticut · State Highest Courts
Decided
April 15, 1859
Judges
Sanforb
Citations
28 Conn. 334
Cited by 7
Headnotes
The plaintiff, a counsellor at law, instigated the defendant with others to engage in a riot, and promised to defend them if they were prosecuted. The defendant was prosecuted, and employed the plaintiff to defend him. The plaintiff afterwards sued him for his services and disbursements in defending him. Held that he could not recover. If there bad been nothing unlawful in the acts of the defendant, yet the plaintiff could not recover, as his services were rendered upon consideration of the performance of those acts, and in fulfillment of his promise to render them if the acts were performed. But, aside from this view, the unlawfulness of the acts which the plaintiff procured the defendant to perform, vitiated the whole contract between the parties, and on grounds of public policy the plaintiff ought not to be allowed to recover.
Summary
*Book debt. The plaintiff was a counsellor at [ *335 ] law, and brought the suit to recover for professional fees and disbursements. The case, was referred to an auditor, who found that the defendant employed the plaintiff to defend him in certain public prosecutions and that the services were rendered and money paid by the plaintiff in so defending him ; and found that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff’ in the sum off $48, if the plaintiff was entitled to recover anything. But the auditor further found that, shortly before the prosecutions referred to, the defendant with sundry others was engaged in a riot, and that the plaintiff was one of the instigators of the riot and encouraged the defendant and others to take part in it, by promising to defend them, by urging them on, and by shouting and swingeing his hat; and that the account of the plaintiff was wholly for services rendered and money paid by him for the defendant, in prosecutions against the defendant for the riot. Upon these facts the auditor submitted the question as one of law to the court, whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The superior court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brought the case before this court by motion in error.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Sanforb

Text extracted by OCR from a scanned original; check the original for exact wording.

Sanforb, J.

The plaintiff, then an attorney and counsellor at law, being one of the instigators arid promoters of á riot, encouraged the defendant to take part in it, by urging him on, and by promising to defend him. The defendant was prosecuted for that riot, and the plaintiff, being employed by him as his counsel, made the promised defense, and, for his expenses and professional services in the making of that defense, he seeks to recover in this suit. No principle of law or justice warrants such recovery. '

It is true, as the plaintiff contends, that the plaintiff’s promise to defend could not have been enforced1 by suit. The'considation for it was illegal, and “ ex turpi causa non oritur actio.” But, having been performed, the law will not aid him to recover compensation for it. In such a case the law leaves the parties where it finds them. ...

*276 Had the entire transaction been a legal one, it would be unjust to compel the defendant to pay this demand. He paid the stipulated compensation for this defense before it was made, and no matter whether that compensation was adequate or inadequate, beneficial to the plaintiff or otherwise, he ought not to be required to pay it again.

But there are vital principles of public policy which [ *338 ] forbid *the court to lend its aid for the enforcement of a claim like this. The object of all law is to repress vice, preserve the peace, and promote the general welfare of the state and of society, and no individual has any right to its assistance in enforcing a demand origináting in a violation on his part of its principles or enactments.”

It is indeed found by the auditor, that the defendant employed the plaintiff as his counsel to defend him, (whether before or after the riot, does not appear,) but it is not found that, upon such employment or retainer, the defendant undertook to make the plaintiff any compensation, other than the riotous services which had been already rendered at the plaintiff’s instigation. We can not presume that the employment was any other than that originally provided for, or the defense made by the plaintiff, any other than that which he had promised. The fair import of the whole finding is, that to induce the defendant to engage in the riot, the plaintiff promised to defend him against the expected prosecutions, and that, when the prosecutions came, the defendant requested the plaintiff to perform his promise, and he did so. The plaintiff can not now repudiate his promise and compel the defendant to make him further compensation. It would be a reproach to the law, if its courts could be made the instrument of enforcing a claim like this.

It is claimed that the plaintiff is not seeking to enforce an illegal contract, because the auditor finds that “ the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as his counsel,” &c. But he is seeking to enforce a contract which originated in his own illegal instigation to the commission of a crime, without which instigation that crime might not have been committed, and so no occasion for the plaintiff’s services have arisen.

The contract on which the recovery is claimed was incurably vitiated in its origin by the plaintiff’s illegal conduct in relation to it, and the groundlessness of the plaintiff’s claim is equalled only by his effrontery in bringing it to the notice of

[ *339 ] *the court. . The judgment of the superior court must be reversed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Judgment reversed.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

Cited by 7 cases

View all citing references →
1876–1877: 11888–1889: 11894–1895: 11910–1911: 11932–1933: 11936–1937: 11940–1941: 118762026peak 1876 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Vaszauskas v. Vaszauskas161 A. 856 (Conn. 1932)
  2. Snyder v. Willey33 Mich. 483 (1876)
  3. Bowman v. Phillips41 Kan. 364 (1889)
  4. Case v. Smith31 L.R.A. 282 (Mich. 1895)
  5. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Janowitz23 A.2d 514 (Conn. 1941)
  6. McKenzie v. Lynch133 N.W. 490 (Mich. 1911)

Most recent

  1. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Janowitz23 A.2d 514 (Conn. 1941)
  2. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Escoe1937 OK 81, 64 P.2d 855
  3. Vaszauskas v. Vaszauskas161 A. 856 (Conn. 1932)
  4. McKenzie v. Lynch133 N.W. 490 (Mich. 1911)
  5. Case v. Smith31 L.R.A. 282 (Mich. 1895)
  6. Bowman v. Phillips41 Kan. 364 (1889)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

No citations to other opinions in this database were found.

Keyboard shortcuts

/Focus the search box
j kNext / previous result
EnterOpen the selected result
xAdd / remove the selected result from the download list
n pNext / previous search term in a case
cCopy the citation of the current case
+ −Larger / smaller reading text
?Show this list